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Farms, Their Environmental Harms,
and Environmental Law
J.B. Ruhl*

Farms are one of the last unchartedfrontiers of environmental
regulation in the United States. Despite the substantial
environmental harms they cause- habitat loss and degradation,
soil erosion and sedimentation, water resources depletion, soil
and water salinization, agrochemical releases, animal wastes,
nonpoint source water pollution, and airpollution- environmental
law has given them a virtual license to do so. When combined, the
active and passive safe harbors farms enjoy in most
environmental laws amount to an "anti-law"thatfinds no rational
basis given the magnitude of harms farms cause. This Article
comprehensively documents the environmental harmsfarms cause
and the safe harbors they enjoy in environmental law, then
argues for a core federal statute that blends regulation,
information, tax, incentive, and trading instruments to address
several of the major sources of harm. This Article shows that
conventional prescriptive regulation simply will not effectively fit
the geographic,economic and political demographics offarms, but
that the proposed blend of instruments could achieve significant
gains in farming's environmental performance without excessive
administrativeor compliance complexities and costs.
Copyright © 2000 by The Regents of the University of California
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee,
Florida. Early versions of this Article were presented at workshops sponsored by the
Stanford Law School's Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Center and the
staff of the United States Senate Committee on the Environment, and the fimal
product has benefited greatly from observations the workshop attendees provided. I
am also thankful in particular to Buzz Thompson for the extensive and insightful
comments he offered on several versions of the Article, and to Meg Caldwell, John
Dernbach, Bob Ferris, Shi-Ling Hsu, Ann Klee, Chris Lant, Caryn Nadenbush, Jim
Salzman, and Bill Snape for the additional help they provided. Karleen O'Connor,
George Washington University Law School Class of 2000, provided valuable research
and editorial assistance, and the Florida State University provided a generous
research stipend that allowed completion of the Article. Of course, all mistakes and
opinions are mine. Please direct questions and comments to jruhl@law.fsu.edu.
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INTRODUCTION

Farms and farming are intrinsically linked with human
civilization, and have had a dramatic impact on our planet's
systems. I Environmental
landscape
and
environmental
regulation in the United States, though young when compared to
other fields of law, is a highly developed body of law.
Unfortunately, a wide chasm exists between these two social
endeavors- farms are virtually unregulated by the expansive
body of environmental law that has developed in the United
States in the past 30 years. Yet the absence of an environmental
regulation program for farms presents us with the opportunity to
create one from scratch. The time for taking advantage of that

1. See A.M. MANNION, AGRiCULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 227 (1995)
("Agriculture, to state the obvious, has had a profound influence on the Earth's
surface and the processes that operate thereon. There are few parts of the globe that
remain unaffected by agriculture."); P.A. Matson et al., AgriculturalIntensification and
Ecosystem Properties, 277 SCI. 504, 504 (1997) ("Expansion of agricultural land is
widely recognized as one of the most significant human alterations to the global
environment."); Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth's Ecosystems,

277 SC. 494, 494 (1997) ('The use of land to produce goods and services represents
the most substantial human alteration of the Earth system.").
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opportunity is long overdue.
To acknowledge that farms pollute and degrade the
environment should neither indict farming as a way of life nor
denigrate the ideals farmers hold. Farming in America is a
deeply-rooted cultural institution with many noble qualities and
important economic and social benefits, but it is also an industry
with much in common with other industries, their owners, and
their
workers.
Acknowledging
that
industries
cause
environmental damage has not generally been regarded as an
attack on the people or the institutions involved. Nor should it be
so for farms. The plain truth Is that farms pollute ground water,
surface water, air, and soils; they destroy open space and wildlife
habitat; they erode soils and contribute to sedimentation of lakes
and rivers; they deplete water resources; and they often simply
smell bad. These effects are and always have been consequences
of farming in general.' What is amazing is that these
consequences have escaped serious regulatory attention even
through the recent decades of environmental awakening. The
organic farming 3 and sustainable agriculture 4 movements that
2. Farming has caused widespread environmental degradation for centuries.
For example, the January 1849 Scientific American included a report of the practice,
common in England at the time, of steeping wheat in an arsenic solution before
sowing it to prevent loss of the crop to worms and birds. Although successful in
achieving its intended agricultural purpose, the magazine condemned the practice for
the adverse effect it had on partridges and pheasants, concluding "we can afford to
feed both men and birds." See 50, 100, and 150 Years Ago-Biocides for Agriculture,
Sci. AM., Jan. 1999, at 14. Six thousand years ago, Sumerian irrigation practices
salinized water and soils to the point of inhibiting food production, a factor many
historians believe contributed to the decline of the Sumerian culture. See Mohamed
T. E1-Ashry et al., Salinity Pollution From Irrigated Agriculture, 40 J. SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION 48, 48 (1985). For comprehensive histories of agriculture from the
perspectives of its effects on the environment and vice versa since the dawn of
agriculture, see generally MANNION, supra note 1, at 31-226 and DANIEL E. VASEY, AN
ECOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE, 10,000 B.C.-A.D. 10,000 (1992).
3. In the midst of some uncertainty as to what organic farming is, Congress
passed the Organic Foods Production Act as part of the 1990 Farm Bill to require the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), with the assistance of a newlycreated National Organic Standards Board, to promulgate national standards for
marketed organic foods. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6522 (1994); see also Kenneth C.
Amaditz, The Organic Foods ProductionAct of 1990 and Its Impending Regulations:A
Big Zero for Organic Foods?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 537 (1997). USDA proposed
standards in 1997, see Dep't of Agric., Proposed Rules, National Organic Program, 62
Fed. Reg. 65,850 (1997) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205), on which it has received
over 300,000 comments claiming the standards were contrary to the Board's
recommendations and at odds with the organic farming industry's goals. Information
about organic farming and the standards, including USDA's proposed rule and all the
comments, is available at Agric. Marketing Serv., USDA, National Organic Program
Home Page (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop>. Although USDA
has announced it will make substantial revisions to the rules based on the
comments, several organic farming and food protection advocacy groups have
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are gaining momentum from within the farming community may
be steps in the right direction, but they are not panaceas. At best
these steps should be taken in addition to, rather than in lieu of,
an effort to rein in the environmental impact of farms through a
concerted, comprehensive regulatory framework.
To be more accurate, it is not entirely true to say that
environmental law has never addressed farming or that farms
have wreaked environmental damage unbeknownst to the
political institutions that generate such laws. Rather, Congress
has actively prevented their intersection through a nearly
unbroken series of decisions to exclude farms and farming from
the burdens of federal environmental law, with states mainly
following suit.' Congress has erected what I will call a vast "antilaw" of farms and the environment. While federal, state, and
organized continuing campaigns against USDA's proposals. See International Center
Apr.
6,
1999)
Organic Watch
(visited
for Technology
Assessment,
<http://www.icta.org/projects/cfs/orgwtch.htm>; Campaign for Food Safety, Save
Organic Standards (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://www.purefood.org/organlink.htm>.
Whatever the outcome of USDA's rules, at present organic farming represents a small
proportion of the total farm economy- total retail sales of what are marketed as
organically grown foods rose to just over $3.5 billion in 1996. See Is Organic Better?,
NEWSwEEK, June 1, 1998, at 55.
4. The sustainable agriculture movement focuses on ways to promote natural
resource stewardship in agriculture while still maintaining the economic profitability
of farms and the social vitality of farming communities. See James Stephen
Carpenter, Farm Chemicals, Soil Erosion, and Sustainable Agriculture, 13 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 190, 220-43 (1994); Neil D. Hamilton, Sustainable Agriculture: The Role of the
Attorney, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,021 (1990); Robert Myers et al.,
Developing an EnduringAmerican Agriculture, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 110 (1997);
see also VERNON W. RUTAN ED., AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH: SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1994) (overview of sustainable agriculture
movement). Some commentators have described the sustainable agriculture
movement as part of a larger "New Agriculture" movement through which a "network
of farmers, consumers, educators, community activists, food marketers, and chefs
are combining to offer alternatives to [farm] industrialization," Neil D. Hamilton,
Greening Our Garden:Public Policies to Support the New Agriculture, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 357, 358 (1997), while others have expressed the concern that the sustainable
agriculture movement may play into continued efforts by farming interests to project
the "agroecological opium" that farms are environmentally benign, or even have the
potential to be environmentally beneficial, thereby making the case to keep
environmental regulation of farms an adjunct to overall farm support policies. See
Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmentalfrom Economic Objectives
in AgriculturalRegulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 337 (1995).
5. See John Davidson, Conservation Agriculture: An Old New Idea, 9 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 20, 20 (1995) (noting that "nearly every major federal
environmental statute exempts production agriculture"). As pointed out in this
Article, in recent years some states have begun to move ahead of the federal
government in environmental regulation of agriculture on certain fronts. See William
L. Oemichen, State Government Service to the Agriculture of Tomorrow, 2 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 247 (1997). Even taken together, however, these state efforts by no means
reverse the basic theme of safe harbor for farming in environmental law.
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local governments have been busy addressing most other forms
and sources of environmental degradation, farms remain largely
unburdened by environmental law, 6 yet move steadily up the
ranks of the worst threats to the environment. Today, farms
stand at or very near the top of that list in many categories of
environmental degradation.7
6. As one leading agriculture law scholar has put it, whereas many sectors of
the economy are exploring "next generation" environmental policy, "agriculture is
different. It never had coherent first-generation environmental protection programs."
C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection from Farm to Market, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NExT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 200, 200 (Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997). Runge points out that even after 30 years of
modem statutory environmental law, "[N]o significant environmental controls have
been placed on farm practices even where agricultural activities are a primary cause
of pollution problems." Id. at 201; see also Chen, supra note 4, at 350-51 ("Unlike
agriculture, which enjoys environmental exemptions both explicit and implicit,
virtually every other industry in the United States must face a comprehensive battery
of environmental obligations."); Davidson, supra note 5, at 20 ("In contrast to the
national response to other environmental problems.., the response by lawmakers to
agricultural pollution has been cautious and exploratory."); Margaret Rosso
Grossman, Agriculture and the Environment in the United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L.
291, 293 (1994) ("Despite the serious effects of agricultural pollution, little direct
environmental regulation of fanning practices has occurred, and some federal farm
policies have encouraged environmentally harmful practices."); J.W. Looney, The
Changing Focus of Government Regulation of Agriculture in the United States, 44
MERCER L. REV. 763, 771 (1993) ('The least pervasive area of agricultural regulation
is at the farm level.'). For background on the law of farms and the environmentwhat little there is of it- see K. Jack Haugrud, Agriculture, in SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 451-574 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993) (environmental
law treatise chapter covering agriculture); Symposium, Agriculture and Forestry in a
Changing World. 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1995). See also Sally J. Kelley et al.,
Agricultural Law: A Selected Bibliography, October 1992-December 1995, 61 Mo. L.
REV. 877, 909-33 (1996) (covering books and articles on agriculture and wetlands,
land use, water rights, water quality, pesticides and herbicides, sustainable
agriculture, and soil conservation). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
maintains the "Ag Center," an internet site devoted to assisting the agricultural
community in understanding and complying with environmental laws. See National
Agric. Compliance Assistance Ctr., Agric. and Ecosystems Div., Office of Compliance,
U.S.
EPA,
About
the
Ag
Center
(visited
Apr.
22,
1999)
<http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ag/about.html>. By accessing the "Laws and Policies"
portion of the site, visitors can obtain what EPA claims are plain-English descriptions
of how environmental laws apply to farming and links to related sites.
7. For example, farms rank as the leading cause of water quality impairment in
our nation's lakes and rivers. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 1994 REPORT TO CONGRESS ES- 12 to ES- 19 (1994)
[hereinafter NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY]. This dubious distinction is not

limited to farms in the United States. France's Ministry of the Environment recently
presented an exhaustive analysts of the environmental consequences of French
agriculture, finding that agriculture is that nation's top water consumer, top national
emitter of nitrates, and second-highest emitter of phosphates. Environmental
problems in France associated with these and other agricultural practices include
levels of nitrates in drinking water and groundwater far beyond European Union
norms as well as growing concentrations of toxic substances in soils. See Lawrence J.
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It may be that farming has escaped attention because
"[algriculture's vintage- its sheer age as a human activityobscures its long-term effects on the environment."' But the
cumulative effects of more than 450 years of crop and livestock
farming in America are no longer obscure; if we continue to leave
farms unregulated, it is by choice, not by ignorance.
We ought not ignore the pressing need for environmental
regulation of farms simply because farming and farmers are
melded into American ideology.9 Given how distant the lay
conception of farms is from reality, ideology seems a poor reason
to favor farming in this respect. Rather, "the simple expedient of
treating agriculture like any other activity- no more virtuous or
villainous- promises to restore some semblance of allocative
efficiency and distributive justice to American farm policy." 0
With this expedient in mind, this Article outlines in detail how
farms, with the sanction of law, have dramatically degraded the
environment. One would be hard pressed to identify another
industry with as poor an environmental record and as light a
regulatory burden.
For those readers who may be unconvinced or unaware of
the impact farms have had on the environment, Part I of this
Article inventories the environmental harms that farms cause.
Unfortunately, this exercise is a necessary step because many
farm interests portray efforts to regulate farms as being premised
on "bad science" and exaggerated descriptions of the
environmental dangers that farms pose." But the reality is that
Speer, Report Blames Agriculture for Damages to Environment, Recommends EcoTaxes, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 15, 1999, at A-7. For a thorough discussion of
European policies regarding agriculture and the environment, see Margaret Rosso
Grossman, Agro-Environmental Measures in the Common Agricultural Policy, 25 U.
MEM. L. REV. 927 (1995).
8. Chen, supra note 4, at 337.
9. A leading scholar of American agricultural law sums it up best in observing
that "[mluch of the favorable regulation enacted for agriculture can be traced to the
special status of farming in American society." Grossman, supra note 6, at 293.
American ideology tends to romanticize farms, focusing on the Jeffersonian agrosociety roots of democracy, the plight of dust bowl farmers, and the peacefully bucolic
farm by the side of the road. In fact, American farms comprise one of the most
massive, self-interested, economically anti-competitive, and politically powerful
industries in our nation's history. See generally Jim Chen, The American Ideology. 48
VAND. L. REV. 809, 810-31 (1995). For a concise social and political history of farming
in America, see Haugrud, supranote 6, at 460-74.
10. Chen, supranote 9,at 875-76.
11. See, e.g., NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, FARMERS,
RANCHERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (1995). Many farm advocates remain in deep
denial of the industry's environmental failure. For example, one leading farm
advocate recently advocated that growth control laws should put farms "legally out of
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farming, particularly in the modem American style, is an
intensive land use involving a multitude of polluting and land
transforming activities. 2 The magnitude of its environmental
impacts is not readily apparent from studying individual farms;
rather, serious environmental degradation results from the
aggregation of harmful farming practices across large areas.
When compiled on regional, national, and global levels, the
numbers are quite alarming.1 3 Environmental law can no longer
ignore the fact that farming is integrally related to the future of
our national and global environmental quality.
Part II of this Article provides an inventory of the many
provisions of environmental laws that exempt, release, and
excuse farms from regulation. 4 Some of these provisions can be
understood, in isolation, as rational responses to the need for
efficient administration of environmental law and the importance
of farming to other social and economic goals. When the sheer
mass of this anti-law is considered as a whole, however, it defies
reasonable explanation. There is simply no rational relationship
between the magnitude of the environmental harms farms cause
5
and the response of environmental law.'
the reach of development for the foreseeable future" because in addition to food, they
"provide environmental amenities like scenic open space, wildlife habitat and
unpaved watersheds: and [farms] demand few public services." Edward Thompson,
Jr., "Hybrid" Farmland Protection Programs: A New Paradigm for Growth
Management?, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoLY REv. 831, 831 (1999) (author is

Senior Vice President for Public Policy, American Farmland Trust).
12. Its adverse impacts include not only environmental degradation, which is
substantial in its own right, but also effects outside the scope of this Article, such as
occupational safety risks, food quality impairment, animal mistreatment, the risks of
biogenetic engineering, and the promotion of resistant bacteria harmful to humans.
13. A 1998 report prepared jointly by the World Resources Institute, the United
Nations Environment Program, the United Nations Development Program, and the
World Bank identified "intense agricultural development" as one of three "drivers of
change" in the global environment. Alec Zacaroli, Environmental DegradationCauses
Millions of PrematureDeaths Per Year, Report Says. 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 113 (1998).
The other two were industrial development and increased energy use.
14. The favorable treatment of farms is by no means limited to environmental
regulation. See Chen, supra note 9, at 875 n.353 (collecting farm safe harbor
provisions in antitrust laws, labor laws. minimum wage laws. bankruptcy laws, tax
laws, motor carrier laws, and animal welfare laws).
15. For additional legal commentary on some of the safe harbors farms enjoy
from environmental regulation, see Haugrud, supra note 6 (discussing the general
coverage of the environmental law of farms); Elaine Bueschen. PflesteriaPiscicidw A
Regional Symptom of a National Problem, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,317
(1998) (focusing on water pollution control laws); Larry C. Frarey & Staci J. Pratt,
Environmental Regulation of Livestock Production Operations, 9 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 8 (1995) (focusing on exemptions covering animal waste runoff); Drew L.
Kershen, Agricultural Water Pollution: From Point to Nonpoint and Beyond. 9 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1995) (focusing on water pollution control laws); Grossman,
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The solution to this disconnection between effect and
response is complex. It may be that "[tiraditional agriculture
quakes at the idea that environmental law will come to the
farm." 6 If so, perhaps the approach of traditionalenvironmental
law is the problem. Protecting the environment from farms is not
merely a matter of applying traditional approaches that have
worked with other industries. Rather, as Part III of this Article
demonstrates, the geographic, economic, and political settings of
the farming industry call for approaches that may be outside the
box of conventional environmental law. The environmental
regulation of farms must incorporate several key features if it is
to succeed where traditional models of environmental law surely
would not. First, it must relate to farms the way farms relate to
the landscape- that is, as numerous, disperse, and diverse
operations having cumulative effects over large geographic
scales. Second, it must take full advantage of market incentives
and adaptive management techniques as means of keeping farms
and their regulatory burdens flexible and responsive to rapidly
changing social and economic conditions- that is, it must avoid
relying exclusively on command-and-control regimes that have
dominated modem federal environmental law. Finally, it must
relate to farms the way farms relate to the relevant
decisionmaking bodies- that is, local and state governing bodies
must be sufficiently empowered to form arms-length cooperative
relationships with federal regulatory authorities.
Satislying these criteria through a national environmental
law system for farms probably will not require a completely new
model of environmental law. Farms may present a special case
requiring unconventional responses, but we are not completely
inexperienced in dealing with these issues in similar contexts.
Although environmental law has deliberately overlooked farms, it
has tested a variety of regulatory models in other settings, from
heavily centralized command-and-control schemes to relatively
decentralized market-based trading systems. Many of these
programs have successfully managed problems similar to those
presented by farms. The ingredients for an appropriate approach
to regulating farms thus are already developed and in use, albeit
scattered throughout a multitude of other environmental
regulation programs. My proposed framework for a farmenvironment management law, outlined in Part IV of this Article,

supra note 6, at 299-330 (discussing the general coverage of the environmental law of
farms).
16. Chen, supra note 4, at 351.
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cherry picks from existing successful environmental law
programs to assemble a comprehensive legal framework that
responds to the geographic, economic, and political setting of the
farming industry. The anti-law of farms and the environment
could thus be replaced with a body of positive law that
responsibly addresses the problems of the future.
I
THE ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS OF FARMS

The United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 1997
7 defines a farm as "a place
Census of Agriculture (Census)"
which
produced and sold, or normally would have produced and sold,
$1,000 or more of agricultural products during 1997."8 In 1997,
over 1.9 million such operations fit that description in the United
States.'" Data from the Census and from other studies reveal the
size and diversity of the industry we call farming and the
massive aggregate impact it has on the environment.
A.

Some Background on Farmsand Farming

Farms cover over 930 million acres of the United States, with
roughly equal divisions of cropland and pastureland/rangeland
accounting for the vast majority of that total.2 0 The total market
17. The results of the 1997 Census of Agriculture are available at NATIONAL
AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE (visited Feb.

10, 1999)

<http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/>

[hereinafter

CENSUS].

USDA's

National Agricultural Statistics Service conducts the census in years ending in the
numbers 2 and 7 by sending report forms to all known ranchers and farmers, who by

law must return the completed forms even if they conducted no agricultural
operations. See National Agric. Stat. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric.. Frequently Asked
Questions About
the
Census of Agriculture (visited
Feb.
10,
1999)

<http: //www.nass.usda.gov/census/ census97/cenfaqs.htm>.
18. Id. This Article examines the environmental effects and regulation of farms
only. Crop production farms are categorized into oilseed and grain farming, vegetable
and melon farming, greenhouses and nurseries, tobacco, cotton, sugarcane, hay, and

all other crops. See CENSUS, supra note 17, at United States Data 69, tbl.47.
Livestock farming is categorized into beef cattle, cattle feedlots, dairy cattle and milk
production, hogs and pigs, poultry and eggs, sheep and goats, animal aquaculture,
and other animal production. See id. The environmental effects and regulation of

-upstream" industries that supply farms, such as pesticide manufacturing and seed
suppliers, and of "downstream" industries that are supplied by farms, such as meat
packing and other food processing and distribution, are vast topics in their own right

and outside the scope of this Article. For an excellent discussion of the regulation of
the agriculture industry as broadly defined to include these related sectors, see
Looney, supra note 6.
19. See CENSUS, supra note 17, United States Data at 19, tbl.7.

20. See id.at 8, fig.4. This is roughly 45% of the United States' 2.1 billion acres
of total land mass. Adding forest land to crop and pasture land brings the figure to
75%. See RUTHERFORD H. PLAi,

LAND USE AND SOcIETY 6-8 (1996).
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value of agricultural products sold by American farms in 1997
was just under $200 billion, 21 and total expenses were over $150
billion.2 2 Individual farms, meanwhile, are tremendously diverse.
For example, roughly half of American farms generate annual
product values under $10,000, accounting for less than 1.5% of
total farm production value, whereas roughly 3.6% of farms
generate over $500,000 in annual product value, accounting for
over 56% of total farm production value.2 1 Over half of farms are
24
under 500 acres in size, whereas only 4% are over 2000 acres.
Over 85% of farms, mostly the so-called "small farms," are owned
by individuals or families; corporate farms make up under 5%
and partnerships just under 9%.25 The four principal crops, in
order of acres in production, are corn, soybeans, hay, and
wheat.26 The principal livestock, in order of production value, are
cattle, poultry, and hogs. 2 As a point of reference, farms in the
United States produced over 98 million head of cattle, 366
million egg layer chickens, 6.75 billion broilers and meat
chickens, and 61 million hogs in 1997.28
Despite their diversity, one feature is common to all farms:
they are part of an industry. Farms owned an estimated $110
billion in machinery and equipment in 1997.29 They spent a total
of over $6 billion on gasoline and other fuels,3" over $18 billion
on chemical fertilizers, crop control chemicals, and other
agricultural chemicals combined, 31 and over $2.75 billion on
electricity. The payroll for farms in 1997 was over $14 billion
for hired farm labor and over $2.9 billion for contract labor.3 3 In
short, farming is a vast industry in the United States which, in
turn, supplies and is supplied by other industries.'
21.
22.

See CENSUS, supranote 17, United States Data at 7, fig.3.
See id. at 98, tbl.49.

23.

See id. at 6, fig.2.

24.
25.
26.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 8, fig.5.

27.

See id. at 9, fig.6.

28.
29.

See id. at 10, tbl.1.
See id.

30.
31.

See id. at 23, tbl.14.
See id.. tbl.15.

32.

See id. at 100, tbl.49.

33.
34.

See id.
The American "food and fiber" industry as a whole accounts for $1 trillion in

economic activity every year, or "over 15 percent of our gross domestic product,"
Allison Rees Armour-Garb, Minimizing Human Impacts on the Global Nitrogen Cycle:
Nitrogen Fertilizer and Policy in the United States, 4 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 339, 346

(1995), one of every six jobs, and the largest export component in the economy$50 billion annually. See NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION SERV.,

over
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B.

The Inventory of EnvironmentalHarms Farms Cause

Another attribute that farms share is that they degrade the
environment. The magnitude of that effect, however, 3is5
something that is difficult for most nonfarmers to grasp.
Consider the typical farming process: first, remove all existing
vegetation from the land and level it; second, deploy a singlespecies regime of crop or livestock; third, cultivate the crop or
livestock with water and chemicals; finally, remove the crop or
livestock and associated waste products from the land and start
over. A number of environmental harms flow directly and
necessarily from that basic reality of farming: (1) habitat loss and
degradation; (2) soil erosion; (3) water resources depletion; (4)
soil salinization; (5) chemical releases; (6) animal waste disposal;
(7) water pollution; and (8) air pollution.3 6 In each of these
categories, farms are a significant source of environmental harm.
1.

HabitatLoss and Degradation

The consequences of modem agriculture on wildlife habitat
are undeniable, from habitat elimination to more direct effects on
water and wildlife species." The "structure and diversity of the
agroecosystem can also influence the movement of wildlife

AGRIC., GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE 7, 27 (1996) [hereinafter GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE]; Looney,

supranote 6, at 763.
35. For example, the 1998 comprehensive Roper Starch survey of adult
Americans' environmental perceptions, the seventh in an annual series of such
surveys, revealed that although most Americans claim they know a "fair amount"
about environmental issues and problems and list clean water as a top priority, only
one in five knows that run-off is the most common form of pollution of streams and
rivers. Nearly half of people surveyed mistakenly believe the most common source of
water pollution is industrial discharges, and 15% believe it is garbage dumping by
cities. See THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION & TRAINING FOUNDATION, ROPER
STARCH WORLDWIDE,

THE NATIONAL REPORT

CARD ON

ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGE,

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 5-6, 23 (1998). Americans simply do not perceive farms as

the leading source of water pollution.
36. To some extent these eight categories interrelate and overlap. For example,
farm irrigation practices lead to water resource depletion and soil salinization; the
pollutants carried in nonpoint source water runoff from farms include chemicals,
animal waste, and eroded soils: farms release nitrogen into the environment through
chemical applications and animal waste. Nevertheless, the literature on the impacts
of farming on the environment tends to break the problem down into these discrete
topics, each of which is susceptible to measurement and study. Thus, I use them to
organize both the factual overview of the environmental harms of farms, as well as
some of the measures I propose to reform the law of farms and the environment.
37. See NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL SERV., U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, OUR LIVING
RESOURCES: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION, ABUNDANCE, AND HEALTH OF
U.S.

PLANTS,

RESOURCES].

ANIMALS,

AND

ECOSYSTEMS

424

(1995)

[hereinafter

OUR

LIVING
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between natural and agricultural systems and affect their use of
such systems."3 8 Despite the ability of perennial, vegetationally
diverse agro-ecosystems with complex structure to provide
important habitats for many birds and other animals typically
found in undisturbed habitats 3 9 farms pose an enormous net
negative to wildlife.
Farming no longer poses a significant direct threat of habitat
loss. Most direct loss of habitat resulting from conversion of land
areas to farming has already occurred.4 ° In fact, the United
States loses a small portion of its available farmland each year,
mainly to urban and suburban land uses. 1 But the magnitude of
the historical transformation of undisturbed habitat to farming
was immense- after all, at one time virtually all of the 930
million acres currently in farming uses were undisturbed
habitat. The fact that these habitat losses were experienced in
the past does not obviate the seriousness of their continuing
impacts to wildlife in the present.4 2 Further, habitat losses to
38. Matson et al., supra note 1, at 507.
39. See id.
40. For example, "conversion of wetlands to agricultural land has declined
steadily since the 1950s." GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 52. Over 790,000
acres of wetland were lost on non-Federal lands between 1982 and 1992, for a yearly
loss estimate of 70,000 to 90,000 acres. Agriculture was responsible for 87% of the
loss of wetlands from the mid- 1950s to the mid-1970s, but only 54% of the loss from
the mid-1970s to the mid- 1980s. See NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note
7, at ES-28 to ES-29.
41. Between 1992 and 1997, farmland in the United States fell from 946 million
acres to 932 million acres, a loss of about 1.5% in five years. In 1964, land in farming
was about 1.1 billion acres, about 18% more than we have today. See CENSUS, supra
note 17, United States Data at 10, tbl.1. Between 1982 and 1992, 3 million acres of
cropland were converted to commercial or residential uses. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE,
supra note 34, at 30; Myers et al.. supra note 4, at 111. The highly visible impact of
urbanization on prime quality agricultural land lying at the urban fringe has led
several states to implement narrowly focused farmland protection laws. See Haugrud,
supra note 6, § 8.2(B)(1)(b), at 323-30; see also George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to
Growth Management: Vermont, Oregon, and a Synthesis, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
13 (1996); Henry E. Rodegerdts, Land Trusts and Agricultural Conservation
Easements, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 336 (1998): Jeanne S. White, Beating
Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and Strategies for Slowing its
Conversion to NonagriculturalUses, 28 ENvTL. L. 113 (1998). The federal government
also has entered the arena. For example, the Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981
directs federal agencies to take farmland preservation into account when
administering their authorities, see 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4209 (1994), and the 1996
Farm Bill authorized USDA to initiate a Farmland Protection Program through which
the federal government can join with state, tribal, and local governments to acquire
conservation easements on land that farmers want to preserve in agriculture, see
Pub. L. No. 104-127, § 388, 110 Stat. 888, 1020 (1996) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3830
(1994 & Supp. I1 1997)); see also Grossman. supranote 6, at 330; Haugrud, supra
note 6, § 8.2(B)(1)(a), at 483; Rodegerdts. supra, at 337.
42. For example, reduced habitat is the most common threat to endangered
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farms have not been geographically uniform throughout the
nation. 3
The continuing loss of valuable habitat on farms themselves
is often overlooked. The amount of undisturbed grass-dominated
cover and non-cropped areas on farms has decreased, resulting
in lower availability of habitat and higher losses to predators of
many species of wildlife."* In many agricultural areas, crucial
wildlife habitat components such as undisturbed grassland have
been dissected into small, isolated patches.4 5 Habitat diversity on
farms has also declined drastically as a consequence of the
elimination of hay and pasture once needed by draft animals and
a shift to crop monocultures. *s In addition, wetland drainage,
consolidation of fields and farms, and elimination of fence-rows
and idle areas have reduced habitat diversity even further,
thereby diminishing the populations of wildlife that once coexisted with crops on farms. 7 Increased agrochemical use has
also been implicated in the long-term decline of species that
relied on farmland as part of their habitat base. "
Despite these losses, the truly pernicious effects of farming
on habitat today occur off-site.4 9 For example, gaseous and
dissolved nitrogen oxide and ammonia emitted from agricultural
ecosystems are transported to and deposited in downwind and

species. See William Stolzenburg, Habitat Loss Affects 88 Percent of Species, NATURE
CONSERVANCY, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 6; David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to
Imperiled Species in the United States. 48 BIoScI. 607 (1998). The effects of habitat
loss on species viability may not be fully manifested for decades or centuries, see
Michael L. Rosenzweig, Heeding the Warning in Biodiversity's Basic Law, 284 Sci.
276, 277 (1999), and for many endangered species, habitat restoration is a necessary
ingredient for recovering the species from the path toward extinction, see Theodore C.
Foin et al., Improving Recovery Planningfor Threatened and Endangered Species, 48
BioSci. 177, 179-80 (1998).
43. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 23 (map of farmland distribution
in the United States). For example, the Mississippi River ecosystem, which covers
almost 400 of the contiguous United States, has lost over 75%, and in some places
95%, of its floodplain to farmland, urban development, and impoundments. See
500,000 Acres Will Shield Waterways from Farm Runoff, EDF NEWSLETTER, June
1998, at 1, 3 (discussing plans to restore some of the converted floodplain).
44. See OUR LIVING RESOURCES, supra note 37, at 424. Harvested cropland has
increased by 20 million acres since 1987. See CENSUS, supra note 17, at United
States Data 19, tbl.7.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See
See
See
See
See

OUR LIVING RESOURCES, supranote 37, at 424.
id.
id.
id.
Matson et al., supra note 1, at 507 ("Although agroecosystems

are

typically managed in isolation from other ecosystems within a region, the physical,
ecological, and biogeochemical changes that take place within them have numerous
consequences for adjacent, and even distant, ecosystems.").
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downstream terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. This deposition
causes inadvertent fertilization, which can lead to acidification,
eutrophication, shifts in species diversity, and effects on
predator and parasite systems. 50 Transport of pesticides beyond
farm boundaries also causes severe damage to wildlife and
and
evaporation
Similarly, because
habitat functions."'
concentration effects cause irrigation return-flows to carry
greater concentrations of salt and minerals than found in
populations
fish and wildlife
irrigation water sources,
5 2
Also, high erosion rates associated
downstream often suffer.
with cultivated agriculture can lead to sedimentation in
reservoirs and lakes, which reduces the lifetime of these water
systems as aquatic habitat. 3 Overall, therefore, farming has
caused and continues to cause significant habitat degradation
both on the farm and off.5 4
2.

Soil Erosionand Sedimentation

Converting natural ecosystems to permanent agriculture
results in a loss of soil organic matter, thus increasing the
erosion potential of the soils. 5 As a result, farms are by far the
leading national cause of soil erosion. 6 In 1997, for example,
there were 375 million acres of cropland in the United States, of
which 103.5 million acres were considered "highly erodible."57 In
1982, forces of erosion moved almost 3.1 billion tons of soil from

50. See id.
51. See Carpenter, supra note 4. at 213-18: Report Links Wildlife Decline to
ChemicalExposure, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 718 (1999).
52. See Matson et al.,. supranote 1,at 508.
53. See id.; Carpenter, supra note 4, at 218-19.
54. When land conversion, farm practices, and the offsite effects of pesticides
and fertilizers are combined, farming has significantly affected 38% of the listed
endangered species, See Wilcove et al., supra note 42, at 610-12. For additional
economic and legal analysis of the relation between farming and habitat, see Jan
Lewandrowski & Kevin Ingram, Policy Considerationsfor Increasing Compatibilities
Between Agricultureand Wildlife, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 229 (1999).

55. See Matson et al., supranote 1,at 506.
56. For example, 90% of all the soil erosion that happens in Illinois, about 158
million tons per year, occurs on farms. THE NATURE OF ILLINOIS FOUND. & ILL. DEP'T OF
ENERGY AND

NATURAL

RESOURCES,

THE

CHANGING

ILLINOIS

ENVIRONMENT:

CRITICAL

TRENDS 59 (1994).

57. See Natural Resources Conservation Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., 1997
tbl. 14.
available at
Report
Resources
Inventory- Summary
National
<http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/NRI/1997/> (visited Dec. 7, 1999) [hereinafter 1997
National Resources Inventory]. Highly erodible cropland is generally steeper and less
fertile, requires more inputs to maintain production, and can be damaged by high
erosion rates. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 204-05 (explaining protocol for
evaluating highly erodible land).
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America's cropland, 1.4 billion by wind and 1.7 billion by
5
watery.
This loss of topsoil is replenished at a rate of less than
one inch in 200 years.59
Depending on a variety of factors,6" between 25 and 40% of
soil that erodes from a field will reach a water body.6" Erosion
thus leads directly to sedimentation in reservoirs and lakes.6 2
Yearly soil discharge from agriculture land to waterways in the
United States is estimated at over 1 billion tons of sediments and
447 million tons of total dissolved solids. 3 The Mississippi River
alone carries 331 million tons of topsoil to the Gulf of Mexico

annually.6 4
Sediments not only reduce the lifetime and uses of water
systems, 65 but also carry significant amounts of pollutants. Both
"instream suspended sediment and bedload are, by volume, the
largest category of pollutants in the United States."6 6 "High levels
of suspended sediments can also reduce net primary production
in freshwater and marine systems, ultimately affecting" the
feeding and reproduction of fish and aquatic invertebrates.6 7
Farming also releases nutrients and other chemicals that are
absorbed by the sediment soil particles entering streams and
rivers as a result of soil erosion. 68 Bottom sediment
contaminated with pesticides and other agricultural chemicals is
an increasing problem in watersheds around the nation.6 9

58. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 36.
59. See Charles M. Cooper & William M. Lipe, Water Quality and Agriculture:
MississippiExperiences, 47 J. SOIL& WATER CONSERVATION 220, 220 (1992).
60. "[The rate and amount of [soil organic matter] loss depends on a number of
factors, including climate and soil type as well as numerous factors directly
influenced by cropping systems, such as the amount of organic inputs, crop coverage
of the soil, tillage practice, and length and type of fallow." Matson et al., supra note
1, at 506.
61. See David Zaring, FederalLegislative Solutions to AgriculturalNonpoint Source
Pollution, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10, 128, 10,129 (1996).
62. See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 508. Wind erosion contributes to the
aerosol content of the atmosphere, playing a large role in climate and air pollution.
See id.
63. See Cooper & Lipe, supra note 59. at 220.
64. See id.
65. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 210 ("[The hundreds of millions of tons of
eroded soils deposited in waterways disrupts navigation, fills reservoirs, increases the
costs of water treatment, and limits recreational uses.").
66. Cooper & Lipe, supra note 59, at 220; see also Carpenter, supra note 4, at
210-11.
67. Matson et al., supranote 1, at 508.
68. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 40.
69. For example, EPA recently delivered to Congress a report entitled The
Incidence and Severity of Sediment Contamination in Surface Waters of the United
States, identifying 7% of watersheds sampled as containing areas of probable concern
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Through improved soil management technology and
practices, soil erosion is to some extent on the mend.70 Average
cropland erosion rates in tons per acre per year for 1997 were
substantially lower than erosion rates for 1982.71 Most of this
improvement, however, occurred by 1992, with little additional
performance improvement since that time.72 Moreover, even
these improved rates are 12 times higher than soil formation
rates, meaning net losses of cropland soils each year at an
annual cost to society in excess of $29 billion.7" Indeed, some
new "good farming" practices actually increase soil erosion
rates."4 Soil erosion associated with farming thus continues to
reduce soil productivity and
substantially affect water quality
75
and atmospheric resources.
3.

Water Resources Depletion

Farms use vast quantities of water. In 1992, for example,
farmers in the United States irrigated 49 million acres of
agricultural land,7 6 and by 1997, that number had soared to 55
million acres.7 7 Over 40% of the energy used by agriculture is

because of contaminated bottom sediment, and including agricultural runoff as one
of the leading causes. See Notice of Availability of Report to Congress, 63 Fed. Reg.
2237, 2238 (1998).
70. Between 1982 and 1997, total erosion on all cropland decreased by 42%. In
1982, erosion totaled 3.07 billion tons, and by 1997 it had been reduced to 1.9 billion
tons. See 1997 Natural Resources Inventory, supra note 57, fig.3. Some controversy
has developed over whether the picture looks even better than that. Most of the
erosion figures discussed in the text are derived from large scale models of erosion
rates. A recent study based on a watershed-specific survey of historical "markers" of
soil loss and sedimentation suggests that erosion rates have fallen dramatically from
the 1970s to the 1990s, though the study is not without its critics. See James Glanz.
Sharp Drop Seen in Soil ErosionRates, 285 Sci. 1187 (1999); R. Monastersky, Erosior
Dustup over Muddy Waters, 156 Scr. NEws 116 (1999).
71. See 1997 National Resources Inventory, supra note 57, at 7 (noting that
combined water and wind erosion rates fell from 7.4 in 1982 to 5.0 in 1997).
72. See Id. tbls. 10 & 11 (showing rates of water and wind erosion for cropland in
each state for years 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997). The amount of highly erodible land
in cropland production, which fell significantly from 1982 to 1992, has also leveled
off through 1997. See iAi
73. See David Pimentel & Edward L. Skidmore, Rates of Soil Erosion, 286 SCI.
1477 (1999).
74. For example, farmers who use impermeable plastic sheet mulch, which is
better than vetch-covered rows at retaining soil moisture and temperature.
experience higher soil erosion rates. See Plastic Mulch's Dirty Secrets, 156 SCI. NEWS
207 (1999).
75. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 34.
76. See CENSUS, supra note 17, United States Data at 10, tbl. 1.
77. See id. On a global scale, 40/o of crop production comes from the 16/o of
agricultural land that is irrigated. See Matson et al., supra note 1,at 506.
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devoted to irrigation.78 Although irrigation acreage in the western
states declined from 1982-1992 as the use of groundwater for
irrigation became increasingly uneconomical, 79 irrigation acreage
in the eastern United States has expanded in that time period as
8
farmers attempt to reduce the risk of drought.
Overpumping of groundwater sources for irrigation is a
serious concern in many regions,8 ' leading to effects such as
water table drawdown, land subsidence, desertification,
destruction of natural springs and associated wildlife habitats,
and saltwater intrusion. 82 Yet as old surface water reservoirs lose
capacity due to siltation and new ones become increasingly
difficult or Impracticable to site,83 increases in agricultural
production will raise the demand for irrigated water from
groundwater sources. Irrigation water for farms, from all
sources, can be expected to become more scarce "as competition
for withdrawals increases with human population growth and
development." 84 Complicating this problem are massive federal
subsidies
for existing and expanded farm irrigation
infrastructure and supply.8" Agricultural demand for water thus

78. See Lindsey McWilliams, GroundwaterPollution in Wisconsin: A Bumper Crop
Yields Growing Problems, ENv'T, May 1984, at 25, 27.
79. For a comprehensive history and future prognosis of irrigated farming in
western states, see COUNCIL FOR AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FUTURE OF
IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE (1996).

80. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 31.
81. For example, intensive irrigation has drawn down the huge Ogallala aquifer
that stretches across Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, posing the possibility of
future shortages and reduced productivity. See Sandra Postel, When the World's
Wells Run Dry, WORLD WATCH, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 30, 32; Runge, supra note 6, at
204; Robert R.M. Verchick, Dust Bowl Blues: Saving and Sharing the OgallalaAquifer,
14 J. ENVrL. L. & LrTG. 13 (1999; Erla Zwingle, Ogallala Aquifer: Wellspring of the
High Plains, NAT. GEO., Mar. 1993, at 83.
82. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., WaterAllocation and Protection:A United States
Case Study, in EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES AND ISSuES 476 (W.G. Ernst ed., 2000).
83. See Matson et al.,
supra note 1, at 506.
84. Id. Irrigation also leads to significant alteration of surface water systems and
habitat, as large surface storage reservoirs must be constructed to convert seasonal
stream flows to permanent water supplies. The effects of such projects have been
tremendous and irreversible in many areas of the nation, particularly in the West.
See Harrison Dunning, Confronting the Environmental Legacy of IrrigatedAgriculture
in the West: The Case of the Central Valley Project, 23 ENvTL. L. 943, 944-54 (1993).
The classic discussion of the issue is found in

MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT

(1986).
85. The Bureau of Reclamation has spent billions of dollars developing sources of
economically inefficient irrigation water for western farmers. See Thompson, supra
note 82, at 483 (noting the irony that this subsidized water encourages western
farmers to grow crops that other federal subsidy programs pay midwestern and
southern farmers not to grow, even though the latter could grow them more
economically).
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appears to be headed upward
competing uses.
4.

on a

collision course with

Soil and Water Salinization

In addition to being a significant user of limited water
supplies, irrigated farming continually degrades its surrounding
environment in arid and semi-arid areas through the salinization
of soils and water.8" Irrigating arid and semi-arid soils leaches
salts and other minerals from the soil, causing them to
87
accumulate in the plant root zone and retard plant growth.
Highly salinized soil is useless for agriculture, and reclaiming it
is economically difficult, if not impossible.88 Over 570 million
acres of the continental United States have a moderate to severe
potential for soil and water salinity problems,8 9 and an estimated
20 to 25% of all irrigated land in the United States suffers from
saline-induced yield reductions.9" At least 48 million acres of
cropland and pastureland are categorized as saline, and recent
surveys indicate that this number is growing at a rate of 10% a
91
year.
For farmers, the solution to salinized soil is to flush the
salinized soils with more high quality water than is needed for
the crops so that the excess water carries away the leached
salts. 92 Often this flushing process is accomplished through
installation of an underground drainage tile system, which
captures the irrigation water as it percolates through the soils,
collects it into an underground drainage pipe network, and then
efficiently moves the saline-rich waters away from the farmland
in a drainage ditch system. 93 The salts that have been flushed
from the irrigated farmlands end up in irrigation return flows
which typically carry substantially higher concentrations of salt
and minerals than their original surface or groundwater
86. See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 506.
87. See El-Ashry et al., supra note 2, at 49 ("Repeated application of water to
land for irrigation results in the accumulation of salts in the upper layers of soil.").
Saline soils are those that contain sufficient salts to adversely affect plant growth.
See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 33.
88. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 33.

89. See id.
90. See El-Ashry et al., supra note 2, at 48.
91. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34. at 33.
92. See EI-Ashry et al., supra note 2. at 49 ("To maintain agricultural
productivity, these salts must be leached out of the crop root zone.").
93. See Gary Bobker, Agricultural Point Source Pollution in Califomia's San
Joaquin Valley, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13, 13 (1995) (noting that hundreds of
thousands of farmland acres in the San Joaquin Valley employ such tile systems).
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sources.9 4 This salinized water has potentially devastating effects
on downstream aquatic systems.9" Indeed, "[ilrrigation-related
salinity is the major water quality problem in the semiarid
western states, where significant quantities of salts occur
96
naturally in rocks and soils."
5.

Agrochemical Releases

Farms
are
massive
users of chemicals,
including
7
insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides. Every year, over "750
million pounds of pesticides are applied to agricultural crops
yearly" in the United States.9" Since 1979, agriculture has been
responsible for about 80% of all pesticide use in the United
States, 99 and pesticide use on farms has nearly tripled since
1964.10 "Four of the most prevalent herbicides- atrazine,
simazine, alachor, and metolachlor- are applied nationwide,
and grain belt states receive large shares of the estimated 135
94. The "leaching fraction" of the irrigated water- the excess needed for leaching
away the salts- will contain unnaturally high salt concentrations because of the
intended "salt loading" effect and because the irrigation return water is further
concentrated by evaporation. See E1-Ashry et al., supra note 2, at 48-49.
95. One of the most tragic examples is the Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge,
which was created when financial troubles caused a planned irrigation return flow
"regulation" project to become a terminal reservoir for return flow waters in
California's Central Valley. Seen as a potential waterfowl haven, selenium-laden
return flow water collected in the vegetation and invertebrates, eventually causing
tremendous damage to the waterfowl. See Dunning, supra note 84, at 953-54;
Bobker, supra note 93, at 14-15.
96. EI-Ashry et al., supranote 2, at 49.
97. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) defines
pesticides to include nitrogen stabilizers and "substances intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest... [or] for use as a plant regulator,
defoliant, or desiccant." 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1994). The pesticide industry involves
about 30 major manufacturing companies, 100 smaller companies marketing the
active ingredients of pesticides, 3,300 product formulators who take the raw pesticide
ingredients and produce finished pesticide products, and over 29,000 pesticide
distributors. About 600 distinctive groups of active ingredients are found in the
45,000 pesticide products that are marketed in the United States. About 1.2 billion
pounds of pesticides, valued at over $6.5 billion, are sold each year in the United
States, over 70% of which are used in farming. See P.S.C. Rao et al., Inst. of Food
and Agricultural Sciences, Fact Sheet SL-53, Regulation of Pesticide Use 1-2 (rev. ed.
1997). For more on FIFRA and farming, see infra text accompanying notes 259-73.
98. Zaring, supra note 61, at 10,129.
99. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supranote 34, at 45. About 25% of pesticide use in
the United States is in California. See James Liebman et al., Pesticide Action Network
and Californians for Pesticide Reform, Rising Toxic Tide-Pesticide Use in California,
1991-1995, available at <http://www.igc.org/panna/risingtide/textoftide.html>.
Pesticide applications on farms in the United States have risen dramatically since the
1960s, while land in cultivation has remained about the same. See Carpenter. supra
note 4, at 191.
100. See Zaring, supra note 61, at 10,129.
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million pounds" of herbicides used annually.0 ' Although
pesticides have undoubtedly improved agricultural efficiency and
their
adverse
immensely, 02
human
living
conditions
environmental impacts are also undeniable.
A significant fraction of pesticides applied to agricultural
systems fails to reach its target pests and moves into the soil
where it poses immediate and long-term environmental
threats.0 3 For example, chlorinated hydrocarbons such as DDT
can persist in the environment for decades after their use, while
organophosphates and carbamates are short-lived but acutely
toxic.'0 4 As urban areas increasingly encroach upon farmlands or
will be exposed
even encompass them, the danger that 0residents
5
to harmful levels of pesticide increases.
Pesticides from farm applications have also infitrated
adjacent ecosystems through a multitude of pathways, including
discharges and runoff to surface waters,10 6 leaching to ground
water,0 7 and aerial drift. 08 These unwanted pesticide migrations
101. Penny Loeb, Very Troubled Waters. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 28,
1998, at 43.
102. For an aggressive defense of the use of pesticides, arguing that this and other
technology-intensive farming practices will allow the Earth easily to support the
projected population of 10 billion, see DENNIS T. AVERY. SAVING THE PLANET WITH
PESTICIDES AND PLASTIC (1995).

103. See, e.g.. PlasticMulch's Dirty Little Secrets, supra note 74, at 207 (measuring
and comparing chemical runoff from fields using different kinds of mulch). Even
when pesticides reach their target, long-term environmental effects remain, for
example, the problem of increasing pest resistance. See Matson et al., supra note 1,
at 505. Once pests develop resistance to pesticides, farmers typically respond by
increasing the quantity of the pesticide applied or shifting to other pesticides, fueling
the pests' resistance buildup mechanisms. Today, nearly 1,000 major agricultural
insect, disease, and weed pests are immune to common pesticides. See LESTER R.
BROWN ETAL., VITAL SIGNS 1999, at 124 (1999).
104. See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 508.
105. For example, in 1999, the New Jersey Historic Pesticide Contamination Task
Force estimated that 5% of the state's land is affected by agricultural pesticides and
recommended that areas formerly used for agricultural purposes should be tested for
pesticide residue before they are developed. Some local jurisdictions in New Jersey
already impose such a requirement. See Task Force Urges Sampling of Farm Areasfor
Pesticide Residues Before Development, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1896 (1999. Recent
studies indicate that humans, and even fetuses, continue to be exposed to pesticides
that have long been banned in the United States. See Pesticide Exposure Begins
Early, 156 Sci. NEWS 47 (1999).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 48-5 1.
107. A soil's vulnerability to leaching of pesticides and other agricultural
chemicals depends upon three principal factors: (1) the propensity of soils to leach
pesticides and nitrates, (2) the amount and timing of rainfall; and (3) the extent of
chemical use. The coastal plains stretching from Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, as
well as the Corn Belt and the Mississippi River Valley all have the highest
vulnerability to leaching agrochemicals. See Robert L. Kellogg et al.. The Potentialfor
Leaching of Agrichemicals Used in Crop Production:A NationalPerspective, 49 J. SOIL

ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 27:263

can have significant adverse impacts on the diversity and
abundance of nontarget species as well as complex effects on
ecosystem processes and trophic interactions. °9 The threat also
extends to human health; more than 14 million Americans drink
public water obtained from river sources that contain
herbicides, 110 and millions more ingest pesticides in drinking
water obtained from groundwater sources."'
112
Fertilizers are another major agrochemical pollutant.
Farmers apply nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium to promote
crop growth; however, when applied inappropriately or in
excessive amounts the excess nutrients are carried from
farmlands into waterways. Fertilizer application rates have
increased dramatically." 3 American agriculture now discharges
& WATER CONSERVATION 294, 294-97 (1994). Not surprisingly, pesticides from every
major chemical class have been detected in groundwater. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE,

supra note 34, at 48. The United States Geological Survey's 1999 National Water
Quality Assessment report, which analyzes 5,000 water samples from 20 major river
and groundwater areas of the country, found at least one pesticide at detectable
levels in more than 90% of water and fish samples from all streams. See U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, USGS CIRC. 1225, THE QUALITY OF
OUR NATION'S WATERS: NUTRIENTS AND PESTICIDES (1999): see also Chemicals Widely
Present in Stream, Potential Threats Uncertain, Study Finds, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA),
Mar. 22, 1999, at A-3. In 1992, the EPA reported that 132 pesticide-related
compounds, 117 parent pesticides, and 16 pesticide degradates had been found in
ground water in 42 states. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, TROUBLE ON THE
FARM,

GROWING

UP WITH

PESTICIDES

IN

AGRICULTURAL

COMMUNmES

28

(1998)

[hereinafter TROUBLE ON THE FARM].
108. See infra text accompanying notes 174-77.
109. See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 508. For example, evidence is mounting
that the presence of certain pesticides in water bodies is linked to increasing rates of
amphibian deformities. See J. Raloff. Thyroid Linked to Some Frog Defects, 156 SCI.
NEwS 212 (1999). Ironically, the unintended effects of pesticide use have direct
ramifications for farms. For example, farmers must compensate for reduced
pollination resulting from declining honeybee populations lost to pesticides, and
must apply excess pesticides when pesticides kill the pests' natural predators. See
generally Carpenter, supra note 4, at 213.
110. See Loeb, supra note 101, at 43. Indeed, several water supply systems
recently sued the manufacturer of the herbicide atrazine for the costs of removing the
chemical from their water supplies. See No Class Action for Herbicide Cleanup Costs:
Water Systems Have No Standing, Court Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 9, 1999,
at A-2. For a detailed review of the impact of farm chemical releases on groundwater
and some of the legal instruments that can be used to regulate those practices, see
Debbie Sivas, GroundwaterPollutionfrom AgriculturalActivities: Policiesfor Protection,
7 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 117 (1987-1988).
111.

The State of California reported that 22 pesticides were detected in a total of

436 groundwater wells in 1996. See TROUBLE ON THE FARM, supra note 107, at 28. A
1997 survey of water contamination found that about 4.3 million Americans in 245
communities are exposed to levels of carcinogenic herbicides in drinking water that
exceed the EPA's benchmark of "acceptable- cancer risk. See id.

112.
113.

See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 201-03.
In 1987, 1.38 million farms spent $6.7 billion applying fertilizer to 211
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1.16 million tons of phosphorous and 4.65 million tons of

nitrogen into waterways annually." 4 Land use models identify
agriculture as the leading source of nitrogen and phosphorus in5
the environment, accounting for 76 and 56%, respectively."
These nutrients, so beneficial on the farm, threaten associated
water resources by fostering excessive plant growth. 6 Nutrient
runoff from farms thus influences the health of natural systems
by stimulating eutrophication of estuaries and coastal marine
environments, resulting in anoxic conditions that are toxic to
aquatic animal populations." 7
6.

Animal Waste

Driven by economies of scale and new production and
processing technologies, industrialization of the livestock
production sector"l8 has produced unprecedented livestock
concentrations in the United States." l9 As a result, the United
States produces 200 times more livestock waste than human
waste. 2 "Livestock in the United States produce approximately
1.8 billion metric tons of wet manure per year, much of which
reaches surface water after being applied to fields as fertilizer." 121
Although many farming operations contain their animal
waste in on-site structures, spills occur frequently and with
drastic effects. For example, a 100,000 gallon spill in Minnesota
killed almost 700,000 fish along 19 miles of a major stream. As a
result, a downstream dairy operation had to dump 3,000 pounds
of milk after cows drank infected water and half the pregnant

million acres; ten years later 1.2 million farms spent $9.6 billion applying fertilizers
to 233 million acres. See CENSUS, supra note 17, at United States Data 23, tbl. 15; see
alsoZaring, supranote61, at 10,129.
114. See Cooper & Lipe, supra note 59, at 221.
115. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 201 (seven million tons per year In 1960;

nineteen million tons per year in 1994).
116.
117.

See generally GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 41.
See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 507; Zaring, supra note 61, at 10,129.

Although most attention regarding the environmental impacts of fertilizer runoff has
been devoted to its nutrient loading effect, recent studies have suggested that
fertilizers may pose toxicity threats as well. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENvTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, ESTIMATING RISK FROM CONTAMINANTS CONTAINED IN AGRICULTURAL
FERTILIZERS 1-1 (1999) (draft report); J. Raloff, Fertilizer: Hiding a Toxic Pollutant?,

156 ScI. NEWS 245 (1999).
118. For further discussion of these industry trends, see infra text accompanying
notes 386-90.
119. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 41.
AUDUBON, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 26, 31.
120. See Ted Williams. Assembly Line Swie.
121. Zaring, supra note 61, at 10,129.
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animals aborted. 2' 2 The Missouri Department of Natural
Resources found that 63% of all large animal feeding operations
had spills between 1990 and 1994.123 In North Carolina, a 25
million gallon hog-waste spill is the biggest on record, and killed
10 million fish and closed 364,000 acres of coastal wetlands to
shellfishing in 1995.124 The Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency reported that 15 out of 22 randomly inspected manure
lagoons in western Illinois were illegally discharging wastewater
into streams in 1998.125 In Iowa, 60 spills have been recorded
since 1992. One of those, a 1.5 million gallon spill in 1995, killed
8,861 fish, polluted thirty miles of river, and closed a primary
recreation area. 126 Recently, several cases involving intentional
bypasses of manure holding ponds have resulted in substantial
27
criminal fines. 1
Spills and illegal discharges are merely the tip of the iceberg,
however. Even proper farm waste management releases immense
amounts of waste and waste-related pollutants. For example,
California's Central Valley is home to 1,600 of the state's 2,400
dairies, and its 891,000 cows create as much waste as 21 million
people. 128 Creeks in that area often contain 200 times more
ammonia than the level that is poisonous for fish. 129 Dairy
manure pollution in California is a significant cause of fishery

depletion. 130
Cows are not the only source of waste management problems
on farms. For example, chicken manure contains twice as much
phosphorous as human waste.'
The 625 million chickens
raised annually in the Delmarva area, which includes portions of
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, produce 3.2 billion pounds of
waste annually, the constituents of which include 13.8 million
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Williams, supra note 120, at 28.
See id.
See id. at 27.
See NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL & CLEAN WATER NETWORK, AMERICA'S
ANIMAL FACTORIES: How STATES FAIL TO PREVENT POLLUTION FROM LIVESTOCK WASTE 26
(1998) [hereinafter AMERICA'S ANIMAL FACTORIES].
126. See d. at 34.
127. See Carolyn Whetzel, Dairy Farm Ordered to Pay $250,000 for Polluting
California River in CWA Case, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2572 (1999): Pamela Najor, Iowa
Hog Farm Pleads Guilty to Dischargein First Criminal Manure Discharge Case, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA), June 29, 1999, at A-4.
128. See AMERICA'S ANIMAL FACTORIES, supra note 125, at 15. A mature dairy cow
produces as much waste as 34 people, or an average of 114 pounds of waste per day.
or 22.5 tons of manure per year. See id.
129. See id. at 16.
130. See id. (noting that salmon and steelhead fisheries are down more than 90%
from their historic levels).
131. See id. at 50.
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32
pounds of phosphorous and 48.2 million pounds of nitrogen.
Hogs are a major pollution source as well. In North Carolina,
the significant progress made by municipal and industrial
sources of pollution has been largely offset by agricultural
pollution, primarily runoff from hog production facilities. North
Carolina has been the fastest growing swine-producing state in
the country, as the number of hogs has increased from 3.7
million in 1991 to more than 10 million in 1998.13 In 1998, the
North Carolina Department of Environment, Health and Natural
Resources investigated 1,595 drinking water wells located on
property adjacent to hog and poultry production facilities and
found that 10.2% of the wells tested were contaminated with
nitrate levels above current drinking water standards, and 34.2%
of the wells tested exhibited detectable nitrate levels. 134 According
to EPA estimates, in 1995 agriculture in eastern North Carolina
was responsible for airborne emissions of 179 million pounds of
ammonia nitrogen per year. Hog operations alone were
responsible for 73% of these emissions.135 Indeed, current
scientific studies find that at least 67% and perhaps as much as
95% of the total nitrogen produced by swine is actually volatized
to the atmosphere as ammonia nitrogen, 36 making land and
water pollution control measures largely a moot point.

7.

Nonpoint Source Water Pollution

In addition to pollutants released in irrigation return flows,
farms release massive quantities of pollutants through runoff
from fields and livestock operations. These releases are
37
collectively known as nonpoint source water pollution.'
132. See New NPDES Permit Condition to Hold Chicken ProducersAccountable for
Waste, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 22, 1998, at A-2.
133. See AMERICA'S ANIMAL FACTORIES, supra note 125, at 73. For current
background on hog farms in North Carolina and elsewhere, see Environmental
Defense Fund, Hog Watch (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.hogwatch.org>.
134. See id. at 76.
135. See id.
136. See id.at 77.
137. EPA defines nonpoint water pollution as "water pollution caused by rainfall
or snowmelt moving over and through the ground and carrying natural and humanmade pollutants into lakes, rivers, streams, wetlands, estuaries, coastal waters, and
ground water." Section 319 Federal Consistency Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,504,
45,504 (1998). Agricultural nonpoint source pollution thus includes "runoff from
manure disposal areas, and from land used for livestock and crop production."
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F)
(1994). By legislative decree, if not physical reality, agricultural nonpoint source
pollution also includes "return flows from irrigated agriculture." Id.; see infra text
accompanying notes 185-93 (explaining the origins of this legislative fiction).
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Nonpoint source pollution from all sources accounts for 65-75%
of the pollution in the nation's most polluted waters. 3
In 33
states, nonpoint source pollution is the most significant form of
pollution affecting streams and rivers.'3 9
In Iowa, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, and Wisconsin, nonpoint source pollution
accounts for over 90% of stream and river pollution. 4
In 42
states, nonpoint sources are the predominant source of pollution
in lakes,' 4 1 and in six states nonpoint source pollution accounts
42
for 100% of lake pollution.
Farms are the major source of nonpoint water pollution
nationally, 14 with farm runoff acting as a primary transport
mechanism for fertilizers, animal wastes, pesticides, sediments,
and bacteria.' 44 For example, commercial fertilizers in farm
runoff have widespread and pernicious effects,1 4 1 leading to
eutrophication as the nutrient laden runoff promotes rapid algal
and plant growth, and attendant consequent depletion of oxygen
resources.1 4 1 Overall, nitrate concentrations from fertilizer runoff
have increased three- to tenfold in our nation's surface waters

138. SeeZaring, supra note 61, at 10,128.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 10,128-29.
142. See id. at 10,129.
143. See Kershen, supra note 15, at 3 ("Near unanimous agreement exists that
agricultural nonpoint source pollution is the largest contributor."). EPA's 1994
National Water Inventory ranks agriculture, defined as crop production, pastures,
rangeland, feedlots, and other animal holding areas, as the leading source of water
quality impairment in lakes and rivers, in both cases by wide margins, and the third
leading cause of impairment in estuaries. NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra
note 7, at ES-11 to ES-12, ES-15 to ES-18. Federal government efforts to control
agricultural nonpoint source runoff have proven costly. For example, since fiscal year
1994, the federal government has spent $3 billion annually to address nonpoint
source runoff. USDA spent a total of $11 billion in that period, primarily on farm soil
conservation programs designed to reduce sedimentation loading of streams. EPA.
which spent $225 million in fiscal year 1998 funding state and regional programs to
control nonpoint source pollution, has estimated that it will cost $9.4 billion annually
to control what it says are the three main sources of nonpoint pollution: agriculture,
silviculture, and animal feeding operations. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
GAO/RCED-99-45, Water Quality: Federal Role in Addressing- and Contributing
to- Nonpoint Source Pollution 4-5 (1999); Methodology Used to Calculate Costs of
Nonpoint Pollution Inadequate, GAO Says. Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 16, 1999, at
A-10.
144. See Cooper & Lipe, supra note 59, at 220-22.
145. For example, commercial fertilizers, animal manure, and atmospheric
deposition, in that order, are the primary nonpoint sources of nitrate in surface water
and groundwater. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 48.
146. See NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-9; GEOGRAPHY OF
HOPE, supra note 34. at 41-45: Matson et al., supra note 1, at 507. The
eutrophication effect is also discussed supra at the text accompanying note 50.
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since the early 1900s. 4 Commercial fertilizers today are the
dominant nonpoint source pollutant in the western, central, and
southeastern United States,148 and their effects can be felt far
from the farm source. For example, hundreds of thousands of
tons of agricultural fertilizers applied in the enormous
Mississippi River watershed reach Louisiana's Gulf Coast
estuaries, contributing to an offshore hypoxic "dead zone."149
Eighty percent of the nitrogen delivered to the Gulf originates
more than a thousand miles upstream above the confluence of
the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers- almost all of it from cropland
runoff.150 Agriculture is also a major source of nutrient discharge
into the watershed of the Chesapeake Bay, where inputs of
nitrogen and phosphorous have led to excessive plankton
production and the demise of submerged aquatic vegetation.'
Other coastal regions have experienced similar hypoxia

147. See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 507.
148. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 48.
149. See id. at 44; Runge, supra note 6, at 205.
150. The Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act of 1998
directs a newly formed federal task force on the hypoxia issue to assess the ecological
and economic impacts of hypoxia in the Gulf and develop a plan for controlling the
effects by 2000. See Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-383, §
604(a)-(b), 112 Stat. 3411. 3449 (1998). The Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recently released reports on a series
of comprehensive studies it had funded on the Gulf hypoxia effect. See National
Center for Coastal Ocean Science, NOAA, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Hypoxia in the
Gulf
of
Mexico
(visited
May
17,
1999)
<http://www.noaa.gov/products/pubs-hypox.html>. One report concludes that
"ithe principal source areas for the nitrogen that discharges to the Gulf are
watersheds draining intense agricultural regions in southern Minnesota, Iowa,
Illinois. Indiana, and Ohio." -Nonpoint sources contribute about 90% of the nitrogen
and phosphorous discharging to the Gulf. Agricultural activities are the largest
contributors of both nitrogen and phosphorous." DONALD A. GOOLSBY ET AL., FLUX AND
SOURCES OF NUrRIENTS IN THE MISSISSIPPI-ATHAFALAYA RIVER BASIN 14 (1999); see also

Clean Water Act Should Be Strengthened to Address Nutrient Reduction, Group Says,
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 30. 1999, at A-10. The task force has finalized the
assessment phase of its mission and has begun to develop an action plan proposal.
See Notice of Fifth Meeting of the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed
Nutrient Task Force, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,788 (1999) (notice of availability of the report
and public comment period, and of task force decision to begin work on action plan).
151. See Water Quality Policies Must Be IntegratedAmong Air, Water, Land, USGS
Official Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 8, 1999, at A-2. The United States
Geological Survey's National Water Quality Assessment found that 85% of nitrogen
contributed to the Chesapeake Bay is from groundwater and the atmosphere,
suggesting that integrated management will be needed to address watershed
degradation, nonpoint source pollution, total maximum daily loads, and wetlands
protection. Id.; see also Thomas E. Jordan et al., Effects of Agriculture on Discharges
of Nutrientsfrom CoastalPlain Watersheds of Chesapeake Bay, 26 J. ENVrL. QUALITY
836, 836 (1997).
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problems. 152
Animal waste is another major component of farm runoff,
accounting for one-third of all water impairments attributable to
the United States produce
agriculture.' 5 3 "Livestock in
tons of wet manure per year,
metric
approximately 1.8 billion
much of which reaches surface water supplies after being
applied to fields as natural fertilizer." 5 4 In 1996, the Maryland
Department of Environment reported that approximately 93% of
Maryland waters that fail to meet state water quality standards
55
do so because of excessive nutrient pollution. The Department
also estimated that 326 million pounds of nitrogen and 19
million pounds of phosphorous enter the Chesapeake Bay every
year. "' 6 The effect of these nutrient loads goes beyond
eutrophication of aquatic habitat; entire ecological processes are
affected. For example, Pfiesteriapiscicida, a one-celled organism
that lives in many estuaries and rivers and under certain
conditions eats away at fish's scales, has been implicated in
massive fish kills in rivers leading to the Chesapeake Bay and
other Atlantic and Gulf Coast estuaries, forcing the closing of
57
many rivers to commercial and recreational uses.' According to
scientists, the Pfiesteria piscicida outbreaks are correlated with
increased nitrate levels in rivers caused by chicken waste, which,
when applied to crops as "natural" fertilizer, runs into the
watershed."
Overall, runoff of topsoil, silt, sediment, manure, nutrients,
chemicals, and other pollutants from agricultural nonpoint
sources is the leading source of impairment in the Nation's
60
Agriculture
rivers, 1 9 affecting 60% of the impaired river miles.
is the leading source of impairment in lakes as well, affecting
152. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier,29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,469, 10,470 (1999).
153. See Frarey & Pratt, supra note 15, at 8. Farm animal waste management Is
discussed in more detail supraat the text accompanying notes 118-36.
154. Zaring. supranote 61, at 10,129.
155. SeeAMERICA'S ANIMAL FACTORIES, supra note 125, at 50.
156. See id.
157. See generally JoAnn M. Burkholder, The Lurking Perils of Pfiesteria, Sci. AM.,
Aug. 1999, at 42; Carol Jouzaitis, Fish-Killing Microbe Found in Fourth River. USA
TODAY, Sept. 15, 1997, at 3A.
158. See, e.g., John P. Alneida, Nonpoint Source Pollution and Chesapeake Bay
Pfiestera Blooms: The Chickens Come Home to Roost, 32 GA. L. REV. 1195 (1998);
Bueschen, supra note 15, at 10,317-19; Burkholder, supra note 157. at 46.
159. From 1984 through 1996, the percentage of rivers designated as "impaired,"
meaning that they cannot support aquatic life and are unsafe for fishing and
swimming, grew from 26% to 36%. See Loeb, supra note 101, at 42.
160. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 40: NATIONAL WATER QUALIrY
INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-14; Zaring, supra note 61, at 10,129.
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50% of impaired lake acres, or 2 million lake acres. 16
Agriculture also pollutes 34% of impaired estuarine waters. 162
Groundwater, on which half of the U.S. population and most
rural communities depend,1 6 1 is also substantially threatened
from polluted farm runoff.' 6
8.

Air Pollution

Although farms are often associated with unpleasant odors,
many people overlook the fact that farms are significant sources
of chemical air pollution. Fertilizer is a source of several
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and
methane," 5 and leads to increased emissions of gases that play
critical roles in tropospheric and stratospheric chemistry and air
pollution. 6' 6 Worldwide, agricultural soils emit nitrogen oxides
(commonly known as NO.) at estimated rates of up to 25% of the
emissions from global fossil fuel combustion. 167 Once in the

161.

See NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY,

supra note 7, at ES-19; Zaring,

supra note 61, at 10,129.
162.

See NATIONAL WATER QuALnY INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-25.

163. More than 97% of the nation's rural drinking water comes from underground
aquifers, and over 50% of the nation's population relies on groundwater as its source
of drinking water. See Erik Lichtenberg & Lisa K. Shapiro, Agriculture and Nitrate
Concentrations in Maryland Community Water System Wells, 26 J. ENVTL. QUALITY
145, 145 (1997).
164. Groundwater is especially susceptible to nitrate contamination from the
nitrogen sources in commercial inorganic fertilizer and manure. See id. at 145-47:
see also Carpenter, supra note 4, at 202-03; Runge, supra note 6, at 204. Nitrogen Is
present in water as nitrate-nitrogen (known as NO3-N) and converts to nitrites, which
have acute toxic effects at high concentrations. Nitrates and nitrites are also
suspected to have carcinogenic effects either through secondary conversion to other
compounds or in synergistic effects with pesticides also found in contaminated
waters. See generally Lichtenberg & Shapiro, supra note 163, at 145; Carpenter,
supra note 4, at 202. Rising use of commercial fertilizer has been suspected as a
primary source for increasing NO, concentrations found in groundwater, which at
some locations reaches levels deemed unhealthy for human consumption. See N.R.
Kitchen et al., Impact of Historical and Current Farming Systems on Groundwater
Nitrate in Northern Missouri 52 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 272, 272 (1997)
("Nitrates attributable to fertilizers and manure have been found in the groundwater
of every agricultural region of the nation."); Zarng, supra note 61, at 10,129. Water
in one-fourth of the wells in many agricultural areas has become unsafe to drink
because of high levels of nitrates. See Loeb, supra note 101, at 43.
165. See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 507-08. EPA estimates that agricultural
activities were responsible for seven percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in
1997. See OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF'U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS: 1990-1997, at 5-1 (1999), available at U.S. EPA, U.S. Emissions

21,
2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/oppeoee1/
Inventory- 1999 (visited Mar.
globalwarming/publications/emissions/us 1999/index.htim>.
166. See Matson et al., supranote 1, at 507.
t .
167. See id.
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atmosphere, NO. is a critical regulator of tropospheric ozone, a
key component of smog, and a threat to human health,
NO, is also
agricultural crops, and natural ecosystems."
solution
or
dissolved
in
gaseous
deposited
and
"transported
forms to downwind terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems," leading
to acidification, eutrophication, shifts in species diversity, and
changes in predator and parasite systems.'6 9 Wind erosion also
contributes to the aerosol content of the atmosphere, which
plays a critical role in climate change as well as air pollution.7 0
Animal waste is another major source of air pollution. In
Minnesota, large-scale feedlots emit hydrogen sulfide at levels
vastly exceeding state air quality standards for other
industries."' According to EPA estimates, agriculture in eastern
North Carolina was responsible for airborne emissions of 179
with hog
million pounds of ammonia nitrogen in 1995,
1 72
operations responsible for 73% of these emissions.
Pesticide dispersal in the air is also often overlooked in
comparison to more visible and documented pollution problems,
but it is significant. Sources include fumigants, wind erosion of
pesticide-laden soil particles, and aerial drift from spraying.'7 3 In
California, two weeks of ambient air monitoring near sugar beet
and potato fields for the carcinogen fumigant Telone II measured
ambient air levels that exceeded the safe level for chronic
inhalation exposures,' 74 and 19 of 26 monitored pesticides have
been detected in and around California communities between
1986 and 1998.1' Fog samples gathered in suburban Maryland
and in agricultural regions of California revealed up to 16
different agricultural pesticides.'7 6 Thus, farms pose a
substantial threat to air quality.
168. See id.
169. Id. For example, air pollution is the leading cause of water quality
impairment in the Great Lakes, with pesticides and nutrients being significant
components of that impairment. See NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note
7. at ES-20 to ES-22.
170. See Matson et al., supra note 1, at 508.
171. See AMERICA'S ANIMAL FACTORIES, supra note 125, at 53. i[The Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency... confirmed through a testing program that half of the
CAFOs tested were exceeding state standards for hydrogen sulfide, some by up to 50
times," and "[vliolatlons occurred on a frequent basis, with one operation exceeding
the half-hour standard 32 times over 19 days." Id.
172. See id. at 76.
173.

See TROUBLE ON THE FARM, supra note 107, at 29.

174. See id.
175. See Zev Ross & Jonathan Kaplan, Californians for Pesticide Reform,
Poisoning the Air 1 (1998), available at (visited Apr. 8, 1999) <http://www.igc.org/
cpr/poisoned-air/airexecsum.html> (compilation of state government testing data).
176.

See TROUBLE ON THE FARM, supra note 107, at 30.
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II
THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SAFE HARBORS THAT FARMS ENJOY

Getting a handle on the environmental law of farms is
difficult. There is no unified code of environmental law for farms.
Federal environmental law is scattered throughout many
statutes, making it difficult to piece together the various
provisions that could apply to farms. Although the general theme
at the federal level is hands-off, no express or implied
preemption prevents states from more aggressively regulating
farms. To date, however, states have generally not chosen to
regulate the environmental impacts of farming in any
comprehensive manner. 7 ' We are left, therefore, with a collection
of provisions, spread throughout many different laws, which
combine to form what I call the "anti-law" of farms and the
environment. There are few exceptions to this anti-law.
A.

An Inventory of Safe Harborsfor Farming

The anti-law of farms and the environment comes in two
forms. Some laws, while not expressly exempting or even
mentioning farms, are structured in such a way that farms
escape most if not all of the regulatory impact. Other laws
expressly exempt farms from regulatory programs that would
otherwise clearly apply to them. Together, these passive and
active exemptions provide a large safe harbor for farms from the
impact of environmental law.
1.

Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act (CWA) 8 prohibits the "discharge of any
pollutant by any person" 9 into waters of the United States and
establishes a series of permit programs designed to regulate the
discharge of pollutants provided certain conditions are met.
Though seemingly straightforward, this prohibition is riddled
with important exemptions for farms. Although the CWA defines
"pollutant" to include "agricultural waste discharged into
water," 8 ° other provisions of the statute put discharges of
agricultural wastewater, stormwater, and fill material largely
177. The same political forces that operate on the federal level to impede
regulation of farms no doubt operate with equal or greater force at the state and local
level. See fnfra notes 391-401 and accompany text.
178. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). For an overview of the CWA programs, see
THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994).

179.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).

180.

1I § 1362(6).

ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 27:263

beyond regulatory reach.
a.

Wastewater Permits

Section 402 of the CWA establishes a permitting program,
known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), to regulate the discharge of pollutants.'' NPDES
permits may be issued only if, among other conditions, the
permittee satisfies a set of technology-based' 8 2 and water qualitybased' limitations on the amount and quality of discharged
effluent. For almost twenty years, the NPDES program focused
on discharges of wastewater effluent from "industrial"
processes- that is, water which had come into contact with
process wastes or which was used as a waste disposal medium.
Many wastewater discharges from agriculture, such as the
collected return flow from irrigated fields, appear to fit within the
NPDES permit program as generally described. Indeed, EPA
knew that this interpretation was inescapable under the CWA as
it was originally enacted."M Awed by the prospect of issuing
NPDES permits to two million farms, EPA thus promulgated an
administrative exemption from the statute's unambiguous
terms.'85 The courts struck down that exemption as contrary to
the clear intent and meaning of the CWA, "6 but in 1977
Congress overruled the courts and codified EPA's farm
exemption. The original version of the CWA defined discharge of
a pollutant as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source."187 To exempt farm irrigation return flows
181. See id. § 1342.
182. See td.§§ 1311, 1316-1317.
183. See id. §§ 1312- 1315.
184. See Kershen, supranote 15, at 3 (explaining that EPA took a broad view of its
CWA jurisdiction, leading the agency to conclude that farm irrigation return flows
channeled in ditches and other conveyances were covered).
185. See 38 Fed. Reg. 18,000, 18,003 (1973) (previously codified at 40 C.F.R. §
125.4). The regulation provided that "the following do not require an NPDES
permit:... U)Discharges of pollutants from agricultural and silvicultural activities,
including irrigation return flow and runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, pastures,
rangelands, and forest lands." with an exception for discharges from large confined
animal feeding operations and large irrigation projects. Id.
186. See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). EPA argued that the
regulatory exemption was necessary to allow the agency to avoid the "administrative
infeasibility" of issuing and administering millions of farm NPDES permits. See id. at
1374. Although the court rejected EPA's position, it explained that EPA could
accomplish most of its objectives by promulgating a general permit describing and
authorizing the classes of discharges it had sought to exempt entirely. See id. at
1380-82. EPA later accepted the court's invitation. See 42 Fed. Reg. 6846 (1977).
187. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994). The "point" in point source refers to the
requirement that the discharge be from "any discernible, confined and discrete
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from the reach of NPDES wastewater discharge permits,
Congress adopted the fiction that "these sources were practically
indistinguishable from any other agricultural runoff"8 and
simply redefined "point source" to exclude "return flows from
irrigated agriculture." 189 Congress drove home the point in
Section 402 as well, dictating that EPA may not "require a permit
under this section for discharges composed entirely of return
flows from irrigated agriculture," 90 and, leaving nothing to
doubt, elsewhere
described
irrigation return flows
as
"agriculturally... related nonpoint sources of pollution." 9 '
Through this exemption, therefore, farms that discharge soils,
animal wastes, fertilizers, and pesticides via return flows into
waters of the United States need no authorization for such
discharges under the CWA.' 912
b.

StormwaterPermits

Although EPA's focus for the first twenty years of the NPDES
program was on process wastewater, the CWA always provided
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id.
§ 1362(14).
188. S. REP. No. 95-370, at 35 (1977). reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4360.
189. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(b), 91 Stat. 1566, 1577
(1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994)).
190. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(c). 91 Stat. 1566, 1577 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(l)(1) (1994)).
191. Id. § 33(a) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (1994)) (emphasis added).
192. It is through this exemption, for example, that hundreds of thousands of
acres of California farm lands using subsurface drainage tile fields discharge polluted
wastewater to the San Joaquin Valley watershed. See Bobker, supra note 93, at 1416. The exemption does not apply to other wastewater discharges a farm might
produce, such as animal waste collected from feed lots, or manure distributed from
spreaders onto farm lands, when ultimately discharged through a point source. See
Concerned Area Residents v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994); see also
Kershen, supra note 15, at 4; Susan E. Schell, The UncertainFuture of Clean Water
Act Agricultural Pollution Exemptions After Concerned Area Residents for the
Environment v. Southview Farms, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 113 (1996). Recently, for
example, state and local prosecutors in California joined in filing four lawsuits
against dairy operators in San Joaquin County for allegedly allowing cattle manure
runoff to pollute waterways. See Carolyn Whetzel, Attorney General, County District
Attorney File Civil Complaints Against Dairy Operators, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), May 6,
1999, at A-9. Also, a court recently held that wastes removed from NPDES-regulated
manure holding ponds and spread on land as fertilizer remain subject to the
continuing jurisdiction of the NPDES permit, meaning that unpermitted discharges of
nonpoint runoff from the manure are illegal. See Community Ass'n for Restoration v.
Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (granting motion for
summary judgment); Susan Bruninga, Land Application of Manure Subject to CWA
Requirements, Court Says, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 173 (1999).
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EPA the authority, under certain conditions, to require permits
for stormwater discharged through point sources. In 1987,
Congress renewed EPA's attention to polluted stormwater
through a series of amendments outlining in detail a framework
for NPDES permitting of municipal and industrial stormwater
discharges.1 93 In the course of doing so, however, Congress made
it clear that the stormwater NPDES program would not extend to
farm stormwater runoff. As it had in 1977 for irrigation return
flows, Congress defined "point source" so as to exclude
"agricultural stormwater discharges." 9' 4 Hence, like irrigation
return flows, stormwater from farms collected in ditches, canals,
and other conveyances, and the pollutants carried in it, are
beyond NPDES stormwater program coverage. 195
c.

Dredge and FY11 Permits

The third major CWA water pollutant discharge permitting
program, found in Section 404 of the statute, covers "the
9 6
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters.""
This so-called dredge-and-fill permit program has been the
nation's principal vehicle for wetlands protection.'9 7 Prominently
excluded from the program, however, are discharges "from
normal farming... activities such as plowing, seeding,
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of
food.... or upland soil and water conservation practices." 98 A

193. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title IV, §§ 401-405, 101
Stat. 65, 65-69 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994)).
194. Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title V, § 503, 101 Stat. 75, 75 (1987) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994)). Congress believed these activities "have no serious adverse
impact on water quality," that regulating them under the dredge and fill permit
program would produce "no countervailing environmental benefit," and that they
would be "more properly controlled by State and local agencies." S. REP. NO. 95-370,
at 76, 77 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4401; see also 123 CONG. REC.
26,707 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Anderson) ("The exemption of these activities from
permit requirements will greatly simplify the administrative process and reduce the
potential redtape burden.").
195. But see supra note 192 (discussing cases applying NPDES program to
irrigation and stormwater runoff carrying pollutants from manure piled onto
farmlands).
196. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
197. For a history of how Section 404, which does not mention the word
"wetlands," has become associated primarily with wetlands protection, see Jason
Perdion, Protecting Wetlands Through the Clean Water Act and the 1985 and 1990
FarmBills: A Winning Trio, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 867, 869-73 (1997).
198. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(A) (1994). Additional exemptions apply to "construction or
maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches," id. § 1344(f)(I)(C), and
"construction or maintenance of farm roads," id. § 1344(f)(1)(E). See generally
Perdion, supra note 197, at 874-77.
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significant limitation on this "normal farming" exemption is that
it does not apply to activities intended to bring a wetlands area
into a use to which it was not previously subject.1 99 Hence,
"normal farming" does not include the conversion of a natural
wetlands area to a rice farm or the conversion of farmed
wetlands into upland cultivated farmlands. 0° Nevertheless,
continued farming in wetlands, or activities designed to reclaim
historically farmed wetlands, has accounted for substantial loss
and degradation of wetland ecosystems since the enactment of

the CWA.2"°

199. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (1994). This so-called "recapture" provision has
generally been construed broadly by courts and administrative agencies, making the
normal farming exemption narrow and tricky for farmers. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENGINEERS, SECTION 404 AND AGRICULTURE INFORMATION PAPER (1990) (addressing

various scenarios under the normal farming exemption and recapture provision); see
also Perdion, supra note 197, at 877-83.
200. The recapture provision addresses only those conversions of wetlands to
farming accomplished through discharges subject to Section 404. Two important
limitations on the scope of that jurisdiction apply to farms. First, farm wetland areas
converted to cropland uses before December 25, 1985- so-called "prior converted
croplands"- are not subject to Section 404. See 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (1993). Second,
a recent court decision holding that the Section 404 program does not reach draining
and clearing activities that do not involve more than incidental redischarge of small
amounts of debris opens the door to relatively easy conversion of many wetlands to
farming free of any Section 404 consequences. See National Mining Assoc. v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Revisions
to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material", 64
Fed. Reg. 25.120 (1999) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323 and 40 C.F.R. pt. 232) (revising
regulations to correspond to National Mining decision and explaining background
thereol). Some farmers already have attempted to take advantage of this turn of
events by draining wetlands for conversion to crop uses. See, e.g., In re Slinger
Drainage, Inc., CWA App. No. 98-10. 1999 WL 778576 (EPA App. Bd. 1999) (finding
that a farmer who drained wetlands after National Mining decision violated Section
404 because installation of drainage tiles involved more than incidental redischarge).
Such conversions may nonetheless have undesirable consequences to farmers under
farm subsidy programs and thus may not be widely implemented. See infra text
accompanying notes 356-61.
201.

See NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY,. supra note 7, at ES-27 to ES-29

(noting that agriculture was responsible for 54% of national wetland losses from the
mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, and remains the leading source of wetland
degradation). One of the murkiest issues involving wetlands and fanning is the
delineation of wetlands on farms and the determination of which such areas are prior
converted croplands for purposes of Section 404 and farm subsidy programs. See
Justin Lamunyon, Wetlands and the Swampbuster Provisions: The Delineation
Procedures, Options, and Alternatives for the American Farmer,73 NEB. L. REv. 163
(1994). Recently, environmental groups have alleged that USDA, the lead agency for
delineation of wetlands on farms, has used poor delineation methodology and
undercounted wetlands on farming land. See Susan Bruninga, Group Says Oversight
Inadequate in Delineations on Farmland Tracts, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 313 (1999);
Susan Bruninga, Group Charges EPA Overlooks Failings in Farmland Delineations,
Seeks Review, Daily Env't Rep. (DNA), June 14, 1999; at A-6.
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Nonpoint Source Water Pollution

In a classic example of passive nonregulation, the repeated
references in the CWA to "point source" as an essential criterion
for application of the NPDES program create one of the largest
safe harbors in environmental law for farms- the failure to
regulate nonpoint sources of water pollution. The size of this
harbor and its effects have not gone unnoticed." 2 It has,
however, remained largely open, particularly for farms.2 "3
Efforts to address nonpoint source water pollution in the
CWA and other statutes have been feeble, unfocused, and
underfunded. For example, Section 208 of the CWA required
states to develop area-wide waste treatment management plans
that were to include a process for identifying nonpoint sources
and establishing feasible control measures. 2 4 Upon EPA's
approval of a state's plan, the state could receive federal
assistance for the planning process. 20 1 With high expectations,
Congress used the program as the rationale for moving irrigation
return flows from the point source side of the CWA to the
nonpoint source side 20 6 and for excluding normal farming from
the Section 404 dredge-and-fill permit program.2 7 Similarly, in
the 1987 amendments, Congress added Section 319 to the
statute, requiring states to prepare "state assessment reports"
that identify waters which cannot reasonably be expected to
meet water quality standards because of nonpoint source

202, See Scott D. Anderson, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source
Pollution: The Massachusetts Approach. 26 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REv. 339, 339-40
(1999) ("[Tihe control of nonpoint source pollution continues to frustrate the [Clean
Water Act's] stated goal to 'restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters.'"): Kershen, supranote 15, at 3 (recounting
descriptions of nonpoint source pollution as "'the neglected legacy and unfinished
agenda' of federal water pollution laws").
203. For a comprehensive overview of federal regulation of nonpoint source water
pollution from farms, see Zaring. supra note 61; George A. Gould, Agriculture,
Nonpoint Source Pollution,and Federal Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 461 (1990).
204. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a) (1994); see also Haugrud, supra note 6, §
8.2(C)(31(b)(i, at 540-41.
205. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(o (1994); see also Haugrud, supra note 6, §
8.2(C)(3)(b)(ii), at 541-42.
206. See S. REP. No. 95-370, at 35 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4360 (-All such sources, regardless of the manner in which the flow was applied to
the agricultural lands, and regardless of the discrete nature of the entry point, are
more appropriately treated under the requirements of section 208(b)(2)(F)."); see also
supratext accompanying notes 185-93.
207. See S. REP. No. 95-370, at 76 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4401 (noting that Section 404 need not extend to normal farming activities because
they will be "controlled by State and local agencies under section 208(b}(4)").
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pollution." 8 States must prepare "state management programs"
prescribing the "best management practices" to control sources
of nonpoint pollution.0 9 When EPA approves a state's
assessment reports and management plans, the state is2 eligible
10
for federal financial assistance to implement its programs.
In the absence of any concrete, enforceable federal blueprint
for addressing nonpoint source pollution, the success of Sections
208 and 319 depended largely on state initiative. It is little
surprise, then, that neither Section 208 nor Section 319
Congress thus took a more
produced meaningful results.1
aggressive step in Section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act
Reauthorization Amendments of

1990,212

amending the Coastal

Zone Management Act 2 8 (CZMA) to add a requirement that any
state with a federally approved coastal zone management plan214
must develop a Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Program subject to
federal review and approval. 21 5 States must identify land uses
leading to nonpoint source pollution and develop measures to
apply "best available nonpoint pollution control practices,
technologies, processes, siting criteria, operating methods, or
other alternatives."2 1 6 When EPA and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration approve a state's Coastal Nonpoint
208. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1994).
209. See id. § 1329(b).
210. See id. § 1329(h).
211. An EPA Advisory Committee recently summed up the weakness of the
Section 208 and 319 programs by explaining that "EPA had no 'hammer' provision for
States not adopting programs and no ability to establish a program if a State chose
not to." EPA TMDL Federal Advisory Committee, Discussion Paper, Nonpoint SourceOnly Waters 5 (1997) (on file with author). See generally Anderson, supra note 202.
at 344 (noting that "the section 208 program failed to make any significant progress"
and under Section 319 "EPA continues to lack the authority to require the states to
take any affirmative action"); Kershen, supranote 15, at 4 (noting that "section 208
gave states great discretion ... and carried no enforcement penalties" and under
Section 319 "the states have been slow to act and EPA has limited enforcement
authority to make states act."): Zaring, supranote 61, at 10,130, 10,132 (noting that
Section 208 was "toothless" and Section 319 suffered from "not enough carrot, not
enough stick"). EPA continues nonetheless to devote considerable resources to the
Section 319 program, largely in the form of increased funding for states that EPA is
proposing be tied to the requirement that states follow "key elements" EPA is in the
process of developing. See Chances for Clean Water Bill Dim: EPA to Use Existing
Authorities on Nonpoint Sources, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Jan. 20, 1999, at S- 18.
212. Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title VI, § 6217 (1990), 104 Stat. 1388-314.
213. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994).
214. For a description of the CZMA coastal management plan provisions, see infra
text accompanying note 431.
215. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455b (1994). See generally Clare Saperstein, State Solutions
to Nonpoint Source Pollution: Implementation and Enforcement of the 1990 Coastal
Zone Amendments ReauthorizationAct Section,6217. 75 B.U. L. REV. 889 (1995).
216. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(g)(5) (1994).
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Pollution Program, the federal government agrees not to fund,
authorize, or carry out projects inconsistent with the state's
plan. 217 For coastal states, this requirement can serve as an
impetus for more aggressive regulation of nonpoint source
pollution, but federal funding assistance is woefully short of the
expected cost of plan preparation and implementation.2 15
Another federally-based incentive for state regulation of
nonpoint source pollution derives from the CWA's program for
determining Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) waste load
allocations under Section 303(d) of the CWA.21 9 Where
application of the technology-based NPDES permit discharge
limits does not bring a water body within ambient water quality
standards,2 2 the TMDL program implements a procedure to

217. See id. § 1455b(k). EPA has recently outlined the guidelines for federal
consistency determinations. See Section 319 Federal Consistency Guidance, 63 Fed.
Reg. 45,504 (1998).
218.

See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 973 (2d ed. 1996)

(noting that EPA estimated the cost of implementing the measures contemplated in
the program at $390 million to $590 million, whereas only $50 million in grant
money was available).
219. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994).
220. Water quality standards are based on two components: (1) designated uses of
the water body, such as recreation or water supply, and (2) water quality criteria,
which set concentration levels for individual pollutants designed to attain particular
designated uses. Water quality standards thus are designed to regulate ambient
water pollution concentrations for identified pollutants in different classes of waters.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1994); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supranote 218, at 937. One
of the difficulties facing efforts to apply the water quality standards program to water
pollution from farming is that, at present, no federally-promulgated water quality
criteria exist for nutrients from nitrogen and phosphorous discharges. EPA, however,
is in the process of developing them. See Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency. Nutrient Criteria Technical Guidance Manual: Rivers and Streams (review
draft of Sept. 1999); Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Nutrient Criteria
Technical Guidance Manual: Lakes and Reservoirs (review draft of Apr. 1999); U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency, Notice of National Strategy for the Development of Regional
Nutrient Criteria, 63 Fed. Reg. 34,648 (1998); see also Susan Bruninga, Effort to Set
Nutrient CriteriaPremature,Too Burdensome on PO7lWs, Officials Say, 30 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 172 (1999); Susan Bruninga, Regulating Nutrients, Implementing ControlsFocus
of EPA Meeting on Draft Criteria,30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 310 (1999): Karen L. Werner,
Project to Guide States in Development of Limits for Pesticides in Impaired Waters, 30
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1284 (1999). In the meantime, some states have developed their
own nutrient criteria in the absence of federal guidelines, though the process has
often been contentious. See Pamela S. Clarke & Stacey M. Cronk, The Pennsylvania
Nutrient Management Act: PennsylvaniaHelps to "Save the Bay" Through Nonpoint
Source Pollution Management, 6 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 319 (1995); Alfred R. Light, The

Myth of Everglades Settlement, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 55, 62-65 (1998) (discussing
litigation over Florida's water quality criteria for phosphorous); McElfish, supra note
232, at 10,197. The Ecological Sciences Division of the Department of Agriculture's
Natural Resources Conservation Service is also developing policies for providing
nutrient management technical assistance in connection with programs protecting
highly erodible lands and wetlands. See 64 Fed. Reg. 19,122 (1999).
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impose more restrictive discharge limits on the NPDES
permittees.22 ' Under the TMDL program, states must identify
impaired water bodies, calculate the total maximum daily
loading of pollutants that the water body can tolerate while still
meeting water quality goals, and then allocate the necessary
reduction in total discharges among NPDES dischargers and,
theoretically, nonpoint source dischargers of that pollutant."'
221. The TMDL program thus represents the intersection of the CWA's technologybased and water quality-based components of regulation. For comprehensive
explanations of the TMDL program, see Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to
Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 203, 215-30
(1999); Office of the Administrator, U.S. EPA, Report of the Federal Advisory
Committee on the Total Maximum Daily Load ('IMDL) Program(1998), (visited Feb. 8,
2000) <http://www/epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl>, and in particular review the series
consisting of Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality StandardsBased Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,329
(1997): Oliver A. Houck. TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water
Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,391 (1997); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Frameworkfor the Clean Water
Act's Ambient Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,415 (1998);
Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,469 (1999). The TMDL program lay dormant for almost twenty years before a
series of lawsuits against states and EPA in the early 1990s resulted in courtimposed deadlines for completing the TMDL process in many states. See Adler,
supra, at 221; Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?, supra. As the weight of litigation
turned against them, EPA and the states worked to develop a plan to carry out the
TMDL program nationally over a twelve year period beginning in 1998. For current
information on this development and the status of the TMDL program, see Office of
Water, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Total Daily Maximum Load (IMDL) Program
(visited June 10, 1999) <http:/www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl>.
222. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994). EPA recently distributed proposed TMDL
regulations designed to include many nonpoint sources in the full scope of the TMDL
program. See Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management, 64
Fed. Reg. 46,011 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 130.33(b)(6)); Revisions to the
Federal
Elimination System Program and
Pollutant Discharge
National
Antidegradation Policy in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and
Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46,057 (1999) (proposed rule amending
various provisions of 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). See generally Lisa E. Roberts, Is the Gun
Loaded This Time? EPA's Proposed Revisions to the Total Maximum Daily Load
Program. 6 ENVTL. LAw. 635 (2000). Nevertheless, there is far from universal
agreement as to whether the CWA allows allocation of a portion of the pollutant load
to nonpoint sources. Indeed, farming groups have initiated litigation challenging
EPA's authority to implement the TMDL program so as to assign allocations to
nonpoint sources. See Susan Bruninga, Suit Challenging EPA Authority to Set TMDLs
for Nonpoint Sources Concerns Cities, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), May 27, 1999, at A-2;
Houck, TMDLs IV, supra note 152, at 10,474. Some members of Congress have also
questioned EPA's authority in this regard. See Susan Bruninga, House Panel
Members Question EPA Authority to Issue ThfDL Proposal. 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1241
(1999). EPA's Federal Advisory Committee on TMDL's declined to address these legal
issues in its final report. See Office of the Administrator. U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on the Total Maximum Daily Load
(7MDL) Program 42 (1998) (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://www/epa.gov/
OWOW/tmdl>. In the first judicial opinion on the question, a California federal
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States must include TMDL implementation as part of "continuing
planning process" programs that EPA must approve in order for
a state to retain delegation to administer the NPDES permit
program within its boundaries.2 2 3

The TMDL program stops there, however, providing no
independent source of authority for enforcing load reduction
allocations. 224

Enforcing

allocations

for

NPDES

permit

dischargers is a straightforward matter of tightening NPDES
permits to reduce total discharges of the pollutants of concern.225
For nonpoint sources, however, the most EPA can say is that
TMDL load allocations are to be "enforced" through the Section
319 program, 22 which, as pointed out above, fails to secure real
gains in control of nonpoint source discharges from farms.
EPA has recognized the obstacle this dichotomy poses to
TMDL program implementation. In waters impaired primarily or
exclusively by nonpoint sources, EPA has proposed a policy that
allows states that promulgate demonstrable means of reducing
nonpoint source pollution in a given water body to ease the
burdens on NPDES permittees.22 7 Where that approach does not
district court held that agricultural nonpoint source pollution must be included in
TMDL determinations, but that states have discretion as to the load reduction
allocation between point and nonpoint sources. See Pronsolino v. Marcus, No. C9901828WHA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2000). Given the complexities involved in the TMDL
and waste load allocation calculations, it appears likely that the implementation
process will continue to face litigation challenges at virtually every stage. See Dana A.
Elfin, Challenges to Total Maximum Daily Loads Possible Following Upcoming EPA
Regulation, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 311 (1999) (reporting that discharger groups are
filing "pre-litigation type comments" on proposed TMDL allocations).
223. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(C) (1994).
224. See Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Total Maximum Daily Load
(IMDL) Program,Memorandumfrom Robert Perciasepe,EPA Assistant Administrator,to
Regional Administrators and Regional Water Division Directors Re: New Policies for
Establishingand Implementing Total Maximum Daily Loads (Aug. 8, 1997) (visited Feb.
1, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/ratepace.html> [hereinafter Perciasepe
Memorandum] ('A TMDL improves water quality when the pollutant allocations are
implemented, not when a TMDL is established.... Section 303(d) does not establish
any new implementation authorities beyond those that exist elsewhere in State, local,
Tribal, or Federal law."). Because the TMDL program is limited in this respect,
establishing TMDLs "trigger[s] no additional obligations on the part of any [nonpoint
source]." Federal Advisory Committee, supra note 211. at 5.
225. See 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1994); see also Perciasepe Memorandum, supra
note 224 ("[Ploint sources implement the wasteload allocations within TMDLs
through enforceable water quality-based discharge limits in NPDES pernits
authorized under section 402 of the CWA.").
226. See Perciasepe Memorandum, supra note 224 (i[Pirograms and efforts for
control of nonpoint sources should be described in the State nonpoint source
management program under section 319.").
227. For example, one of EPA's proposed policies is designed to prevent
degradation of existing water quality levels by requiring that new significant point
sources in a watershed offset their pollutant load with reductions in the existing
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work, EPA suggests that states simply declare, presumably as a

matter of state law, that offending nonpoint sources are actually
point sources and require state-issued NPDES permits and full
TMDL compliance.2 2 Nonpoint source pollution, a significant
contributor to water quality degradation, has been unregulated
for decades. Substantial gains in water quality thus could be
achieved through such an intense focus on nonpoint source
pollution. In addition, the marginal costs of pollution reduction
for nonpoint sources might be well below those that NPDES
permittees would bear to achieve the same reductions in
pollutant loads. Although it is questionable whether the EPA can
use the TMDL program in such a manner or require states to do
the same, the program may allow states to do so in order to
balance the costs of water quality improvement between point
and nonpoint sources.2 2 9
The problem with relying on the CZMA's program and CWA's
TMDL program as the foundations for regulating farm nonpoint
pollution is that neither program addresses farms specifically at
baseline load by a ratio of less than one-to-one. Where the reductions are made to
nonpoint source pollution sources, EPA has explained that "the discharger's NPDES
permit would need to contain any conditions necessary to ensure that the load
reductions from the nonpoint source will be realized." 64 Fed. Reg. 46,057, 46,071
(1999); see also Perciasepe Memorandum, supra note 224 (noting that under the
TMDL program, "where any wasteload load allocation to a point source is increased
based on an assumption that loads from nonpoint sources will be reduced, the State
must provide 'reasonable assurances' that the nonpoint source load allocations will
in fact be achieved"); Office of Water, U.S. EPA. Ensuring That TMDLs Are
Implemented- Reasonable Assurance (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/
OWOW/tmdl/ensure.html> ("In allocating reductions to nonpoint sources, States
must provide reasonable assurance that those nonpoint sources will meet their
allocated amount of reductions.").
228. See Office of Water, supra note 227 ("Reasonable assurance is satisfied by
designating these [nonpoint] sources as point sources and issuing them an NPDES
permit."].
229. EPA cannot mandate the methods by which states accomplish this
balancing, but the agency has suggested that states may institute "regulatory, nonregulatory, or incentive-based [measures], depending on the program." Perciasepe
Memorandum, supra note 224. The use of incentive-based measures could, for
example, allow NPDES dischargers to pay for nonpoint source dischargers' reductions
in discharge loads and thereby ease restrictions in their NPDES permits. The irony is
that farms, the leading source of water pollution in America, would be paid to stop
polluting. This prospect is likely to pit farms and other nonpoint sources against
NPDES dischargers, which are more likely to support EPA's suggestion that
reasonable assurance can also be demonstrated through the direct regulation of
nonpoint sources. EPA has essentially left it to each state to decide how to resolve the
debate, but it has made clear that a state's failure to resolve the debate will result in
federal imposition of TMDLs and load allocations. See Office of Water, supra note 227
("Because reasonable assurance is a required element of a TMDL, EPA may then
disapprove that State's TMDL. If EPA disapproves a TMDL, EPA must establish the
I
TMDL.").
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the federal level. States, in other words, will have the discretion
to achieve the general goal of nonpoint source pollution control
in ways that do not place serious burdens on farms, or leave
farms entirely unregulated.2 3 ° Some states have done exactly that
"
in their initial TMDL implementation policies.23
' Indeed, in a
recent series of comprehensive studies of state law, the
Environmental Law Institute identified few states with any
meaningful program regulating farm nonpoint source pollution,
much less an actively enforced one.232 Most states have followed
the federal lead and focused on point source pollution; of those
that have ventured into addressing nonpoint source pollution,
most leave farms out of the picture. 233 EPA remains
fundamentally powerless to require otherwise.2 " Hence, while
the impetus for state regulation of nonpoint pollution is growing
under the CZMA and the CWA, farms appear poised to slip

230. Even if the CWA allows EPA to include nonpoint sources directly in the TMDL
program, in the end "states have discretion in allocating pollution loads among
sources as long as the allocations will meet TMDL targets." Report of the Federal
Advisory Committee, supra note 211, at iii. States will be free to leave farms out of
the picture even if other nonpoint sources such as urban runoff are covered. Indeed,
although EPA's proposed TMDL rules aggressively invite states to cover more farm
animal feeding operations as point sources, see 64 Fed. Reg. 46,057, 46,074 (1999),
the proposed rules are otherwise silent with respect to farms. For further discussion
of the animal feeding operations issue, see infra text accompanying notes 307-26.
231. For example, Florida recently enacted a TMDL implementation statute that
subjects only nonagriculturalnonpoint source pollution to load allocations by the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, leaving agricultural sources subject
to voluntary best management practices developed by the Florida Department of
Agriculture. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.067(7)(c) (nonagricultural sources) &
403.067(7)(d) (agricultural sources).
232. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS FOR THE
CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1997); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE,
RESEARCH REPORT: ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAWS TO CONTROL NONPOINT
SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1998); James M. McElfish, State Enforcement Authorities

for Polluted Runoff, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,181, 10,195-99 (1998).
233. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INSTITUTE, ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS, supra
note 232, at iii ("Agriculture is the most problematic area for enforceable [nonpoint
source water pollution] mechanisms. Many laws of general applicability. . . have
exceptions for agriculture. Where state laws exist, they often defer to incentives, cost
sharing, and voluntary programs."); McElfish, supra note 232, at 10,182. Although
"no state is entirely without any enforceable authority relevant to nonpoint source
discharges ... some states have few such authorities [and] others have adopted a
bewildering array of enforceable tools... paired with equally bewildering arrays of
exemptions and exclusions." Id.
234. For example, EPA has explained that for water bodies impaired primarily or
exclusively by nonpoint source pollution, the primary implementation mechanism for
the TMDL program "will generally be the State section 319 nonpoint source
management program coupled with State. local, and Federal land management
programs and authorities. For example, voluntary, incentive-based approaches at the
State and local level can be used.. . ." Perciasepe Memorandum, supranote 224.
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through the process once again. Although states could reverse
this continuation of past practice, farms appear likely to retain a
safe harbor for their nonpoint source discharges.
3.

Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act (CAA) provides a complex and
comprehensive regulatory framework covering stationary and
mobile sources of air pollution.2" 5 Although farms do not enjoy
the range of express exemptions under the CAA that they do
under the CWA, they generally escape most CAA regulatory
programs by virtue of de minimus discharge exceptions. By
limiting their emphasis to "major sources" emitting more than
threshold quantities of regulated pollutants, CAA regulatory
programs essentially give farms yet another safe harbor, this one
for air pollution. 23r By contrast, other sectors of the agriculture

economy upstream and downstream of farms are heavily
regulated by the CAA.237
A significant CAA regulatory program not tied to minimum
emission quantity thresholds leaves the fate of farms open to the
states and thus largely beyond direct federal control. Under
Sections 108 and 109 of the CAA, EPA must designate "criteria"
air pollutants that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare, and then establish nationally uniform

235. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). For an overview of the CAA programs,
see THE CLEAN AIR AcT HANDBOOK (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds.,
1998).
236. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1994) (defining major source of hazardous
air pollutants as a source emitting 10 tons per year of any such polutant or 25 tons
per year of any combination of such pollutants); id. § 7479(1) (defining major source
for purposes of permits designed to prevent significant deterioration of air quality
generally as any source emitting 250 tons per year of any air pollutant: farms are not
included in the list of specifically identified sources requiring only 100 tons per year
to qualify as major); id. § 76020) (defining major source generally for the CAA to mean
any source emitting 100 tons per year of any pollutant, unless otherwise specified).
One exception is the CAA program for standards of performance for new stationary
sources, which establishes no "major source" threshold. See id. § 7411. However, the
new source emission limits apply only to categories of sources EPA has designated
and for which it has promulgated such standards. EPA has not done so for farms
generally, though grain terminal elevators storing over 2.5 million bushels are subject
to gas emission opacity and particulate matter emission limits. See 40 C.F.R. subpt.
DD, § 60.300 (1999) (standards of performance for grain elevators).
237. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 33,550 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63)
(EPA final rule regulating emissions of hazardous air pollutants from pesticide
manufacturers); 64 Fed. Reg. 31,358 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63)
(EPA final rule regulating emissions of hazardous air pollutants from fertilizer
manufacturers).
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ambient air quality standards.2 38 Section I10 of the CAA allows
states, if they elect to do so, to develop State Implementation
Plans (SIPs) prescribing the enforceable measures the state will
implement to achieve the NAAQS. 2 39 Within the SIP framework,
the details are left to state discretion. The criteria pollutants are
federally designated, but the questions of whom and what to
regulate in order to achieve the federal standards are left to the
states. 240 Although states could regulate air pollutant emissions
from farms within that scope of discretion, 24 1 most states do not
do so rigorously, and EPA actively dissuades them from doing
SO.242

238. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994). For a thorough overview of the NAAQS
program, comparing its operation to that of the CWA water quality protection
programs, see Adler, supra note 221, at 230-34.
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994). See generally Adler, supranote 221, at 234-50.
If a state elects not to prepare a SIP, or prepares one that does not meet EPA
approval, EPA must prepare a Federal Implementation Plan for the area in question.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1994).
240. See United Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 267, 269 (1976) ("[T]he State
has virtually absolute power in allocating emissions limitations so long as the
national standards are met.... Congress plainly left the States, so long as the
national standards were met, the power to determine which sources would be
burdened by regulation and to what extent.").
241. EPA has explained that "the degree to which ambient air emissions from
farming practices- such as prescribed burning- are allowed are location-specific
(specific to a geographic area) within each State Implementation Plan." National
Agric. Compliance Assistance Ctr., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Laws & PoliciesCleanAirAct 3 (visited Apr. 22, 1999) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ag/Icaa.html>.
242. For example, faced with the prospect that its new regulations establishing
NAAQS for fine particulate matter could extend to farm emissions of soil and
particulates from tilling, prescribed burning, and other practices, EPA is currently
devising policies to allow farms to escape regulation. EPA has contended that farms
do not constitute major sources of the fine particulates, though data to support that
claim appear to be nonexistent. Farm industry advocates are concerned that states
could nonetheless attempt to regulate farm emissions through the state SIPs, so EPA
is developing "guidance" for states that will reflect the purportedly small contribution
farms make to fine particulate emissions. These and other issues are the subject of
the Agricultural Air Quality Task Force EPA and USDA jointly established in 1997.
See Alec Zacaroli, Agencies Develop MOU Addressing Agricultural Impacts on Air
Quality; 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1282 (1997). The issue has been complicated by a recent
court decision striking down EPA's new rule on the ground that it violates the
nondelegation doctrine. See American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1999): see also Alec C. Zacaroli. Court Rulings Imperil EPA's Efforts to Clamp Down on
Ozone Pollution, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 325 (1999). A related program designed to
protect visibility in and near national parks and other vista areas may provide states
with another opportunity to regulate farm emissions. Section 169A of the CAA
establishes this so-called "regional haze" regulatory program, new regulations which
EPA recently promulgated to require all states to develop regional haze SIPs to
achieve clear visibility for protected areas by the year 2064. See Regional Haze
Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35713 (July 1, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51);
see also Eric L. Hiser, Regional Haze and Visibility: PotentialImpacts for Industry. 29
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2597 (1999). Although few protected areas lie close to heavily
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Under the CAA's program for prevention of significant
deterioration (PSD) of air quality, in areas where the NAAQS is
met for a regulated pollutant, states must establish "increments"
of maximum air quality degradation and administer permits for
major sources of the covered pollutant.2 4 3 States may exclude
from the increment "concentrations of particulate matter
attributable to the increase in emissions from... temporary
emission-related activities."244 This provision would probably
cover prescribed seasonal agricultural burning. Hence, although
farms would not normally be regulated under the PSD permitting
program as they would not meet the "major source" threshold,2 45
the exclusion of seasonal burning removes any incentive a state
may have to restrict such fanning practices in order to protect
the area's increment for other economically valuable sources of
emissions.
Beyond the general omission of farm regulation from the
CAA framework, several specific exemptions for farms apply, or
are proposed to apply, under programs that might otherwise
capture some farming emissions. For example, Section 112 of the
CAA requires sources of designated hazardous air pollutants to
comply with specified prevention, control, and reporting
conditions. Facilities that use the chemicals in quantities above
specified thresholds must prepare and file a "risk management
plan" with EPA prescribing measures for prevention of and
response to accidental releases. 4 6 Farms do not enjoy a blanket
exemption from these requirements: rather, the program allows
EPA wide discretion to set threshold quantities and "exempt
entirely" any substance that is used as a nutrient in
agriculture.24 7 EPA has done so for ammonia, exempting it "when
held by farmers."2" EPA also has raised the quantity threshold
farmed areas, the farm industry has expressed concerns that states may implement
regional haze SIPs so as to restrict emissions from tilling and prescribed burning,
which could be transported in the atmosphere to distant protected areas. Farming
groups have suggested that they would seek congressional intervention should states
focus on farms with that objective. See James Kennedy, Farmers Fear Haze Rule
Implementation, Could Seek Congressional Help, Group Says, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2558 (1999). As of yet there is no evidence that states are moving toward regulation
of farms under regional haze SIPs any more than they have under the NAAQS SIPs.
243. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7478 (1994).
244. Id. § 7473(c)(1}(C).
245. See supra note 237 (discussing the major source feature of the PSD and
other CAA programs).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994).
247. See id. § 7412(r)(5).
248. 40 C.F.R. § 68.125 (1999). EPA has explained that the ammonia exemption
applies "as long as it is used on that [farm] establishment. It would not be exempt if
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for propane, widely used on farms for heating, cooling, drying
grain, and powering irrigation systems, to a level that effectively
removes farms from the scope of the planning requirement.24 9
Regulation of emissions from mobile source fuels and
engines under Subpart II of the CAA2 50 also takes a hands-off
approach to farms. For example, Section 209 of the CAA
preempts states from controlling emissions from "new
engines... used in farm equipment or vehicles and which are
smaller than 175 horsepower." 25 1 Farms also are exempt from the

requirement that centrally-fueled fleets of vehicles use lowerpolluting fuels.252
A recent example of the clout the farm industry has in
securing safe harbors in the air pollution realm comes at the
international environmental policy level. The production and
consumption of methyl bromide, a colorless gas used as a
pesticide on more than 100 crops, has been banned both
domestically and internationally because it depletes the
stratospheric ozone layer.2 53 International protocols will ban
methyl bromide in 20 10.24 Originally, the CAA specified a
domestic phase-out date of 2001;255 however, under tremendous

resold or used on another establishment." National Agric. Compliance Assistance
Ctr., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Laws & Policies- Clean Air Act 6 (visited Apr. 22,
1999) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ag/Icaa.html>. Congress added the nutrient
exemption option because it believed "the imposition of costly and burdensome
regulation on routine use of ammonia emissions associated with the production of
crop nutrients would place an undue economic burden on an already beleaguered
farm economy," and because "America's farmers have learned to live with and handle
ammonia safely." See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385.
249. See Browner Signs Administrative Stay to Exempt Fuels from Risk
Management Requirements, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), May 25, 1999, at A-4. In response
to a court-ordered stay issued in connection with litigation challenging EPA's
authority to extend the program to fuel-related uses of propane, see National Propane
Gas Assoc. v. EPA, No. 96-1278 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 1999), EPA simultaneously stayed
the risk management program for propane, see 64 Fed. Reg. 29,168 (1999), and
proposed a regulation raising the propane threshold quantity to a level that effectively
will exclude farms even if the litigation challenging coverage of propane does not
succeed, see 64 Fed. Reg. 29,171 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68).
250. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590 (1994).
251. Id. § 7543(e)(l).
252. See id. §§ 7586 (application of clean fuels requirement to centrally fueled
fleets) & 7581(5) (exemption of farm vehicles).
253. For background on methyl bromide and the phase-out bans, see U.S.
General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-96-16, The Phaseout of Methyl Bromide in
the United States (1995): Sondra Goldshein, Methyl Bromide: The Disparity Between
the Pesticide's PhaseoutDates Under the Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 577 (1998).
254. See Goldshein, supra note 253, at 587-92.
255. See id. at 585-86.
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farm industry lobby pressure, Congress extended the
implementation date.256 Hence, where the CAA's "passive" safe
harbors for farms do not suffice to protect farms, Congress often
provides targeted "active" safe harbors. Although there have been
efforts by a few states to regulate farm air pollutant emissions
more aggressively, they are trivial by comparison to the overall
negligence in this area.25 '
4.

Agrochemical Regulation Laws

Farms purchase pesticides and fertilizers, apply them to
crops and soils, and any excess is removed by water runoff and
air dispersal. As demonstrated above, the CWA and CAA do not
purport to reach this "disposal" of chemicals in any meaningful
way. Consistent with that theme, the nation's core agrochemical
regulation statute, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),258 does little to regulate farm
applications of pesticides and leaves fertilizers untouched. FIFRA
is primarily a product-licensing statute under which no one may
sell, distribute, or use a pesticide unless it has been registered
with EPA.259 The registration process for new pesticides involves
testing designed to detect the harmful effects a product may have
on the environment. 2 ° Approved pesticides must be periodically
256. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §
764(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-36 (1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(h) (1994)). EPA
had indicated its receptiveness to the extension, and USDA lobbied outright in its
favor. See Goldshein, supranote 253, at 599-601.
257. See Kip Betz. Agricultural Coalition Asks Court to Void, Block Enforcement of
OdorRegulations, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 952 (1999) (discussing dispute over attempt by
Missouri to promulgate ambient air standard for hydrogen sulfide); Kip Betz, State's
Largest Hog Producer Submits Plan to Control Odors, Risk of Waste Spills, 30 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1338 (1999) (large hog farm agrees to odor control measures as part of
consent agreement in settlement of state environmental law violations); Trevor Oliver,
Fighting Corporate Pigs: Citizen Action and Feedlot Regulation in Minnesota, 83 MINN.
L. REv. 1893, 1901-04 (1999) (discussing Minnesota's ambient air standard for
hydrogen sulfide from feedlots, which has no federal counterpart).
258. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994). For an overview of the FIFRA program, see
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw ch. 5 (2d ed. 1994). For an excellent
summary of how FIFRA applies to farms, see Michael T. Olexa, Institute of Food and
Agricultural Sciences, Fact Sheet FRE-71. Laws Governing Use and Impact of
Agricultural Chemicals: Registration, Labeling, and the Use of Pesticides (rev. ed.
1995).
259. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994]. EPA reviews about 15,000 pesticide
registration applications annually, most of which involve new formulations containing
active ingredients which have already been registered. Only about 15 new active
ingredients are registered each year. See Rao et al., supra note 97,at 2. FIFRA allows
states to register pesticides for use in their respective boundaries, subject to EPA
review. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c) (1994).
260. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1994) (EPA must find that the pesticide "will
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re-registered, which involves a thorough review of available data
about the pesticide. 261 The end result of FIFRA's registration
program, assuming the pesticide is approved and retains its
registration, is a label describing, among other things, how the
pesticide must be used.26 2
By regulating which pesticides can be made and sold, FIFRA
clearly

has a direct effect on farm pesticide use. 263

Direct

regulation of farms, however, is not a main concern of FIFRA: the
statute does little more than require that pesticides be applied by
certified persons and consistent with their label instructions.
Pesticides are approved for either "general use," in which case
anyone can apply them,2 4 or "restricted use," which requires
application by a certified applicator. 265 For purposes of restricted
pesticide use on farms, FIFRA divides users into "private
applicators" who use or supervise the use of restricted pesticides
for agricultural commodity production on property owned or
leased

by

them

or

their

employers, 266

and

"commercial

applicators" who are hired to apply restricted pesticides or
otherwise do not qualify as private applicators.26 7 Commercial
applicators must pass a rigorous certification test administered
by EPA or a state-approved program: 26 s private applicators must
also obtain certification, but may not be required to take an
examination. 26 9 In addition to following worker safety rules, 27 ° all
perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment.").
261. See id. § 136a-1.
262. See id. § 136a(c)(l)(C). It is a violation of FIFRA "to use any registered
pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling." Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G).
263. See Looney, supra note 6, at 796-97. EPA can take its product restriction
authority one step further toward direct regulation of farm practices by conditioning
the legal use of a pesticide. A current example is EPA's proposed rule to restrict the
legal sale and use of five pesticides that are in common use on farms- alachlor,
atrazine, cyanazine, metolachlor, and simazine- except in compliance with an EPAapproved state management plan outlining measures farms must employ for
groundwater protection. See 61 Fed. Reg. 33,260 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 152 & 156).
264. See7 U.S.C. § 136a(d) (1994).
265. See id. § 136a(d)(1)(C)(i). A pesticide must be classified as restricted if EPA
determines that it "may generally cause, without additional regulatory restrictions,
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, including injury to the applicator."
Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C).
266. See id. § 136e(2).
267. See Ar. § 136e(3).
268. See id. § 136i. EPA has promulgated rules for states to use in administering
the certified applicator tests. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 171 (1999).
269. See40 C.F.R. § 171.5 (1999).
270. Thousands of farm workers have become ill or died from exposure to
pesticides in the farm workplace. See generally Carpenter, supra note 4, at 191-95
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certified applicators- private and commercial- must maintain
records of restricted pesticide applications, showing product,
amount, date, location, and area of application, and comply with
any additional state recordkeeping requirements,2"' but they
need not report the applications to anyone unless a federal
agency (acting through the USDA), state agency (acting through
a designated lead state agency), or health professional
administering medical treatment so requests or state law
27 2
requires regular disclosure.
In short, so long as the label instructions are followed, the
applicator is properly certified and the applicator follows worker
safety and recordkeeping requirements, FIFRA imposes no direct
restrictions or requirements on farms. While this does not
amount to a complete safe harbor for farm use of pesticides,
FIFRA's hands-off approach to farms-the primary users of
pesticides- pales in comparison with the CAA and CWA's
regulatory approach to their targeted industries. Under FIFRA,
with regard to farmers, no permits are required, no
environmental or efficiency performance standards are imposed,
no technology-based standards are applied, no regular public
reporting of pesticide applications is required, and no monitoring
of pesticide levels in soils, runoff, or groundwater is required.
Although some states regulate pesticide applications more
aggressively than does FIFRA, it is fair to say that the nation has
no comprehensive regulatory framework governing farm use of
pesticides.
Farm use of fertilizers is subject to even less federal and
273
state control. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
(summarizing studies of farming occupational health threats). Regulations to protect
farm workers from the dangers of exposure to pesticides have been controversial,
though ultimately limited in effect, for over twenty-five years. See Haugrud, supra
note 6, § 8.2(C)(2)(h), at 366-67. Most such regulation at the federal level is
channeled through EPA's authority to regulate the uses of pesticides under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, under which EPA has
promulgated rules regarding hazard notification to workers and restriction of workers
from areas where pesticides have recently been applied. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 170 (1999).
EPA continues to explore other ways of directly and indirectly ensuring farm worker
protection through this and other authorities. See, e.g., Setting Residue Limits Not
Way to Reduce Farm Children'sExposure, Industry Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA). Dec.
22, 1998, at A8 (discussing issue of whether EPA should establish food pesticide
residue limits as a way of reducing risks to children in farm occupational settings).
271. See 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a) (1999).
272. See id. § 136i-1(b) to (c). Certified commercial applicators must provide
copies to the person for whom the application was performed. See t. § 1361- 1(a)(2).
USDA and EPA must also survey certified applicator records to develop a database
sufficient to compile annual reports concerning pesticide use. See id. § 136i-1 (0.
273. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
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requires pre-manufacture
registration
of the chemical
ingredients of fertilizers;2 74 however, TSCA imposes no use
restrictions equivalent to FIFRA's labeling, certification, worker
safety, or recordkeeping provisions, and few states impose more
rigorous controls. s As previously explained, the CWA and CAA
offer a mixture of active and passive safe harbors for pollution
that results from farm use of fertilizers. Other federal
environmental laws contain numerous express exemptions for
"normal application of fertilizers."2 76 Overall, then, fertilizers are
simply not in the sights of federal environmental laws.
5.

Chemical Storage and Release Reporting Laws

One of the most prominent trends that has unfolded with the
proliferation of federal environmental statutes is the use of
information disclosure devices as an adjunct to direct regulation
of pollution behavior.7 7 These measures range from the
requirements in Superfund 7 8 and the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)2 79 that persons who
release designated hazardous substances in specified quantities
must report such events to public authorities, 8 0 to EPCRA's
broader emergency planning and toxic release inventory (TRI)
programs.28 1 These programs have significantly increased the
information available to the government and citizens about the
sources and magnitude of chemical releases to the
274. See Ad. § 2604(a).
275. Washington recently enacted fertilizer registration legislation that imposes
restrictions on the metals content of fertilizers. See Nan Netherton, Governor Signs
Bill on Dairy Farms, Changes to Commercial FertilizerRules, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 186
(1999).
276. See, e.g., infra notes 284 (hazardous substance release reporting), 286
[chemical storage reporting), and 299 (contaminated site remediation liability).
277. See Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of
EnvironmentalRisks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998) (describing the regulatory impact of
several environmental information disclosure programs). The growing importance of
information disclosure and other "right-to-know" mechanisms to environmental
regulation and enforcement is evidenced by EPA's recent decision to create a new
Office of Information. See Sara Thurin Rollin, New Information Office to Focus On TRI,
Confidential Information, FOA Rule Changes, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), June 16, 1999,

at AA- 1.
278. Superfund is the shorthand name for the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). For an
overview of the Superfund remediation and liability programs, see RODGERS, supra
note 258, ch. 8.
279. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994). For an overview of the EPCRA program,
see JAMES M. KuszAJ, THE EPCRA COMPLIANCE MANUAL (1997).

280.
281.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(a) (1994) (Superfund) & 11004 (EPCRA).
See id. §§ 11022 (emergency planning) & 11023 (toxic releases).
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environment.2 82 But not surprisingly, farms have been left out of
the information revolution in environmental law.
Superfund, for example, excludes "the normal application of
fertilizer" from the definition of release 283 and excludes from
reporting requirements any application of a FIFRA-registered
pesticide. 284

EPCRA excludes from the definition of hazardous

chemicals subject to emergency planning and storage
285
notification any substance in "routine agricultural operations,"
and the EPCRA TRI emission reporting regulations specifically
incorporate the CERCLA exemption for FIFRA-registered
pesticides.28 6 Farms also are outside the categories of facilities
subject to the TRI program.28 7 Information transfer from farms to
the public concerning agrochemical use and release is simply not
a part of the CERCLA and EPCRA programs.
6.

Hazardous Waste Management Laws

Farms handle large volumes of chemicals, much of which are
disposed either directly as spent or residue materials or
indirectly as excess fertilizer or pesticide. Most industries in this
position must deal with the mind-numbing complexity of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the nation's
principal hazardous waste management and disposal regulation
law. 2 8 Farms, however, do not.

282. One of the most innovative uses of the information derived from the TRI and
other information disclosure programs is found at the Environmental Defense Fund's
"Scorecard" web page where a wealth of information about reporting facilities and the
chemicals they emit can be obtained on a site-specific basis In a matter of seconds.
8, 1999)
Defense
Fund,
Scorecard (visited Aug.
See Environmental
<http://www.scorecard.org>. As previously noted, see supra note 272, although
FIFRA requires recordkeeping for restricted pesticide applications, there is no
equivalent to the TRI public disclosure requirement under FIFRA.
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(D) (1994).
284. See iAd.§ 9603(e).
285. See id.§ 11021(e)(5).
286. See 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(2)(iv) (1999).
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1(A) (1994) (limiting the TRI requirements to
"facilities... that are in Standard Industrial Classification Codes 20 through 39").
Courts have also ruled that EPA may not designate chemicals, including fertilizer
components such as phosphoric acid, as toxic under the EPCRA TRI program based
on their environmental effects; rather, only inherent toxicity may be considered. See
Fertilizer Inst. v. Browner, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9298 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1999).
Although farms would not be required to report their applications of such fertilizers
in any event, fertilizer manufacturers would be subject to reporting their emissions In
manufacturing the chemicals.
288. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994). For an overview of the RCRA program,
see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL (Theodore L. Garrett ed.,
1994).
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For example, EPA has not classified solid wastes generated
from growing and harvesting crops and from raising livestock as
hazardous wastes subject to RCRA's comprehensive "cradle-tograve" regulations. 289 Similarly, farm irrigation return flows are
not considered solid waste and are not subject to RCRA
regulation, notwithstanding the fact that such return flows carry
significant quantities of fertilizers, pesticides, contaminated soil,
and animal wastes.2 9 ° Farms disposing of waste pesticide from
their own use are exempt from RCRA waste management
regulations so long as empty containers are triple rinsed and the
pesticides are disposed of consistent with label instructions.29 1
Farms generating less than 25 gallons per month on average of
used oil are exempt from RCRA's used oil management and
disposal regulation, 21' and farms generating less than 100
kilograms per month on average of specified "universal wastes,"
which include obsolete or unused pesticides, enjoy exemptions
from a variety of hazardous waste regulations. 29 3 Finally, wind
dispersal of chemicals used in pesticides is generally not
considered a RCRA problem, but instead is handled under the
Clean Air Act-which does not regulate it in any meaningful
way.294 Although a farm that engages in hazardous waste
management not related to farming would fall squarely within
RCRA's scope, farms that stick to farming are outside that scope,
notwithstanding the large volume of chemicals they dispose.
7.

ContaminatedSite Remedation Laws

Superfund's enactment in 1980 acknowledged that we had
begun the process of beefing up environmental law too late to
prevent the proliferation of thousands of contaminated properties
around the country. While laws such as the CWA, CAA, and
RCRA helped to stem the tide, Superfund was designed to
establish a remedial program focused primarily on the
contaminated sites that had been created before those laws were
promulgated .295

289. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1999).
290. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994).
291. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4, 262.70 (1999).
292. See id. § 279.20(a)(4).
293. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 273.3, 273.10 to 273.20 (1999).
294. See RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 288, at 9 ("Although air emissions
from industrial facilities may exhibit hazard characteristics ... , they ordinarily
would not be 'solid wastes' within the meaning of RCRA, thus avoiding an overlap in
the Clean Air Act and RCRA regulatory programs.").
295. For a discussion of Superfund's objectives and an overview of its remedial
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While the administrative, legal, and remedial costs of
Superfund have grown difficult to justify under any cost-benefit
calculus,2 9 6 the farm industry has not paid its share in any way.
Despite the persistence of many agrochemicals in soils and
sediments and the growing realization that urban expansion into
29 7
converted farmland contains those latent chemical threats,
Superfund does not impose liability for any response costs
resulting from application of FIFRA-registered pesticides, 298 and
excludes the "normal application of fertilizer" from remediation
and liability provisions.29 9 Farms also enjoy a significant
exemption under the related program for the remediation of
petroleum product releases from underground storage tanks.A °
8.

Common Law Nuisance and Statutory "Right-to-Farm"Laws

It has often been said that the statutory form of modem
environmental law is built on the backbone of the common law of
nuisance.3 0 ' Given the extent to which modem environmental
law is prevented from reaching farms, it is no surprise that
nuisance law continues to play an important role in efforts to
control the environmental impact of farms. Particularly in areas
where suburban development has encroached upon existing
farm operations, new residents are likely to object to the
resulting dust, noise, and odors, and nuisance provides an
obvious cause of action.
It should also be no surprise that farms enjoy a substantial
safe harbor even on this front. All states have enacted so-called
"right-to-farm" laws, which generally exempt farms from common
law nuisance attack."0 2 Although the degree of protection
and liability program, see RODGERS, supra note 258, ch. 8.
296. One recent study found that each case of cancer that Superfund-led
remediations have purported to avoid in the future has carried a median cost of $4 18
million. See Study Says Faulty Risk Perceptions, Political Influences Bias Site
Remediation. Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), June 1, 1999, at A-5.
297. See supra text accompanying note 105.
298. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i) (1994].
299. See id. § 9601(22).
300. The underground storage tank program is found in subchapter IX of RCRA.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i (1994). The program exempts from the definition of
underground storage tank any "farm or residential tank of 1,100 gallons or less
capacity used for storing motor fuel for non-commercial purposes." Id. § 6991(1)(A).
For an overview of the underground storage tank program, see RICHARD P. FAHEY,
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS: A PRIMER ON THE FEDERAL REGULATORY PROGRAM (2d ed.
1995).
301. See, e.g., RODGERS, supranote 258, ch. 2.
302. See generally Nel D. Hamilton. Right-To-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten
Reasons Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve AgriculturalNuisances May Be Ineffective,
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afforded by these laws varies, °3 the basic theme is to protect
farms from private nuisance actions by codifying the "comes to
the nuisance" rule." 4 Although the tide is turning against such
laws in some areas, 30 they remain a significant obstacle to the
use of common law environmental remedies against farms.
B.

Significant Exceptions to the GeneralRule of Safe Harbor

The breadth and depth of the safe harbor that farms enjoy
from environmental regulation make it all the more remarkable
that three regulatory programs have managed to levy a
significant degree of environmental controls on farming. The
three programs represent three different approaches to
environmental regulation. First, the regulation of concentrated
animal feeding operations under the Clean Water Act NPDES
program constitutes direct regulation of a limited class of farms;
second, the Endangered Species Act is a general environmental
protection program that has no safe harbor exceptions for
farming; and third, the so-called "Swampbuster" provisions of
the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills indirectly regulate environmental
impacts of farms through the manipulation of farm subsidy
policies. In each case, farms have felt the unaccustomed pinch of
environmental law.
1.

Regulation of ConcentratedAnimal Feeding Operations
Only 190,000 of the 640,000 farms in the United States that

3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103 (1998); McElfish, supra note 232, at 10,190-91; Alexander
A. Reinert, The Right to Farm Hog-ned and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1694
(1998). Prior to the advent of these laws in the past two decades, it was not
uncommon for farms to be declared a nuisance. See Hank W. Hannah, Farming in the
Face of Progress, PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 9, 9-11.

303.

See generally McElfish, supra note 232, at 10,191

(explaining variation

among state laws); Hannah, supra note 302. at 11-13 (discussing plaintiff tactics for
circumventing right-to-farm laws); Haugrud, supra note 6, § 8.2(B)(1), at 485-87

(dividing the laws into three models based on scope of covered farms and scope of the
safe harbor). Most of the right-to-farm laws deny the protection when the farm is
operated negligently in violation of federal or state laws or so as to cause water
pollution or soil erosion.
304. See Hamilton, supra note 302, at 104; Haugrud, supra note 6, § 8.2(B)(1), at
484-85; McElfish, supra note 232, at 10,191.

305.

Most significantly, the Iowa Supreme Court recently found that Iowa's right-

to-farm law constituted an illegal taking of property adjacent to protected farms, and
the United States Supreme Court let the decision stand. See Bormann v. Board of

Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Girres v. Bormann,
525 U.S. 1172 (1999). But see Pure Air and Water, Inc. v. Davidsen, 246 A.2d 786
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (differing result from Bormann); Jeff Feirick, Upholding the New
York Right to Farm Law, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Aug. 1999, at 1 (discussing Davidsen).
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raise or keep livestock rely on pasture land to feed the
livestock. °6 The remaining farms use animal feeding operations
(AFOs) known as confined feedlots- food is brought to animals
kept in confined quarters." 7 The size of an AFO is measured by
the number of cows, hogs, chickens, or turkeys translated into
Many AFOs squeeze an impressive
"animal units" (AUs).305
number of AUs into confined feedlots, resulting in what is known
as a concentrated AFO (CAFO) and, consequently, a point source
within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. 30 9 There were about
6,600 such CAFOs holding more than 1000 AUs each in
operation in the United States in 1992."'°
Anyone who has visited a CAFO is unlikely to forget the
odoriferous experience. Most CAFOs handle their massive
quantities of animal waste by collecting the manure and urine in
large impoundments and applying it to farmland as crop fertilizer
or simply as a method of disposal.3 1' This practice results not

306. See Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency. Compliance Assurance Implementation Planfor ConcentratedAnimal Feeding
Operations 2 (1998) (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/strategy.html>.
307. In their joint policy on AFOs, EPA and USDA explain that AFOs "congregate
animals, feed, manure and urine, dead animals, and production operations on a
small land area. Feed is brought to the animals rather than the animals grazing or
otherwise seeking food in pastures, fields, or rangeland." USDA/U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations 91 2.1
(Mar. 9, 1999), available at <http://www.epa.gov/owm/finafost.htm> [hereinafter
Unified National Strategy]. To qualify as an AFO, the confined feeding must occur at
least 45 days per year and prevent any sustained vegetative production on the lot.
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (1999).
308. One AU is equal to roughly 1 beef cow, 2.5 hogs, 5 horses, 10 sheep, 55
turkeys, or 100 chickens. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 122, app. B (1999).
309. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994) (including "concentrated animal feeding
operation" within the CWA definition of point source). Generally any AFO is a CAFO if
it either (1) confines at least 1000 AUs, (2) confines at least 300 AUs and discharges
pollutants through a point source, or (3) confines under 300 AUs but is designated a
CAFO on a case-by-case basis by the relevant permitting authority because it is a
significant source of water pollution. However, such operations are not CAFOs if they
discharge pollutants only in the event of a 25-year, 24-hour storm event. See id. The
more technical details of deciding whether an AFO is a CAFO requiring an NPDES
permit took EPA ten pages to explain in a recent draft guidance document on CAFO
permits. See OFFICE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
GUIDANCE MANUAL AND EXAMPLE NPDES PERMrr FOR CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS 2-1 to 2-10 (1999) (review draft) (on file with author).
310. See Unified National Strategy, supra note 307, T 4.5. EPA and USDA estimate
that the number of large CAFOs has grown to 10,000 since the 1992 figure was
compiled. See id. The vast majority of AFOs confine fewer than 250 AUs. See id. T[
2.1. Nevertheless, the proliferation of large CAFOs has boosted livestock production
even as the total number of AFOs has decreased, indicating that the industry is
consolidating into fewer, but larger, AFOs. See id.
311. For vivid descriptions of AFO operations, see generally Frarey & Pratt. supra
note 15, at 8; Oliver, supranote 257, at 1895-97.
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only in an intensely unpleasant odor, but it also increases the
potential for environmental degradation and the transport of
pathogens to human populations. 312 Given their intense and
pernicious impacts on surrounding communities, CAFOs have
become lightning rods for local land use controversy.1 3
Although regulation of CAFOs is a significant exception to
the general rule that farms enjoy a safe harbor, the story has two
sides. In 1998- over 25 years after Congress included CAFOs in
the CWA's definition of point source- only 2,000 of the nation's
450,000 AFOs had NPDES permits or state equivalents. 1 4 One
large safe harbor for AFOs from the CWA, of course, is the
regulatory definition of a CAFO and its relatively high AU
threshold. Even those AFOs which attain CAFO status through
sufficient AUs or because of the nature of their discharge have
another safe harbor in the exclusion of AFOs that only discharge
pollutants through a point source in significant storm events.
These two filters winnow the nation's 450,000 AFOs down to the
2,000
presently required
to follow
NPDES permitting
requirements.
Clearly, the AFO issue encompasses more than the 2,000
farms presently under the thumb of NPDES permitting
requirements. That reality has become a major focus of federal
and state regulators in the past several years. The federal focus
recently culminated in the issuance by USDA and EPA of a
Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations (Unified
National Strategy)."' The cornerstone of the Unified National
Strategy is a "national performance expectation" that all AFOs
will develop and implement technically sound and economically
312. See Unified National Strategy, supra note 307, ql2.2. Recent studies suggest
that CAFOs present a measurable public health threat to surrounding communities.
See Terry Hammond, Study Finds Hog Lagoon Neighbors Report Higher Levels of
Respiratory Illness, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), May 14, 1999, at A-5.
313. See generally Williams, supra note 120; Fern Shen, Md. Hog Farm Causing
Quite a Stink, WASH. POST, May 23, 1999, at Al; William Claiborne, Despite Stink, Hog
FarmProceeds on Tribal Land, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1999, at A3.
314. See Unified National Strategy, supra note 307, q14.2.
315. See Unified National Strategy, supranote 307. The Clinton Administration's
1998 Clean Water Action Plan called for USDA and EPA to compile the National
Uniform Strategy as one of 111 specific action plans. See id. 1.1. The agencies
released a draft for public comment in September 1998. See 63 Fed. Reg. 50,192
(1998). For a detailed overview of the proposal, describing it as a sign that "AFOs and
CAFOs are now entering the meat grinder of regulatory politics," see Gregory Blount
et al., The New Nonpoint Source Battleground: Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 42 (1999). For a comprehensive overview of
the Unified National Strategy, see Dana R. Flick, The Future of Agricultural Pollution
Following USDA and EPA Drafting of a Unfied National Strategy for Animal Feeding
Operations,8 DICKINSON J. ENVrL. L. & POLY 61 (1999).
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feasible nutrient management plans addressing such operational
matters as feed management, manure handling and storage, and
land application of manure. 1 6 Because the Unified National
Strategy imposes no new regulatory requirements, preparation of
a plan for most AFOs will be purely voluntary unless state law
requires one.3 17 On the regulatory front, the Unified National
Strategy outlines provisions for CAFOs that will effectively
expand the coverage of permitting controls. For example, the
Unified National Strategy will expand the number of AFOs
requiring NPDES permits to 15,000-20,000 by including most
large (over 1000 AUs) operations as well as AFOs that are either
operating under unacceptable conditions or are otherwise
contributing to water quality impairment, regardless of their
size. 3 18 Moreover, all AFOs needing an NPDES permit may be
required to prepare nutrient management plans and comply with
these
feedlot effluent standards." 9 EPA has begun to implement 32
proposals through TMDL rules 320 and guidance documents. '
Predictably, reaction to the Unified National Strategy has
been mixed, with few interest groups fully in favor.
Environmental groups contend the measures do not reach far
enough, while farm groups assert that a purely voluntary
program

will

be

sufficient. 322

Many

state

government

316. See Unified National Strategy, supra note 307, q 3.1-3.5.
317. Seeid.914.1.
318. See id. qI4.5. The Unified National. Strategy envisions that the permitting
program will be implemented over several phases and will rely on general permits for
all but the larger (over 1,000 AUs) CAFOs, which will need to obtain individual
permits. See id. qI5.0 (Strategic Issue #3).
319. See id. I 4.6. The effluent guidelines presently impose a "zero discharge"
condition on CAFO feedlots with NPDES permits. See 40 C.F.R. pL. 412 (1999). EPA
has announced plans to revise the standards, including measures to address
phosphorous levels in runoff. See 63 Fed. Reg. 62,469 (1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§
412 & 122.23 (1999)). Farming interests have vociferously opposed EPA's efforts. See
USDA Proposal to Include Phosphorous in Nutrient Plans Concerns Farm Group, 29
Env't Rep. (BNA) 610 (1998) (quoting American Farm Bureau official).
320. See supra note 223.
321. For example, EPA has issued a draft NPDES permit for CAFOs and other
AFOs subject to permitting. See Office of Wastewater Management, U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, Draft Guidance Manual and Example NPDES Permit for
9,
1999)
Sept.
(visited
Operations
Feeding
Concentrated Animal
<http://www.epa.gov/owm/afoguide.htm>.
322. See Environmentalists Fault Feedlot Plan While Farmers Want Voluntary
Approach, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Sept. 17, 1998, at A-6; Susan Bruninga, Farmers,
Public Interest Groups Debate Merits of Animal Runoff Control Strategy, 29 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1645 (1998]; Susan Bruninga, Ranchers and Farmers in the West Sound Off on
Pollution Control Strategy, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1646 (1998). Farm groups have
pointed to several significant voluntary efforts initiated by different farm sectors to
improve nutrient management. See, e.g.. Registration and Agreement for Clean Water
Act Section 301 Compliance Audit Program for the Pork Production Industry, 63 Fed.
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representatives have expressed the concern that the Unified
National Strategy will constrain state efforts to respond to the
CAFO issue with locally-designed measures, 32 3 even though
environmental groups have argued that past state efforts have
been weak and poorly implemented.3 1 4 Moreover, some
congressional representatives have questioned whether EPA and
USDA have the legal authority to issue and implement the
National Uniform Strategy as a "strategy" without following

Reg. 69,627 (1998) (recommending that EPA and pork producers agree to initiate
voluntary third party compliance audit program for hog farms in return for reduced
penalties and increased EPA educational support). Environmental groups contend
that such efforts, while salutary, should not deter efforts to regulate CAFOs more
stringently. See Millions to Be Spent on Training,Oversight of EPA Agreement with Pork
Producers, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Nov. 30, 1998, at A-9.
323. EPA has compiled a comprehensive summary of state laws dealing with
CAFOs, proving the states' claims that they are addressing CAFOs in ways that often
go

beyond

EPA's

regulations.

See

U.S.

ENVTL.

PROTECTION

AGENCY,

STATE

COMPENDIUM: PROGRAMS AND REGULATORY ACTIvrrIES RELATED TO ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS (1999).

324. In the time it took for the Unified National Strategy to go from draft to final
stages, a flurry of initiatives to address AFOs through increased regulation were
passed by a variety of states. See, e.g.. Michael Blogna, State Adopts New Reporting
Rules for Spillsfrom Livestock Waste Lagoons, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Feb. 17, 1999,
at A-3 (Illinois); Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding Operations:
Concerns, Limits, and Options for Southeastern States, 6 ENVIL. LAW. 503 (2000)
(canvassing federal law and the law of eight southeastern states); Theresa Heil.
Agricultural Nonpoint Source Runoff- The Effects Both On and Off the Farm: An
Analysis of Federal and State Regulation of Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollutants, 5
Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 50-63 (1998) (Wisconsin); Drew Kershen, Clean Water and
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, LOOKING AHEAD: ABA SECTION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,

ENERGY,

& ENVTL. L. NEWSLETrER, Mar.-Apr.

1999, at 2 (Oklahoma,

Colorado, and Mississippi); Oliver, supra note 257 (Minnesota); Carolyn Whetzel,
Regulators Issue Waste DischargePlanfor Dairy Farms in Southern California, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 13, 1999, at A-4 (California); Large Hog Farms to Have
Releases Regulated by Water, Multimedia Permits, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 71 (1999)
(Mississippi); Proposed Rules for Corporate Hog Farms Ready for Comment, State
Official Says, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1215 (1998) (Missouri). Indeed, the Unified
National Strategy recognizes that many states have already implemented permitting
programs for CAFOs that equal or exceed the federal NPDES program requirements
and has invited such states to seek delegation of authority to administer the NPDES
program. See Unified National Strategy. supra note 307, T 5.0 (Strategic Issue #3):
Susan Bruninga, Nonpoint Sources: Animal Waste Strategy to Recognize State
Programs, Hold Corporations Liable, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2225 (Mar. 12, 1999).
Nevertheless, state water regulators maintain that the Unified National Strategy will
be too expensive to implement fully and have proposed an AFO initiative that relies
more on incentives and voluntary measures. See State Group Seeks More Flexibility
in Regulation of Livestock Waste, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Feb 26, 1999, at A-4; Susan
Bruninga. Faulting EPA-USDA Livestock Strategy, States Say Their Programs Already
Work, 29 Env't Rep. (DNA) 1757 (1999). Environmental groups charge that the state
programs are inconsistent and ineffective. See, e.g., AMERICA'S ANIMAL FACTORIES,
supra note 125, at ix-xii (identifying 15 major deficiencies in the existing state-level
regulation of AFOs).

2000]

FARMS, THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS

rulemaking procedures. 25 In any event, issuance of and debate
on the Unified National Strategy signals continuing federal and
state commitment to retain the lone exception to farming's safe
harbor from water pollution regulation and suggests that at least
some components of the farming industry are amenable to
direct, concerted environmental regulation.
2.

EndangeredSpecies Act

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) 26 is a rare example of an
environmental law with sharp teeth and no safe harbor for
farms. Once designated as endangered or threatened, 7 a species
is protected through several provisions with virtually no federal,
state, local, or private actor beyond the ESA's reach. Given their
pervasive impact on wildlife habitat, farms have increasingly
been at the center of ESA controversy.
Most of the ESA's land use battles begin through the
application of one of two regulatory provisions. Section 9 of the
ESA prohibits any federal, state, local, or private entity from
"taking" a listed animal species,32 8 which has been construed to
325. Susan Bruninga, Small Livestock FacilitiesMay Get More Time to Comply with
AFO Strategy, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2131. 2132 (1999).
326. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). For an overview of the ESA programs, see
MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROwLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW
193-281 (3d ed. 1997).
327. For a discussion of the listing process and criteria, see J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of
the ESA- The Cornerstone of Species Protection Law, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 26
(1993); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1049-50, 1117-29
(1997).
328. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994). For an overview of the take prohibition as
implemented, see Frederico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the ProhibitionAgainst
Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with A
Powerful Species PreservationLaw, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 109 (1991); Albert Gidari, The
Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on PrivateLandowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419
(1994). Section 9(a) species protections vary according to whether a species is plant
or animal and whether it is listed as endangered or threatened. Thus. Section 9(a)(1),
the cornerstone of ESA regulation, applies only to "endangered species of fish or
wildlife," making it unlawful for "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States to... take any such species within the United States or territorial sea of the
United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994). Threatened species of fish or wildlife
receive the same level of protection by regulations authorized under Section 4(d) of
the ESA. See id. § 1533(d); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1999); see also Keith Saxe,
Regulated Taking of Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 399 (1988). Plants receive less protection under Section 9(a) than do
fish and wildlife species and are not in any circumstance protected from take in the
broad sense used in the context of fish and wildlife species. Rather, Section 9(a)(2)(B)
provides that endangered plants on federal lands are protected from being removed,
maliciously damaged, or destroyed. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1994). Endangered
plants on non-federal lands are protected only if removing, damaging, or destroying
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prohibit "significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering."329 As farming can involve both the conversion of

habitat to farm uses and the degradation of farm and non-farm
habitat through pollution, sedimentation, water resource
depletion, and other farming impacts, the ESA's habitat
modification restriction has increasingly become an issue for
farming practices.3 3 °
While the Section 9 "take" prohibition applies directly to
private actions, including farming, Section 7 of the ESA adds
another layer of regulation for farms by restricting the practices
of federal agencies that fund, carry out, or grant approvals to
state, local, and private actions. Federal agencies must ensure
that their actions conserve listed species 331 and do not jeopardize
them would constitute "a knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State
or... violation of a State criminal trespass law." A. § 1538(a)(2)(B). Hence, farming
implicates the ESA's take prohibition primarily through its effects on terrestrial and
aquatic wildlife species.
329. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999). The Supreme Court recently upheld the regulation
defining take to include habitat modification, albeit emphasizing the narrow criteria
of actual death or injury required to make habitat modification into a prohibited take.
See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687
(1995). For a description of the controversial administrative and judicial
developments leading up to and culminating in the Sweet Home case, see Steven G.
Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a ProhibitedTaking Under the Endangered
Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155 (1995).
330. A current and highly controversial example is the black-tailed prairie dog,
which is under consideration for listing as a threatened species. See 64 Fed. Reg.
14,424 (1999) (proposed to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Most of the reasons
contributing to the species' impaired status relate to farming- for example,
conversion of habitat to farming; sport and varmint shooting; competition and
predation from species introduced through farming; habitat fragmentation through
farming; and poisoning. See id. at 14,426-28. Farming interests have decried the
potential listing of the species as "propaganda" and contend that the Section 9
prohibitions that would come with listing the species will destroy "the agricultural
way of life.., because it is not compatible with uncontrolled prairie dog
populations." Jake Cummins, Target on Prairie Dogs (visited June 10, 1999)
<http://www.fb.com/mtlb/newnews/ prairiedogs.htm> (statement of Montana Farm
Bureau official); see also PrairieDog Receives Positive Petition Finding, ENDANGERED
SPECIES & WETLANDS REP., Apr. 1999, at 13. Recognizing the potential constraints
Section 9 places on farming practices after a species is listed, the Farm Bureau has
become active in challenging species listings. See, e.g., Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v.
Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding listing of a small snail deemed
endangered because of water depletion through farm irrigation and other fanning
practices).
331. Conservation is defined in the ESA as "the use of all methods and procedures
which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
necessary." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994). Section 7(a)(1) of the ESA directs federal
agencies to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by
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the continued existence of any listed species.

32

As farming in the

United States depends heavily on federal support through
subsidies and access to federal public resources, Section 7
become major battlegrounds between
conditions have also
333
ESA.
the
and
farming
Although the restrictions in Sections 9 and 7 of the ESA are
mitigated by the availability of permits for "incidental take" of
listed species,3 3 4 farms have no special status under the relevant
permitting provisions and enjoy no general exemptions from
Sections 9 and 7. Moreover, neither Section 9 nor Section 7
contains any threshold criteria or gaps in coverage that would
allow farms to escape regulatory consequences covertly. While a
farm that poses no on-site or off-site consequences to listed
species need not take affirmative conservation steps to promote a
listed species, 335 the ESA stands virtually alone among the major
safe harbor from
federal environmental laws as offering farms 3 no
36
requirements.
permitting
and
its prohibitions

carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened
species." Id. § 1536(a)(1). Though mandatory on its face, agencies and courts have
construed the conservation provision as a discretionary guideline for agency action.
See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" EndangeredSpecies Act: Rediscovering and
Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25
ENVrL. L. 1107 (1995).

332. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA initiates a complicated set of procedures
implementing the duty of federal agencies to "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined ... to be critical." 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). Section 7(a)(2) has by far been the dominant ESA
provision affecting federal agencies. See Ruhl, supra note 331, at 1119-20.
333. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (involving application of the
Section 7(a)(2) "no jeopardy" provision to a federal agency granting ranching interests
access to federal irrigation water); Sierra Club v. Glicknan, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir.
1998) (involving application of the Section 7(a)(1) conservation duty to federal agency
subsidization of farm irrigation water supplies).
334. Section 7(b)(4) provides for issuance of "incidental take statements" allowing
projects that are carried out, funded, or authorized by federal agencies to obtain
permission to commit take of listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1994). Section
10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA provides "incidental take permit" procedures and standards for
all other projects. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). Both permitting paths involve complicated and
expensive procedures and impact mitigation requirements. See generally J.B. Ruhl,
How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species
Act "HCP" Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENvrL. LAw. 345 (1999).
335. Section 7(a)(1) is the only provision of the ESA that imposes a conservation
duty. By its terms It applies only to federal agency programs and thus does not
extend to private actors whose actions do not require funding or approval from
federal agencies.
336. See generally Lewandrowski & Ingram, supra note 54, at 252-55, 261-62.
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Subsidy-Based ConservationPrograms

Given the size of the farm economy, even without its related
agricultural industries, federal farm policy has been a
centerpiece of national politics since its emergence in the New
Deal. The primary objectives of federal farm policy have been
337
stabilizing commodity prices and supporting farm income.
Indeed, even what passes today as the "conservation" component
of federal farm policy began as a means of controlling farm
commodity production. 338
Nevertheless, the important role
federal farm programs play today in the economics of farming3 39
has
created
opportunities
to
influence
environmental
performance through means other than direct regulation.
For many decades the core of federal farm policy, and the
feature
that
provides
leverage
for
influencing
farms'
environmental record, has been a complicated web of commodity
and income support programs." ° These rely on a mixture of loan
support and forgiveness measures, crop set-aside payments,
government
purchases,
marketing
agreements,
low-cost
insurance, benefit payments, price support payments, and
import restrictions. When combined, these and other price and
farm income supports create a remarkably convoluted and
inconsistent set of incentives and disincentives with respect not
only to farm production decisions3' but also to the
environment. 42 Notwithstanding recent changes in some federal

337.

For an excellent overview and history of these objectives, see AGRICULTURAL

POLICY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES (Daniel A. Sumner ed., 1995).

338. See Charles E. Grassley & James J. Jochum, The Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996: Reflections on the 1996 Farm Bill, 1 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 1, 4 (1996). For a concise history of the conservation side of federal farm
policy, see Christopher R. Kelley & James A. Lodoen, Federal Farm Program
Conservation Initiatives: Past, Present, and Future, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 17
(1995).
339. Farm income attributable to government payments exceeded $5 billion in
1997. See CENSUS, supra note 17, at United States Data 66, tbl.47.
340. See Grassley & Jochum, supra note 340, at 3 ('The commodity title is the
heart of any farm bill."). For a brief history of these programs, see Haugrud, supra
note 6, § 8. I(B)(3), at 465-70.
341. For example, crop set-aside payments reduce supply to increase commodity
prices, but commodity price support programs provide incentive to increase supply,
which reduces prices. See Kelley & Lodoen, supra note 338, at 19.
342. For example, commodity price support programs generally focus on crops
with high agrochemical input and soil erosion impacts and discourage farmers from
crop rotation. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 332-34; Kelley & Lodoen, supra note
338, at 19. For a thorough review of the environmental impact of the crop payment
subsidy programs, see WALTER N. THURMAN. ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF
FARM POLICIES (1995).
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farm commodity and income subsidy programs , 3 determining
the amount and methods of federal support for farming through
these and other mechanisms remains an annual rite of passage
for American politics, 3" and the bill to taxpayers remains
massive. 4 5
A relatively recent appendage to these "crop payment"
programs is a grab-bag of four major "green payments" programs
designed to pay farmers not to put land into commodity
production, with an ancillary objective being conservation of soil
and wildlife resources.34 6 The Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) pays farmers to take highly erodible land out of production
343. Ostensibly to move closer to a market-based farming economy, in 1996
Congress overhauled the subsidy programs to wean farmers from their reliance on
fixed, guaranteed payments by reducing subsidy levels in return for relaxing crop
restrictions. See Freedom to Farm Act, Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996).
344. See, e.g., Farmers' Plight Takes Campaign Spotlight, USA TODAY, Aug. 9,
1999. at 4A (describing the politics behind the 1999 bill). As an example of how
complicated and laden with specialized programs the farm bills have become, USDA's
highly condensed title-by-title summary of the 1996 Farm Bill is 16 single-spaced
pages long. See Office of Communications, Dep't of Agric., The Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996: itle-by-Title Summary of Major Provisions of the
Bill (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.usda.gov/farmbil/ttle0.htm>.
345. Notwithstanding Congress's professed theme of moving toward a marketbased farm economy, the federal government will spend $15 billion in 1999 on direct
payments to farmers, the highest of any fiscal year on record. See Published
Comments by Glickman on the Future ofAgriculture, AGRiC. L. UPDATE, Aug. 1999, at 7
(published speech of USDA Secretary Dan Glickman). Moreover, the combination of
sagging export markets, bumper domestic and worldwide crops, increased domestic
harvested cropland, and domestic droughts and floods led Congress to approve $6
billion in emergency farm support in 1998 and an $8.7 billion bailout in 1999. See
generally Congress Passes a Record $8.7B Farm Bailout Package, USA TODAY, Oct.
14, 1999. at 4A: James Cox. Farmers'Tough Row to Hoe, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 1999,
at IB; Debbie Howlett, Farmers'Crops, Worries, Pile Up, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 1999, at
1A; Judy Keen, In Iowa, a Full Harvest of Political Discontent, USA TODAY, Aug. 9,
1999, at 4A.
346. Some commentators condemn the green payment programs, which are
"putatively designed to protect the environment," as being "more honestly described
as programs for boosting commodity prices and farm incomes by restricting output."
Chen, supra note 4, at 343. For concise summaries of the grab-bag of green payment
programs, which consists of a number of provisions in addition to the four major
programs covered here, see Econ. Research Serv., Dep't of Agric., Conservation and
Nov.
1996,
available at
the
1996
Farm Act,
AGRIC.
OUTLOOK,
<http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/reports/erssor/economics/aob/ 1996/complete/
agriculturaloulook_10.28.96>; Natural Resources Conservation Serv., Dep't of
Dec.
3,
1998)
Agric.,
USDA
Conservation
Programs
(visited
<http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/NRCSProg.html>. The four major programs discussed
here were introduced through the 1985, 1990, and 1996 Farm Bills. See Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888
(1996); Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624,
104 Stat. 3359 (1990); Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354
(1985).
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for extended periods. 47 The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP)
pays farmers to remove wetlands from production for extended
periods or permanently.3 48 The Wildlife Habitat Incentives
Program (WHIP) pays farmers to restore and develop wildlife
habitat. 49 And finally, the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP) consolidates and expands financial incentives to
farmers who agree to participate in conservation plans
prescribing structural, vegetative, and land management
practices.5 0
Almost no one is completely satisfied with the crop
payment/green payment system of farm conservation policy.
Although an impressive amount of farmland has been placed in
temporary or permanent conservation status as a result of the
5
' the results have come only at huge taxpayer
four programs,"
52
cost."
Moreover, the crop payment and green payment
programs have not dovetailed as completely as intended in terms
of recipients. 53 Evidence suggests that farmer participation in
the green payment programs is highly sensitive to market
commodity prices and does not reflect any newly found farm
stewardship ethic.354 Farmers, like most of us, follow the money.
Hence, rather than relying entirely on an incentive-based
the
so-called
conservation
policy,
to
farm
approach
347. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1994); see also Haugrud, supra note 6, §
8.2(B1(2)(a), at 493-99.
348, See id. §§ 3837-3837f.
349. See id. § 3836a.
350. See id. §§ 3839aa-3839aa-8.
351. Total acreage conserved under the CRP and WRP combined was 29.5 million
acres in 1997, divided among 225,000 farms. See CENSUS, supra note 17. United
States Data at 19, tbl.7.
352. There is considerable debate over whether the green payment programs are
the most cost-efficient means of attaining lasting farm conservation progress. See
generally Grossman, supra note 6, at 324; Ralph E. Heimlich & Roger Claassen,
Payingfor Wetlands: Benefits, Bribes, Taxes, NAT. WETLANDS NEWSLETTER, Nov.-Dec.
1998, at 1. Indeed, many commentators are quick to point out that the green
payment programs violate the polluter pays principle that provides a common thread
to most of environmental law- that is, while most landowners must obtain permits
and pay mitigation costs to develop their land for productive purposes, farmers are
paid not to develop their land. See Chen, supra note 4, at 344. The green payment
programs are not an anomaly in this respect. For example, in 1999 federal agencies
doled out $144 million to help CAFOs better manage their livestock wastes. See Large
Scale, Intensive Livestock Operations Getting USDA Help with Waste Management, 30
Env't Rep. (BNA) 661 (1999).
353. For example, many farms favored by and thus heavily invested in the crop
payment programs are not located in areas where the green payment programs are
likely to focus. See Kelley & Lodoen, supra note 338, at 67.
354. See Tina Adler, Prairie Tales, 149 Sci. NEWS 44, 45 (1996) (discussing
research showing "commodity prices determine the popularity of the [CRPI program
among farmers").
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Swampbuster and Sodbuster programs add a punitive element to
farm conservation policy. The Swampbuster program makes
a
farmers ineligible for all crop payment program benefits if 355
farmer converts certain wetlands to agricultural production.
Meanwhile the Sodbuster program imposes the same sanctions
on farmers who put any highly erodible land into production
without an approved

conservation plan. 356 Unlike the green

payment programs, these payment ineligibility provisions work
close to the core of federal farm policy. Indeed, the subsidy
programs have been so important to the farming industry that
farmers may perceive any prerequisites to receiving subsidies as
because
the
requirements. 357
Nevertheless,
regulatory
Swampbuster and Sodbuster programs remain coupled to crop
payment subsidy programs, they depend on the subsidy
programs for their force and thus do little to alter the
fundamental incentives in federal farm policy. 358 Moreover,
through a litany of exemptions from ineligibility and a lackluster
enforcement record, the programs no doubt have accomplished
359
less than they could have even given their inherent limits.
Including the Swampbuster and Sodbuster programs as the
third major exception to the general rule of safe harbor for farms
thus illustrates how paltry the universe of environmental
regulations is for farms.3 6 °
355. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3824 (1994); see also Grossman, supra note 6, at
323-24; Haugrud, supra note 6, § 8.2(A)(2)(c), at 480-81; Linda A. Malone, Reflections
on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an
Agricultural and Environmental Ethic in the 1990 Farm Bill. 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
(1993).
356. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813 (1994); see also Grossman, supra note 6, at
322-23; Haugrud, supra note 6. § 8.2(C)(1)(d), at 518-20; Karen R. Hansen,
AgriculturalNonpoint Source Pollution:The Need for an American Farm Policy Based on
an IntegratedSystems Approach Recoupled to Ecological Stewardship, 15 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POLY 303 (1994).
357. See PERCIVAL ETAL., supra note 218, at 970; see also Looney, supra note 6, at
799.
358. See Kelley & Lodoen, supra note 338, at 67. Of the 78 million acres of
wetlands in the United States, only 17 million acres are suitable for conversion to
croplands. and of those only 6 million acres would depend heavily on crop program
payments to make production viable. See ECON. RES. SERV., USDA, AGRIC. INFO. BULL.
No. 587, THE U.S. FARMING SECTOR ENTERING THE 1990's 27 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.
FARMING SECTOR].

359. See Kelley & Lodoen, supranote 338, at 67.
360. Some commentators point to the CRP, WRP, and Swampbuster programs as
providing "extensive evidence of agriculture's greatly improved [environmental]
performance in recent years." Neil D. Hamilton, Agricultural Production and
EnvironmentalPolicy: How Should ProducersRespond?, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141, 142
(1996). Yet CRP, WRP, and Swampbuster are but small specks in the sea of
environmental policy, under which farms stand out as one of the dirtiest of America's
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III
FARMS AS A SPECIAL CASE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-

SEPARATING FACT FROM

FICTION

The first two Parts of this Article demonstrate that farms
cause substantial harms to the environment, and that, with a
few minor exceptions, environmental law at federal and state
levels has all but licensed those harms.3 6 1 The problem is that
each of the many exemptions to various environmental laws
detailed earlier finds at least some justification from a variety of
administrative, political, and economic perspectives. The
collective body of anti-law, however, cries out for an immediate
and comprehensive response. Yet environmental law would be
tested to the limits if farms were included immediately in
regulatory programs by simply removing all farm environmental
exemptions. Instead, environmental law must address farms
differently; it must reflect the attributes of farms that led to the
creation of the safe harbors in the first place.
The conventional model of environmental law relies on
deterrent-based
prescriptive
regulation
and
punitive,
enforcement, both of which are designed primarily by federal
authorities and implemented primarily by the states.36 2 But the
geographic, economic, and political demographics of the farming
industry challenge any approach that attempts to use this
conventional model. EPA recognized this at the dawn of modem
environmental law when it sought a way out of regulating farm
irrigation return flows under the CWA.3 1 Even today, EPA
thrusts the TMDL program on state and local governments as a
dirty industries. Even if farming has improved its overall environmental performance
record in recent years, an assertion that finds little support in the data presented
supra.it clearly has not improved its position relative to other industries.
361.

I have done so in detail here because I do not believe it is prudent to propose

sweeping legal reform before It is clear that legal reform is needed. Elsewhere I have
advocated that legal reform should be initiated to address sociolegal problems only
when it is clear that other social institutions (for example, volunteerism, nongovernmental groups) cannot or will not address the issue and only when legal reform
can avoid exacerbating problems of social inequity and legal complexity. See J.B.

Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modem Administrative States:
Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the
Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997). My objective in

Parts I and II of this Article has been to demonstrate beyond doubt that we have a
problem with respect to the environmental performance of farms, and that the law
has not merely stood by while other social institutions created the problem, but has
endorsed the process all along. The issue, therefore, is not whether to initiate
significant legal reform, but how. I address this issue in Parts III and IV of the Article.
362. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving

Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL.L. REV. 1181, 1181-90 (1998.
363.

See supra text accompanying notes 185-93.
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means of controlling nonpoint source water pollution." EPA is
in no better position to "instruct each individual farmer on his
farming practices" now than it was in the 1970s.3 65 In short,
because the farm industry is geographically, economically, and
case in
farms present a
special
politically complex,
environmental law and require a special response.
A.

GeographicDimensions

Farms are unlike most industries in their number (about 1.9
million to be more precise), 3 1 their distribution throughout the
nation, and their diversity. Given these characteristics, adopting
the model of federally-designed, nationally-uniform, technologybased performance and emission standards would be difficult
without vastly increased budgets for farm-by-farm permitting,
monitoring, and enforcement.
Regulating the farming industry is thus a daunting prospect.
EPA has observed that "[tloo large a regulated community can
367
make it impossible to implement and enforce requirements."
The dispersal of farms throughout the nation, including deep
into rural areas,3 " further compounds the implementation issue.
It also means that farms diverge based on the variety of local
environmental and social conditions. For example, farms must
respond differently to local conditions such as weather, soil
369
soil erosion potential, 370 leaching potential,3 7 1 and
salinity,

364. See supra text accompanying notes 220-30.
365. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For example, in its
recent policy statement on the development of nutrient criteria for water quality, an
issue profoundly affected by and affecting farms, EPA stated that "EPA's custom of
developing water quality criteria guidance in the form of single numbers for
nationwide application is not appropriate for nutrients. EPA believes that distinct
geographic regions and types of ecosystems need to be evaluated differently and that
criteria specific to those regions and aquatic ecosystems need to be developed." 63
Fed. Reg. 34,648, 34,649 (1998); see also Zaring, supranote 61, at 10,133 ("EPA has
concluded that in the context of nonpoint source pollution, site-specific
decisionmaking that considers the nature of the watershed, the water body, the point
sources, and the management practices to be regulated are more effective than
uniform technical controls.").
366. See CENSUS, supra note 17, United States Data at 10, tbl. 1.
367.

U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

3-11 (1992).
368.

See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34, at 23.

369. See id. at 33-34.
370. See id. at 40-41.
371. See id. at 45-48; see also Robert L. Kellogg et al., The Potentialfor Leaching of
Agrichemicals Used in Crop Production:A National Perspective, 49 J. SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION 294 (1994).
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freshwater availability.3 72 Social conditions that vary include
3 74
373
and surrounding land use.
proximity to metropolitan areas
Farms also vary tremendously in terms of crop type 375 and
37 7
use of
production practice, 376 livestock type and concentration,
8
379
irrigation,
participation in the CRP,
tillage practices,38 °
38
3
82
sediment runoff, ' fertilizer runoff, and pesticide runoff.3 83 The
environmental law of farms thus must balance the desire to
establish a national policy of environmental protection against
the reality that farms are too numerous, too dispersed, and too
diverse to address through a one-size-fits-all regulatory
framework.
B.

Economic Dimensions

Farms in the United States have tremendous economic value
and are a critical economic link to vast supplier and consumer
industries. Part of the economic potency of farms has to do with
the dispersal of the farm economy among many small farms. But
the economic climate for farms is highly volatile today in terms of
both individual farm profitability and industry-wide structure.
Both factors will play an important role in
shaping
environmental policy for farms.
Financially speaking, farms are doing poorly. Predictions in
the early 1990s that "the farm sector seems to be overcoming the
financial difficulties of the mid-1980s" 384 have not come to pass.
Today, many farms are crashing economically as commodity
prices plummet below costs of production throughout the
industry.8 5 In addition to weak export markets, many farm

372. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34. at 49-51.
373. See id. at 28, 50.
374. See id. at 26-27.
375. See id. at 27.
376. See Office of Pest Management Policy, Dep't of Agric., Completed Crop
Profiles, By State/Territory (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://ipmwww.ncsu.edu/
opmppiap/proindex.htm> (describing crop production practices for various crops in
many different states).
377. See GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE, supra note 34. at 42.
378. See i at 31.
379. See id. at 36.
380. See id. at 37.
381. See id. at 40-41.
382. See i. at 43.
383. See i. at 46.
384. See U.S. FARMING SECTOR, supra note 358, at 2.
385. See Warren Cohen, The Seeds of Discontent, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.. May
24. 1999, at 26; Daniel Eisenberg, Lean Times on the Farm, TIME, Jan. 11. 1999, at
40; Gary Strauss, Farfrom Hog Heaven: Farms Fold Under Price Crunch USA TODAY,
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advocates point to the changing economic structure of the farm
and related industries as a major culprit. Faced with the
increasingly sophisticated and expensive technology needs of
farming, 386 the agriculture industry, from chemical producers to
farms to food processors, is consolidating at a rapid pace.
Roughly 3.6% of farms generate over $500,000 in annual
product value each, accounting for over 56% of total farm
production value.3 87 Upstream and downstream industries
exhibit even greater concentration and a propensity toward
vertical integration, 8 8 leading to concerns about the viability of
less advanced farms, the prospects for farm employment, and
the impact on rural farm communities.3 8 9 Increased
environmental regulation of farms may reduce the economic
viability of farms by raising costs, contributing to further
concentration of the industry. Given the economic climate of the
farm industry, this may be disastrous. This is not to suggest that
our commitment to environmental regulation of farms should be
based primarily on the industry's economic health. It does
suggest, however, that the distribution of economic impacts on
farms resulting from increased regulation will play a large role in
the third factor to be considered- the politics of farm policy.
C. PoliticalDimensions
Farms possess immense political power not only because of
their number, but because most are family-owned businesses. Of
1.9 million farms in operation in 1997, 1.6 million were family
owned.3 90 This is a substantial block of similarly situated voters.
Moreover, farms are so widely distributed in the nation that few
federal, state, or local politicians can escape pressure from the
farm constituencies,39 and in farming areas, politicians are
dominated by them.

Although the broad dispersal of farms might hinder their
Feb. 2, 1999, at lB.
386. See U.S. FARMING SECrOR, supranote 358, at 41-45.
387. See CENSUS, supra note 17, at 6, fig.2. See generally Dina Temple-Raston,
Corporate Competition Puts Hog Farmers in a Pinch, USA TODAY, Apr. 6, 2000, at 12A
(discussing competitive pressures in the hog industry).
388. See generally WILLIAM HEFFERMAN ET AL., CONSOLIDATION IN THE FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE SYSTEM 1-13 (1999).
389. See id. at 13-16.
390. See CENSUS, supra note 17, United States Data at 10, tbl.1.
391. Over 500 counties in the United States are "farming dependent," meaning at
least 20% of total business and labor income is from farming, and many more are
"farming-important," meaning 10 to 20% of income is from farming. See U.S. FARMING
SECTOR, supra note 358, at 14.

ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 27:263

collective political action, this effect is offset by two important
political forces. First, farms play a critical role in the economic
fate of their suppliers and customers. The vast agrochemical and
food processing industries are characterized by greater corporate
presence and concentration of economic power than is found in
the farm industry. These industries rely heavily on farms and
can be expected to align themselves politically with the interests
of farms. For example, the Chemical Manufacturers Association,
the Fertilizer Institute, and the National Agricultural Chemicals
Association regularly weigh in on farm policy issues.3 92 Second,
the American Farm Bureau Federation has amassed tremendous
financial strength through its farm services arm and purports to
speak for all farms; it has become one of the most powerful
lobbying forces in the nation. 9 3 The Farm Bureau has fought
steadfastly, and apparently quite successfully, against any and
all proposed environmental regulation of farms. 94 To put it
bluntly, any proposal for comprehensive environmental
regulation of farming faces stiff political opposition.
The political scene is growing- even more complex daily. An
emerging political wrinkle in farm policy results from the
concentration of the industry, which has left the so-called "small
farms" in dire circumstances.3 9 5 Smallness, of course, is not a
particularly distinguishing factor for farms. 396 Nevertheless, with

392. See Armour-Garb, supra note 34, at 346-47.
393. See Vicki Monks, FarmBureau vs. Nature, DEFENDERS, Fall 1998, at 14. 14.
394. See N. William Hines, The Land Ethic and American Agriculture, 27 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 841 (1994); Monks, supra note 393, at 14. The Farm Bureau or its state
offices are frequent plaintiffs and interveners in litigation challenging increased levels
of environmental regulation, such as through implementation of Endangered Species
Act programs. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998)
(intervention in suit challenging irrigation subsidies under ESA); Idaho Farm Bureau
Fed. v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff in suit challenging listing of an
endangered species), Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989)
(intervention in suit challenging EPA approval of poison bait for farm animal
predators); Wyoming Farm Bureau v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997)
(plaintiff challenging reintroduction of endangered wolves).
395. See, e.g., William Claiborne, Fighting the New Feudal Rulers, WASH. POST,
Jan. 3. 1999, at A3 (referring to "small family farms"); What Price Pigs, AUDUBON,
Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 14 (referring to "smaller farmers").
396. USDA has noted that "most U.S. farms are small, noncommercial, and family
owned and operated." U.S. FARMING SECTOR, supra note 359, at 1. But as most farms
are family owned, small cannot mean simply family owned. USDA's "noncommercial"
category describes farms with gross annual sales of less than $40,000, which often
requires that the owners work outside the farm to make ends meet. See id. Recall,
however, that over half of all farms generate less than $10,000 in revenue, see
CENSUS, supra note 17, at 6, fig. 1, meaning that well over half are in noncommercial
status. Over half of all farms also are under 500 acres. See id.
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absolutely no empirical foundation, 39 a "small is better"
mentality has invaded all facets of farm policy, including
environmental issues,398 and made it politically imperative that
any farm policy should save small farms.399 Thus even assuming
it can overcome political opposition from a multitude of powerful
upstream and downstream industries, any proposal for
comprehensive environmental regulation of farming must also
somehow take into account the "save the small farm" factor. Yet,
given the fact that most farms are small, is it unreasonable to
conclude that small farms are a major part of the problem of
environmental harm and should thus bear a major portion of the
regulatory burden?4" The politics of environmental law for farms
are daunting indeed.
IV
MERGING THE ENVIRONMENT AND FARMING- A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR A
POSITIVE LAW OF FARMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Although the process has been undertaken cautiously and
law is
not without considerable debate, environmental
increasingly testing models other than prescriptive regulation as
means of influencing industry behavior.4"' Several approaches
397. Small farms "do not significantly affect the local economy's income and
employment," see U.S. FARMING SECTOR, supra note 396, at 1, and are worse per unit
of production than large farms for many environmental performance indicators. See
Chen, supra note 4, at 345.
398. Chen refers to this as the "'microecological' variation on the agroecological
theme," that is,"the frequently invoked but rarely tested assumption that small farm
size and family ownership guarantee sound stewardship." Chen, supra note 4, at
336, 341.
399. For example, USDA has established a National Commission on Small Farms,
which has devoted considerable attention to attacking corporate farming as the chief
threat to small farms. See, e.g., National Comnm'n on Small Farms, Dep't of Agric., A
Time to Act: A Report of the USDA Nat'l Comm'n on Small Farms (visited Apr. 4, 2000)
<http://www.reeusda.gov/agsys/smallfarm/report.htm> (describing "the small farm
as the cornerstone of our agricultural and rural economy" and proposing over 100
measures to assist small farms, particularly the position of small farms versus
corporate farms). USDA has also in the past few years established a Deputy Secretary
level Small Farms Council, a Small Farms Federal Advisory Commission, and a Small
Farms Coordinator position in each USDA office. See Dep't of Agric., Small Farms @
USDA (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.usda.gov/oce/smallfarm/sfhome.htm>.
400. Much of the small farm rhetoric is lodged against "corporate farms." See
Claiborne, supra note 313, at A3 (referring to "corporate farming ventures"); What
Price Pigs, supra note 395, at 14 (referring to "corporate giants"). The "small" rhetoric
thus appears to be intended to single out the much smaller universe of farms that
are corporate owned, large in size, and very large in revenue. Those farms, while
presenting many environmental challenges, by no means have caused the bulk of
environmental harms inventoried in this Article. Small farms are a major part of the
problem.
401. See generally Rechtschaffen, supra note 362; C. Boyden Gray, Regulatory
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have established records of success, and are adaptable to the
farming industry's complex demographics. These include
information-based programs, taxation programs, incentive
programs, and pollutant trading programs.4 "2 Even the most
ardent defenders of the conventional environmental law model
concede some role for these second-generation approaches.4 "'
Moreover, as centrally-planned prescriptive regulation becomes
less dominant in the mix of instruments, decisionmaking must
take place increasingly at the field level and consequently will
require greater reliance on state and local authorities, albeit with
a continuing federal role in national policy formation. 4° 4 The core
of a positive environmental law for farming thus should borrow
from many models to assemble a cohesive approach that involves
federal, state, and local authorities working in partnership rather
than in feudal arrangements. This reformed law of farms and the
environment will only work to its fullest potential, however, if
policies in the related fields of farm subsidy, upstream and
downstream agriculture industries, and foreign trade are aligned
accordingly.
A.

Core Programs

There are two paths that can be followed to craft a positive
federal environmental law for farming. One path uses the
existing structure of environmental statutes to correct the safe
harbors problem and bring farming back into the various
regulatory programs. That approach, however, would inherit the
failings and pitfalls of the fractured system of environmental law,
including
multiple
agency
authorities,
nonintegrated
Reform, Pastand Future, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 155 (1998).
402. Although instrument choice is a recurring issue throughout environmental
law, perhaps only the field of international environmental law rivals the farmenvironment question for "anti-law- and the consequent need to make sweeping
governance and instrument choice decisions in the immediate future. See Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context,
108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999). A comprehensive review and evaluation of all the
environmental law instrument reform models that have been proposed is outside the
scope of this Article. I discuss the basic themes of each of the five programs covered
herein infra. For an overview of the basic policy issues and the various instruments
that comprise the complete reform "toolbox," see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 218, at
131-79.
403. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 362, at 1243-65.
404. This so-called "devolution" of authority to the states in environmental policy
has become a common refrain and an adjunct to the broader debate over instrument
choice reform. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REv. 570 (1996): Environmental Protection Needs to Rest More With Local
Governments, NEPI Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 29, 1999, at A-6.
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decisionmaking, media-specific statutory focus, and dominance
of the prescriptive regulation model. The other path- the path I
propose- simply abandons the existing structure and forges a
new law built around a core body of environmental law programs
tailored specifically for farming. Given how difficult it has proven
for the existing mix of statutes to tackle the farms problem, and
given how difficult it may be to fit farms into the usual models of
those statutes, there is no way to begin to meaningfully regulate
farms without starting from the ground up.
1. Regulation- Use ConventionalMethods to Address CAFOs
and OtherAgro-IndustrialLow-Hanging Fruit
As the proliferation of CAFOs illustrates, industrialization,
technology, and economics have changed the farming industry
dramatically since the day when EPA declined to apply the
NPDES program to farms. Indeed, when one cuts through the
protectionist rhetoric of the small farms movement, there is
something to the small farm/corporate farm distinction: there
are subcategories of farms that present opportunities for the use
of direct prescriptive regulatory models to capture immediate
gains at a relatively low administrative cost. Many commentators
believe that within the diversity of the farm industry lie
identifiable and manageable sectors, such as CAFOs and large
crop irrigation farms, which ought to be treated as industrialized
operations no different than refineries or. steel mills.40 5 When
these "industrial farming" sectors are carved out of the larger
farm universe, the number of individual operations requiring
direct regulatory attention is less daunting, 40

6

the problems

405. As one prominent agriculture law scholar recently observed, "As agriculture
becomes industrialized, it should be treated like the 'industrial' sector, meaning the
Icommand and control' style of environmental laws applied to 'smoke stack'
industries should apply." Nefl D. Hamilton, Reaping What We Have Sown: Public
Policy Consequences of Agricultural Industrializationand the Legal Implications of a
Changing Production System, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 289, 299-300 (1997). EPA has
recently embarked on efforts to develop sector-based approaches to industrial
pollution control and prevention, through which problem identification and problem
solving is organized around industry sectors sharing common environmental issues.
See EPA Draft Fiscal 2000 Action Plan on Sector-Based Environmental Regulation, 30
Env't Rep. (BNA) 723 (1999).
406. For livestock operations, recall that of the nation's 450,000 animal feeding
operations, EPA believes only about 15,000 are concentrated animal feeding
operations requiring permits under the Clean Water Act. See supra text
accompanying notes 319-22. For crop production, in 1997 only 74,000 farms were
larger than 2,000 acres, see CENSUS, supra note 17, United States Data at 69, tbl.47,
and only 25,000 farms spent more than $50,000 on agricultural chemicals, see id. at
64. tbl.47.
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associated with geographic diversity diminish, 07 and the cost of
compliance is focused on the farms most capable of passing
them on to consumers. 0 In short, these agro-industrial farm
operations are low-hanging fruit, ripe for the picking.
Conventional regulation of such industrialized farming
operations would go well beyond the halting approach EPA has
taken toward regulation of animal waste discharges from CAFOs.
Consistent with the trend in other industries toward integrated
multi-media pollution permits,4 °9 an environmental regulatory
program for industrial farms would initiate a fully integrated
permitting program covering all sources and pathways of
pollutants from such operations, including saline water from
irrigation return flows, air pollutants, soil erosion, chemical
waste runoff, and animal waste discharges. 41° As is currently

done under the conventional prescriptive approach for other
industries, these permits would require "best management
practices" designed to reduce overall farm pollutant releases and
would identify technology-based standards for specific media.4"'
407. For example, although waste handling methods for CAFOs vary to some
extent, "In general, wastes are held In storage structures until they can be applied to
agricultural land as a fertilizer or soil conditioner. Irrigation equipment can be used
to pump liquid waste from storage structures onto fields; dry waste is usually applied
with a tractor-drawn manure spreader." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-99-205, ANMALAGRICuLTuRE: WASTE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 8-9 (1999).

408. See Hamilton, supra note 405, at 300 (l[Ain industrialized agriculture will be
better able than farmers to pass the costs of environmental protection on to
consumers in higher prices.").
409. There is a growing consensus that modem environmental law, because of its
fracture into media-specific statutes, has largely overlooked pollution prevention and
control issues and approaches that focus on product life-cycles, mass materials
flows, multi-media pollution effects, and industrial production systems. See generally
Charles W. Powers & Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology: Overcoming Policy
Fragmentation,in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 6, at 19-36; John C. Dembach,
Pollution Control and Sustainable Industry, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 101 (1997).
EPA has embraced the movement toward multi-media permitting in its sector-based
initiative. See EPA Draft Fiscal 2000 Action Plan on Sector-Based Environmental
Regulation, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 723 (1999).
410. Because of the multiple pathways farm pollution can take, researchers have
concluded that integration of air, land, and water protection in permitting decisions
is critical to comprehensive management of the farm-environment interface. See
Water Quality Policies Must Be IntegratedAmong Air, Water, Land, USGS Official Says,
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 8. 1999, at A-2. United States Geological Survey's
National Water Quality Assessment found that 85% of nitrogen contributed to the
Chesapeake Bay is from groundwater and the atmosphere, and suggested that
integrated management will be needed to address watersheds, nonpoint source
pollution, total maximum daily loads, and wetlands protection. See id.
411. For an overview of the various water runoff restrictions and best
management practice instruments presently in use for CAFOs and, in some states,
for other types of farms, see generally McElfish, supra note 232. No program,
however, resembles the fully-integrated, multi-media permitting system proposed
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The point is that if a sector-based approach is used to identify
farming operations that exhibit high-impact polluting effects,
such as CAFOs and large-scale crop operations, conventional
prescriptive regulation can yield significant environmental
benefits at manageable administrative cost levels.
2. Information- Use Reporting Requirements to Createa
NationalDatabaseof Farms' Chemical Releases
The proposal to address industrial farms through
conventional prescriptive regulation requires that we know as
much as possible about the identified farm sectors. Moreover,
any program directed at the remainder of farms- and there
must be one- will require massive amounts of information to
enable the use of other instruments such as taxes, incentives,
and trading to work effectively. Information, in other words, is a
critical component of the administration of an environmental law
for all farms, and one that is in short supply. Nowhere is this
more true than for the use and release of agricultural pesticides
and fertilizers.
The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program for reporting toxic
chemical releases from manufacturing industries 12 illustrates
how information can facilitate education of regulators, the
public, and industry about the magnitude of pollutant releases.
This aspect of the TRI alone has had beneficial pollution
reduction effects. 13 A similar program for agro-chemical
releases-a Farm Release Inventory (FRI)-would provide a
crucial source of information for the industrial farm permitting
program discussed above, would feed directly into the tax,
incentives, and trading programs discussed below, and could
herein, although this is the direction in which EPA slowly is moving for CAFOs, see
supra text accompanying notes 316-26, and in which some states are moving with
respect to other farming issues, see, e.g., Carolyn Whetzel, Regulators Issue Waste
Discharge Plan for 350 Dairies in Southern Part of State, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2489
(1999) (noting that Southern California regional water authorities propose a general
permit for dairy farms requiring development of waste management plans).
412. See supratext accompanying notes 281-83.
413. Companies subject to the TRI reporting provision reported a total release of
10.4 billion pounds of specified toxic chemicals into the environment in 1987, down
to 2.8 billion pounds in 1993. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 218, at 464-65; see
also Toxic Chemical Releases Decrease by 8.6 Percent in 1994, Report Says, 27 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 531 (1996); Toxic Chemical Releases Cut by 400 Million Pounds, Chemical
Manufacturers AssociationReports, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 501 (1996). Industry sources
believe the reporting requirement galvanized industry into voluntary pollution
reduction goals that in many cases exceed anything required by law. See CMA
Initiative Cuts Toxic Emissions 49 PercentOver Six Years, Official Says, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 11 (1996).
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yield the same release reduction incentives the TRI has yielded.
The administration and pollution reduction benefits of an
FRI program are already apparent in California, where state
pesticide application reporting requirements exceed those of
FIFRA.4" 4 Although the state's reporting data are not assembled
as accessibly as TRI data,4 5 Californians for Pesticide Reform
was able to assemble a comprehensive analytical report for the
period from 1990 to 1995"' and a series of internet-accessible
maps showing total use for different regions of the state.417 These
accomplishments demonstrate that a national FRI that fully
adopts the TRI data collection and reporting system is feasible,
not cost-prohibitive to farmers or the public, and of potentially
tremendous benefit to future policy decisions. Indeed, I believe
that no meaningful environmental regulation of farms will
happen without this critical step.
3. Taxes- Use Tax-Based Instruments to Control Agrochemical
Input Levels
Tax instruments have often been proposed as a means of
influencing pollution behavior by internalizing the social costs of
pollution in the polluter." 8 Many forms of farm pollution would
be difficult to tax in this manner because of the difficulty in
measuring pollution and the factors causing it. Runoff of
pesticides and fertilizers, however, is directly linked to chemical
application levels, which, under the information-based FRI
program outline above, would be reported for all farms and thus
amenable to measurement. If linked, the FRI and a farm
chemical tax would provide a precise and powerful means of
414. California requires filing of a pesticide use report after each use of a
restricted pesticide. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 12979 & 14011.5. For a
thorough description of California's so-called "full reporting system" for pesticide
applications, see Dep't of Pesticide Reg., Cal. Envtl. Protection Agency, Pesticide Use
Reporting: An Overview of California'sUnique Ful Reporting System (1995), available
at
(visited Apr.
21,
2000) <http://www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/dprdoc/userptng/
purhtm.htm>.
415. Access to California's pesticide use reporting databases is available at Dep't
of Pesticide Reg., Cal. Envtl. Protection Agency, DPR Databases (visited Apr. 21,

2000) <http:www.cdpr.ca.gov/dprdatabase.htm>.
416. See James Liebman, Rising Toxic Tide: Pesticide Use in California,1991-1995
(1997), available at <http://www.igc.org/panna/risingtide/textoftide.html>.
417. These maps may be viewed at Californians for Pesticide Reform, California
Pesticide
Use
Maps
(last
visited
Aug.
18,
1999)
<http: //www.igc.org/cpr/resources/maps.html>.
418. Under this Pigouvian tax model, polluters subject to taxes per unit of
pollution will reduce pollution to the point where marginal cost of abatement and the
cost of the tax are equal. See Weiner, supra note 402, at 706-08.
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influencing farm chemical inputs as well as a source of revenue
for mitigation of their effects.
C. Ford Runge has outlined such a program, which he calls
the "negative pollution tax," designed to use taxes to achieve
desired levels of chemical inputs on farms.4 19 Farms using
chemicals in excess of the desired threshold would be subject to
a progressive tax rate: farms using chemicals below the target
level would be rewarded through decreased taxes or even
subsidies.4 20 Building on Runge's proposal, the French Ministry
of the Environment recently recommended a new tax on
pesticides and fertilizers that would be imposed directly on
farmers and modulated based on each chemical's eco-toxicity.
Based on maximum acceptable levels of each chemical set on a
per-crop basis with regional adjustments, revenues from the
taxes would be refunded to farmers who use less than the
maximum ceiling, making the tax a burden only to farmers who
exceed the ceiling. Moreover, organic farmers who use no
chemicals would receive a payment equal to farmers who use
chemicals up to the ceilings, so that the tax reimbursement
scheme would not competitively disadvantage organic farming.42 1
Particularly for small farms, which contribute to the
pesticide and fertilizer pollution problem but which would be
difficult to regulate directly under a permit program, such a tax
system would provide a means of addressing behavior on every
farm in an economically and administratively efficient manner.
Moreover, if small really is "better," as small farm rhetoric
insists, small farmers will only benefit from a negative chemical
input tax. The tax, in other words, will become the arbiter of
performance. As it stands now, tax policy does little to promote
environmental protection on farms and in many states actually
promotes farm chemical usage.422 By adopting tax programs
such as those Runge has proposed and the French Ministry of
the Environment has outlined, U.S. tax policy would point farms
in the right direction for the environment.
419. Runge, supra note 6, at 213-14.
420. For similar but less detailed proposals, see David E. Ervin, Shaping a Smarter
Environmental Policy for Farming, ISSUES IN SC. & TECH., Summer 1998, at 73, 78:
Zaring, supra note 61, at 10,133-34.
421. See Lawrence J. Speer, Report Blames Agriculture for Damages to
Environment, Recommends Eco-Taxes, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 15, 1999, at A-7;
Taxes on Fertilizers.Pesticides Said to Adapt "PolluterPays" to Agriculture, Daily Env't
Rep. (BNA), Feb. 24, 1999, at A-3.
422. For example, 29 states exempt farm chemicals from state sales taxes. See
Sales Tax on Farm Chemicals Could Add $674 Million to State Revenue, Groups Say,
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), July 1, 1999. at A-8.
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4. Incentives- Build on the CRP and WRP to Implement
Incentive-BasedRetirement of Farmlandwith ImportantHabitat
Value
There is a growing consensus that farmland conservation
policy simply is not working. The regulation, information, and
tax programs proposed above assume that farmers will continue
farming- there is nothing inherent in either program that would
prompt farmers to retire land for conservation purposes. The
existing green payment programs designed to do so- principally
the CRP and WRP- are temporary and dependant upon
commodity market prices for farmer participation. Conservationbased prescriptive regulation of farming, such as the Endangered
Species Act, may achieve some conservation goals, but it
provokes farmers to oppose it legally or politically,42 or to sell
out to developers willing to weather the maze of permitting
requirements. 424 Farmland protection laws designed to thwart
developer takeovers of farms also do nothing to promote
conservation of farmland. Overall, then, existing farmland
conservation programs do not promise much in the way of
permanent conservation.
The problem is that current approaches focus on farmland
conservation
policy
and keep
environmental
objectives
subordinate to farm policy. In short, conservation policy and
farm policy must be decoupled if we are to make any significant
farmland habitat conservation gains. Thus, for example, when
New York City decided to protect its water supply watershed, it
embarked on a $10 million farmland retirement program.42 5
Federal efforts to restore the Everglades also involve significant
farmland retirement plans.42 6 The point is that where farms exist
on environmentally critical lands, targeted social investments
will permanently secure the social benefits of those lands. The
public dollars presently being cycled through the CRP and WRP
programs, however, are inefficiently deployed when not reaping
permanent land
conservation,
leaving
farmers
in the
decisionmaking role as to which lands to conserve, when, and for
how long. This funding should be diverted to permanent

423.
424.
425.

See Hamilton, supra note 405, at 300.
See supra note 335.
See $10 Million Farm Land Retirement Plan Launched to Aid New York City

Watershed, 29 Env't Rep (BNA) 937 (1998). The federal funding share for this effort,
however, is from USDA CRP funding and thus not for permanent acquisition.
426. See Drew Douglas, New Dealfor Everglades Land PurchaseWould See 60,000
FarmAcres Acquired, Daily Env't Rep (BNA), Jan. 12, 1999, at A-9.
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acquisitions of land conservation easements and fee titles that
environmental authorities (not farm policy authorities) deem
worthy of public investment.4 27 For example, researchers have
concluded that restoration of wetlands and riparian zones in the
Midwest would significantly reduce the hypoxia effects in the
Gulf of Mexico.42 8 Rather than having farmers decide when to
receive subsidies for temporary conservation of lands they select,
a land acquisition program oriented toward environmental
protection would prioritize agricultural lands that can deliver the
most benefits, secure them through permanent conservation
easements or fee title, and finance restoration efforts.
5. Trading- Use Area-Based PlanningFrameworks and MarketBased Trading Mechanisms to Address the Local FarmEnvironment Interface
The regulation, information, tax, and incentives programs
discussed above have the advantage of avoiding the more vexing
problems of farm demographics: each is amenable to
decisionmaking and policy implementation at federal levels,
though state and local participation is to be expected; the costs
of compliance for each are not inherently prohibitive; and they do
not collide head-on with small farm protection policy. But they
also leave much unaddressed, such as what to do when, even
under the FRI and chemical tax program, a particular watershed
is seriously impaired as a result of farm runoff.
Thus, there must be some core component of the
environmental law of farms that takes national policy to the local
level so as to respond to problems that operate on smaller
geographic scales and which will be most efficiently solved
through locally-based planning authority. My proposed solution
combines two different kinds of programs that have had
measurable success in other environmental law applications.
427. Some commentators warn that aggressive habitat conservation on farmland
"may be overdoing it" because "some of this land will be needed to produce more food
as U.S. and world demand grows." Ervin, supra note 420, at 76. This concern seems
unwarranted given that, notwithstanding the trend of reducing U.S. farm acreage
through conversion to other uses and habitat conservation, U.S. farms continue to
improve in productivity and efficiency, national average crop yields remain high, and
export demand has been stagnant as other countries boost their agricultural
productivity. See Outlookfor the FarmEconomy in 2000, AGRIC. OurLOOK, Apr. 2000,
at 2; The Ag Sector: Yearend Wrap-up, AGRIC. OLMrOOK, Dec. 1999, at 2-3. Moreover,
at some point U.S. domestic environmental protection must take precedence over
foreign demand for U.S. domestic food production.
428. See William J. Mitsch, Hypoxia Solution Through Wetland Restoration in
America's Breadbasket,NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 9.
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Many environmental laws use local planning areas as the
mechanism
for implementing
nationally-designed
policy
objectives.
However, to avoid the pitfalls of some of those
programs, which rely heavily on prescriptive regulation, I
propose relying primarily on pollutant trading models that have
been successfully employed in several contexts. The result is an
area-wide, market-based approach that can adapt to the diverse
geographic, economic, and political settings in which farming
takes place.
a.

Establishing Watershed-BasedPlanning Areas

Area-based planning and implementation of national
environmental policy has a long tradition in federal
environmental law. For example, the Clean Air Act's NAAQS
program establishes uniform nationwide standards but gives
states considerable discretion to allocate the burdens of
compliance through local air quality control regions.42 9 Similarly,
the Coastal Zone Management Act 430 enlists states to develop
comprehensive plans for land use and resource protection in
coastal areas in return for federal funding assistance and the
assurance that federal agencies will act consistently with the
plan.4"3 ' The Endangered Species Act has also utilized area-based
planning approaches; regional habitat conservation planning
permits allow local developing areas to balance endangered
species and development needs.43 2 Each of these federal
programs allocates field-level decisionmaking authority to local
government, while retaining strong components of national
policy setting and enforcement.
To import this theme of area-based planning and
implementation of nationally-designed policy objectives to the
environmental law of farms, a unit of area-based planning must
be selected. Given the close relationship between farming and
water pollution, the most appropriate unit from the perspective
of administration, compliance, monitoring, and enforcement will
undoubtedly be the watershed. Watershed-based area planning
is an old idea that is gaining new vitality and support in many

429.
430.
431.
432.

See supratext accompanying notes 239-43.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (1994).
See id. §§ 1455 (coastal plan) & 1456(c) (federal consistency).
See generally TIMoTHY BEATLY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED
SPECIES AND URiAN GROWTH (1994) (reviewing the background of several regional
plans adopted in urbanizing areas).
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applications.4 3 3 There are several good reasons why watersheds
are becoming the planning unit of choice to implement
environmental policy at the landscape level: they can be defined
topographically; their flows and processes have been the subject
of study for many decades; the effects of human intervention
have been well-documented; and the watershed concept is a
familiar one.43 4 Hence, it is no surprise that the Clinton
Administration's Clean Water Action Plan emphasizes watershedbased planning, EPA has a division devoted specifically to
watersheds, and the Fish and Wildlife Service uses watersheds
as the building block of its new ecosystem-based focus for
endangered species."'
The use of watersheds as the 'planning unit for the
environmental law of farms is even more compelling given the
growing importance of the Clean Water Act's total maximum
daily load program4 3 and the pressing need to integrate farms
into it.4 37 We know that the waterbody "segments" to which the

TMDL program apply are often impaired, in many cases, by
nonpoint source water pollution that begins in watersheds far
from the segment itself. Until some connection is made between
what is happening in the watersheds and what results in the
segments, the TMDL program cannot reasonably be expected to
make significant progress. Thus, although he does not focus
attention on farming specifically, Professor Robert Adler has
made a compelling case for implementing the TMDL program
through watershed-based units.4 38 Regardless of how TMDLs are
implemented, addressing pollution from farms in general will
work best when farms in a common watershed are viewed as
433. For brief histories of the use of watersheds as environmental policy planning
units, see Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L.
973 (1995); Anderson, supra note 202, at 367-83; William Goldfarb, Watershed
Management: Slogan or Solution?, 21 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 483 (1994); William E.
Taylor & Mark Gerath. The Watershed ProtectionApproach: Is the PromiseAbout to Be
Realized?, 11 NAT, RESOURCES & ENV'T 16, 18 (1996).

434. See generally J.B. Ruhl, The (Political)Science of Watershed Management in
the Ecosystem Age. 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 519 (1999) (discussing the
politics of and political framework for ecosystem management, focusing on a
watershed-based exosystem delineation standard).
435. See id. at 522.
436. See Barney Tumey, States Lack Resources to Develop TMDLs Despite Support
for New Program, EPA Told, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1026, 1027 (1999).
437. For background, see supra text accompanying notes 220-30.
438. See Adler, supra note 221, at 291-92; see also John H. Davidson,
Commentary: Using Special Water Districts to Control Nonpoint Sources of Water
Pollution, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 503 (1989) (suggesting that farm water irrigation
supply and return flow management districts established in many states could serve
as planning units and regulatory targets for control of farm water pollution).
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part of a shared problem, and managed as part of a shared
solution.43 9
b.

Implementing Watershed-BasedPollutantTrading

One advantage of dividing farms into watershed-based
planning areas is that it will allow state and local governments to
implement the permitting, tax, information, and incentives
programs discussed above. The principal purpose of the
watershed approach, however, will be to provide an efficient and
flexible medium in which farms sharing responsibility for water
pollution can share in the solution. As information about water
quality in each watershed comes on line through the TMDL
program and information about agrochemical usage becomes
available through the FRI as I have proposed, we will be able to
make more reliable linkages between farming and water quality
impairment at the watershed level. In other words, we will be
able to identify more precisely water quality impairment in a
waterbody segment attributable to farms in that segment's
watershed.
Once that component is identified and quantified, we can
begin to manage farms within the watershed as part of the TMDL
problem, without having to deal with each individual farm as part
of the TMDL program. It is important for the success of the TMDL
program that farms within a watershed that contribute to
impairment of a waterbody segment are brought under the
compliance umbrella. It is not necessary to treat each farm as if
it were an individual point source, so long as all farms are in the
solution on an equal footing with each other. This is essentially a
pollution control trading system. When put into operation along
with the FRI and negative pollution tax programs, the trading
program can be expected to promote adoption of integrated pest
management practices and other alternatives to present styles of
chemical use.4 4 °
The success story of pollutant trading systems is the Clean
Air Act's (CAA) program to allow large coal-burning electric
utilities to trade units of sulfur dioxide pollution as part of a
439. For example, the French Ministry of the Environment recently recommended
that in addition to a pesticide taxing scheme, agricultural zones with "critical
agricultural pollution problems" will require tighter regulation and funding. See
Speer, supranote 7, at A-7.
440. See, e.g., N. Seppa. Coming: A New Crop of OrganicPesticides, 156 SCI. NEWS
228 (1999) (discussing use of certain plants that emit pesticidal toxins as a natural
pest control measure); New, Nonchemical Pest Control Proposed, 284 ScI. 1249 (1999)
(discussing use of less potassium in fertilizer as weed control measure).
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national policy of reducing total industry emissions over time. A
market incentive to engage in such trading was created by the
combination of a declining ceiling of total industry emissions
coupled with annual allotments of pollutant units based on
historical usage. Facilities able to achieve emission levels lower
than their respective allotments could sell allotments in an open
market to those unable to do so. By most accounts the program
has proven a success from administration, compliance, and
pollution reduction perspectives alike. 44'
The farming scenario shares key features with the CAA's
successful sulfur dioxide trading program. The objective of the
CAA program is to control acid rain. Based on the assumption
that sulfur dioxide emissions contribute to acid rain, major
emission sources are the focus of the control program. Rather
than dictate facility-specific emission levels, the CAA program
allows facilities to respond to falling emission ceilings over time
by balancing the financial burden of new technology with the
financial burden of buying allotments. A similar program for
farms is not difficult to construct. The objective of the farm
emissions trading market is to improve water quality. The focus
on farms is based on the evidence that farm emissions impair
ambient water quality in a defined waterbody segment. The FRI
program proposed above will supply data on the usage of
fertilizer and pesticide by each farm located in the problem
watershed. Those data will allow for computation of the total
farm usage in the watershed. Regulators may then impose a total
(and declining) agrochemical application ceiling for the
watershed as a whole and individual allotments for each farm in
the watershed. Most basically, this data will enable regulators to
keep track of trades and compliance. Each individual farmer will
obtain an allotment of fertilizer and pesticide usage. Whether he
or she uses them, banks them for future use, sells them, or
purchases additional allotments will depend on that farmer's
decision whether to invest in best management practices or other
technological solutions that reduce usage, or forgo them and
play the market. As total usage in the watershed declines, total
load of pollutants attributable to farming should decline, and
water quality in the waterbody should improve. The key benefit is
that each individual farmer can maximize the efficiency of his or

441. See MARKET-BASED APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 95-136 (Richard F.
Kosobud & Jennifer M. Zimmerman eds., 1997); Frank S. Arnold, SO 2 Trading
Success Not Easily Replicable, ENVrL. F., May-June 1999, at 11.
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her response to that regulatory program."
The watershed-based chemical usage trading program thus
satisfies what many environmental economists believe are
necessary factors for pollutant trading programs to work: a large
number of sources emitting the same pollutant, each with
different abatement costs; a common "pollution-shed" in which
each source's location is not of great consequence to the outcome
so long as all sources are included in the trading regime; and a
closed market in which the total quantity of allowable pollution
being traded is capped." 3 The program is also consistent with
EPA's general policies on watershed-based effluent trading,' 4
and with the agency's recent effort to create pollutant trading
markets in connection with the water quality TMDL and anti44 5
degradation programs.

442. One key difference between the CAA's SO2 trading program and the proposed
farm chemical application program is that success under the SO2 program is
measured solely by emission reductions- acid rain reductions are not a direct
criterion in the operation of the program- whereas in the farm program success
would be measured by the reduction in total waterbody pollutant load attributable to
farms in the watershed. The farm program uses source reduction rather than
emission control to achieye that goal, that is, the reduction of chemical applications
that lead to emissions rather than the treatment or reduction of farm runoff itself. In
the event that farm runoff continues to impair a waterbody even after the farms in
the watershed have reduced total applications below the prescribed ceiling, the
options would be to lower the ceiling further or to impose emission control measures
on farms in the watershed in the form of best management practices. The objective of
the trading program is to avoid prescriptive regulation of farming practies to the
extent practicable. At some point, farmers in the watershed may view the marginal
costs of emission control as less than the marginal costs of further reductions in the
chemical application ceilings. When farmers in the watershed agree that that point
has been reached, they ought to be in a position as a group to choose emission
controls over further reductions in the application ceiling.
443. See Arnold, supra note 441, at 11; Kurt Stephenson et al., Toward an
Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance Trading System: Identifying the
Statutory and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation, 5 EvrL. LAW. 775 (1999). For
additional legal commentary on watershed-based pollution trading programs, see
Elise Fulstone, Effluent Trading: Legal Constraintson the Implementation of MarketBased Effluent Trading Programs Under the Clean Water Act, 1 ENVrL. LAW. 459
(1995); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a
Placefor PollutantTrading?, 23 COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 137 11998).
444. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR
WATERSHED-BASED TRADING (1996). EPA's focus in the watershed context has been on
trading the costs of pollution control measures rather than trading units of pollution
as is done in the SO program. See id. at xiii-xiv. Nevertheless, EPA appears fully
committed to the policy of developing trading frameworks that operate on watershed
levels.
445. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,058, 46,068-70 (1999) ("EPA is seeking to establish a
market for pollutant trading, in the hopes of creating more effective and efficient
mechanisms for restoring water quality.").
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B.

PeripheralProblems

I have designed the proposed environmental law for farms
with the key demographic constraints of farming in mind.
Prescriptive, centrally-planned regulation is kept to a minimum,
targeted mainly at true agro-industrial operations. The FRI is an
information-based measure applied to all farms to increase
public awareness of farm chemical usage and to facilitate the tax
and trading programs. The agrochemical tax program applies an
economic incentive solution to the problem of pesticide and
fertilizer usage. The watershed-based trading program allows for
focus on local water quality problem areas through a marketbased instrument that maximizes overall efficiency. And the
incentive program uses federal funding to acquire valuable
conservation habitat instead of attempting to regulate its use.
Overall, this package of instruments balances national authority
with local authority, big farm with small farm, and prescriptive
controls with flexible controls in a way that responds to the
realities of the farm industry.
Nevertheless, this reform package cannot work alone. A
separate federal environmental law for farms does not mean
state and local initiatives are unwelcome or unnecessary. Indeed,
the core programs this Article proposes do not address all of the
harms that farms cause, much less offer solutions for them.
Water resource depletion, water salinization, soil erosion, and air
pollution remain unsettled. Because they are profoundly local in
nature, strong initiatives from the states will be needed on these
fronts. The proposed regulatory instruments are not intended to
thwart other promising incentive-based programs." 6 Indeed, the
watershed-based planning units I propose may provide a suitable
planning base for local efforts.
A separate federal environmental law for farms also does not
mean that reform of federal agricultural and environmental
policy in general is unnecessary. Key additional changes will be
needed if the environmental law of farms is to operate to its
fullest potential. First and foremost, farm commodities subsidies
and income subsidies must be reformed to support the objectives
of the environmental program. 4 47 Second, upstream and
downstream industries should be enlisted to facilitate the farm-

446. See also ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO CONTROL WATER

FUND, PLOWING NEW GROUND: USING
POLLUTION FROM AGRICULTURE (1994)

(describing other possible economic incentives, including trading mechanisms).
447. For background, see supra text accompanying notes 341-55.
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based environmental program."' Finally, international trade
policy must be changed to eliminate the concern that further
financial burdens on U.S. farmers will put them at competitive
449
disadvantages with less environmentally responsible countries.
Each of these initiatives involves major challenges, and they
merit more complete coverage at a later time. But none of them
is worth worrying about until we build the core of a federal
environmental law for farms.
CONCLUSION

I do not envy American farmers. They face dire economic
circumstances, criticism from labor rights activists, animal
rights activists, neighborhood activists, environmental activists,
and an increasing industrialization and concentration of their
livelihood that threatens their cherished ideals. Nevertheless, in
addition to needing the food that farms produce, I also need the
water, air, and land they pollute. The anti-law of farms and the
environment has essentially left the balance between food and
pollution up to farmers. It is no longer credible to suggest they
have used that discretion wisely.
Because the debate about whether to forge a positive
environmental law of farming needs to be put to rest once and
for all, I have documented the environmental harms farms cause
and the environmental safe harbors they enjoy. Based on that
evidence, it is reasonable to ask farmers to leave their safe
harbor and think unconventionally about farming and
448.

For example, some states are experimenting with measures that place

restrictions on how food processing companies deal with their farm feedlot
contractors.
See, e.g., New NPDES Permit Condition to Hold Chicken Producers
Accountable for Waste, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 22, 1998, at A-2. Maryland

proposes requiring producers to buy chickens only from growers who have an
approved comprehensive nutrient management plan required by state law for any
farm that uses animal manure or sludge as a fertilizer. See id. EPA recently has

suggested that it will move in that direction with its CAFO regulations, or encourage
states to do so generally. See GUIDANCE MANUAL AND EXAMPLE NPDES PERMrr FOR
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, supra note 309, at 2-10; Susan
Bruninga, Animal Waste Strategy to Recognize State Programs, Hold Corporations
Liable, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2225 (1998) (discussing possible federal proposals to

make processors co-permittees with CAFOs under NPDES program).
449. Trade liberalization and environmental protection have collided numerous
times in the international arena; concerns that environmental standards will be used
as non-tariff import barriers have made it increasingly difficult for a nation to Impose
strong domestic environmental responsibilities on its industries without exposing
them to competitive disadvantages in international markets. See Steve Charnowitz
Free Trade, FairTrade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459
(1994); Thomas Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: IrreconcilableConflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992).
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environmental policy.
I have sought to do so in this Article. Conventional,
rigidly-implemented
and
centrally-planned
prescriptive,
environmental regulation is appropriate for only a small slice of
the farm industry but can achieve significant benefits when
applied to that narrow sector. For the rest of farming, the
combination of information, tax, incentive, and trading programs
I propose offers farmers opportunities to abate pollution flexibly
and efficiently, rather than at the direction of bureaucrats. The
question is whether the farm industry will use its substantial
political clout to keep the debate at the "whether to" level, a
battle they cannot win in the long run, or take action now in the
"how to" debate to shape a positive environmental law of farming
they can live with well into the future.
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